Security, Fraud Detection, and Fraud Mitigation in Device-Assisted Services Systems

ABSTRACT

Secure architectures and methods for improving the security of mobile devices are disclosed. Also disclosed are apparatuses and methods to detect and mitigate fraud in device-assisted services implementations.

BACKGROUND

As the computing power of mobile end-user devices has increased, mobiledevices have become capable of sending and receiving increasing amountsof data. In addition to e-mail and text messages, many of today's mobiledevices can support a variety of applications that send large quantitiesof information to and from end users. For example, in addition tosending e-mail and text messages, many of today's mobile devices candeliver news, weather, sports, maps, social networking information,music, videos, high-resolution photographs, documents, presentations,and other kinds of information.

The ability of mobile devices to send and receive such a wide varietyand large quantity of data has stressed wireless access networkbandwidth capabilities. As a result, network operators are eithereliminating service plans with unlimited data usage, or they areincreasing the price of unlimited service plans so that such plans arenot attractive to most consumers. Consequently, many users of mobileend-user devices subscribe to service plans that include only a limitedamount of data per fixed time period (e.g., per month). Because today'smobile end-user devices can access (e.g., send or receive) large amountsof information, there is a potential for a user of a mobile device toexceed his or her data plan allowance without realizing it. It is wellknown that such “overages” in data usage can be very expensive becausethe billing rate for data usage exceeding the contracted service planamount is often significantly higher than the billing rate under theservice plan.

Because of their computing capabilities, many of today's mobile end-userdevices can also participate in the implementation and enforcement ofservice policies associated with access network service plans, such ascharging, control, and notification policies. Device-assisted services(DAS) have been described in the many prior applications listed in the“Cross Reference to Related Applications” section of this document. Whenend-user devices participate in implementing and enforcing accessnetwork policies, there is a potential for device users to attempt to,or to successfully, spoof or hack end-user device components tofraudulently obtain access to data services at incorrect, lower serviceusage billing rates. Likewise, highly motivated users might try to gainaccess to network elements that perform functions related to servicepolicy implementation or enforcement associated with the end-userdevice's data usage.

Thus, there is a need to secure software and hardware, in both end-userdevices and in network elements, involved in the provision ofdevice-assisted services. In addition, there is a need to detect andmitigate fraudulent or potentially fraudulent activities.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention, in accordance with one or more variousembodiments, is described in detail with reference to the followingfigures. The drawings are provided for purposes of illustration only andmerely depict typical or example embodiments of the invention. Thesedrawings are provided to facilitate the reader's understanding of theinvention and shall not be considered limiting of the breadth, scope, orapplicability of the invention. It should be noted that for clarity andease of illustration these drawings are not necessarily made to scale.

FIG. 1 illustrates the various components of a device-assisted services(DAS) implementation in accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example embodiment of a device-based serviceprocessor system in communication with a network-based servicecontroller system.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example embodiment of functional elements for anetwork access service policy implementation.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example embodiment of a secure service controllerarchitecture for DAS systems.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example embodiment of a secure service controllerarchitecture for DAS systems.

FIG. 6 illustrates an example embodiment of a secure service controllerarchitecture for DAS systems.

FIG. 7 illustrates communications within an applications security zonein accordance with some embodiments.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example embodiment that provides geo-redundancy.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controller portalfunction.

FIG. 10 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controller filetransfer function.

FIG. 11 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controllergateway function.

FIG. 12 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controllercredentialing function.

FIG. 13 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controller EAIserver that supports various communication paths.

FIG. 14 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controller EAIserver that supports various communication paths.

FIG. 15 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controller EAIserver that supports various communication paths.

FIG. 16 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controller EAIserver that supports various communication paths.

FIG. 17 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controller fraudserver.

FIG. 18 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controllerreconciliation server.

FIG. 19 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controllermessage bus.

FIG. 20 illustrates an example embodiment that includes two datacenters.

FIG. 21 illustrates a set of steps an end-user device performs to obtaina credential with a service controller in accordance with someembodiments.

FIG. 22 illustrates a set of steps a service controller performs toprovide a credential to a service processor in accordance with someembodiments.

FIG. 23 illustrates an procedure a service controller performs toallocate credentials to multiple end-user devices in accordance withsome embodiments.

FIG. 24 illustrates an example embodiment of a process to start or stopa data session with SGSN notification.

FIG. 25 illustrates an example embodiment of a process to start or stopa data session with GGSN notification.

FIG. 26 illustrates an example embodiment of a process to start or stopa data session when a AAA or RADIUS server provides start/stopaccounting in a GSM/GPRS core data network.

FIG. 27 illustrates an example embodiment of a process to start or stopa data session when an OCS provides start/stop accounting in a GSM/GPRScore data network.

FIG. 28 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that averifying software component on an end-user device may perform to verifythe integrity of another software component on the end-user device.

FIG. 29 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that ato-be-verified software component can perform in response to theprocedure illustrated in FIG. 28 .

FIG. 30 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure to determinewhether to allow a modification, update, or replacement of an softwareprogram installed on an end-user device.

FIG. 31 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that anend-user device can use to validate that an application installed on theend-user device is authentic.

FIG. 32 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that a servicecontroller can use to validate that an application installed on anend-user device is authentic.

FIG. 33 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that a servicecontroller can use to validate that an application installed on anend-user device is authentic.

FIG. 34 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that anend-user device can use to validate that an application installed on theend-user device is authentic.

FIG. 35 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that a servicecontroller can use to validate that an application installed on anend-user device is authentic.

FIG. 36 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that anend-user device can use to validate that an application installed on theend-user device is authentic.

FIG. 37 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that a servicecontroller can use to validate that an application installed on anend-user device is authentic.

FIG. 38 illustrates an example embodiment of an end-user device forimplementing access network policy specific to a device applicationprogram.

FIG. 39 illustrates an example embodiment wherein an end-user device iscapable of connecting to the Internet through more than one accessnetwork.

FIG. 40 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that a servicecontroller may use to verify a software component on an end-user devicebased on a verification message from the end-user device.

FIG. 41 illustrates an example embodiment of a layered approach that aservice controller can use to assess the likelihood that an end-userdevice is behaving fraudulently.

FIG. 42 illustrates a layered approach to fraud detection in accordancewith some embodiments.

FIG. 43 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controllerreconciliation processing procedure that may be used to detect fraudusing information from and end-user device and information from a secondsource.

FIG. 44 illustrates an example embodiment with network system elementsthat can be included in a service controller system to facilitate a DASimplementation and the flow of information between those elements.

FIG. 45 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure to detect whena user of an end-user device attempts to alter the end-user device's useof a time-based service plan by modifying the time setting on end-userdevice.

FIG. 46 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure to detect whena user of an end-user device attempts to alter the end-user device's useof a time-based service plan by modifying the time zone setting onend-user device.

FIG. 47 illustrates a fraud detection approach in accordance with someembodiments.

FIG. 48 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that arule-based detection element may use to apply rules to detect fraud.

FIG. 49 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that a staticanalysis element may use to determine fraud based on a statisticalmodel.

FIG. 50 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that atime-series analysis element may use to determine fraud based on atime-series model.

FIG. 51 illustrates an example embodiment of a fraud-detection systemthat supports rule-based fraud detection and the application ofstatistical or time-series models in accordance with some embodiments.

SUMMARY

According to various embodiments, systems and methods are provided forsecuring device-assisted services (DAS) systems and for detecting andmitigating fraud in such systems.

In some embodiments, an end-user device comprises one or more modems toallow communications over a wireless access network, memory configuredto store an application-specific network access policy to be appliedwhen a particular application program attempts to communicate orsuccessfully communicates over the wireless access network, and one ormore device agents configured to detect attempted or successful activityby the particular application program and to apply theapplication-specific network access policy to the communicationactivity.

In some embodiments, the one or more device agents are configured todetect attempted or successful activity by the particular applicationprogram by flow-tagging a data flow associated with the particularapplication program, associating the flow tag with the applicationidentifier, and applying the application-specific network access policyto the flow-tagged data flow.

In some embodiments, an end-user device comprises one or more modems toallow communications over a wireless access network, memory configuredto store an application-specific network access policy to be appliedwhen a particular application program attempts to communicate orsuccessfully communicates over the wireless access network, and one ormore device agents configured to use an application programminginterface (API) to arrange an application setting to assist inimplementing the application-specific network access policy.

In some embodiments, the application-specific network access policycomprises a control policy configured to assist in controllingtransmissions or receptions over the wireless access network that areassociated with the application program. In some embodiments, theapplication-specific network access policy comprises a charging policyconfigured to assist in accounting for transmissions or receptions overthe wireless access network that are associated with the applicationprogram. In some embodiments, the end-user device has a user interface,and the application-specific network access policy comprises anotification policy configured to assist in presenting, through the userinterface, a notification message, such as, for example: an offer or anadvertisement, information about a network type (e.g., a home network, aroaming network, a cellular network, a wireless wide-area network(WWAN), a wireless local area network (WLAN), a wireless personal areanetwork (WPAN), a 2G network, a 3G network, a 4G network, a WiMAXnetwork, an Ethernet network, a DSL network, a DOCSIS network, a cablenetwork, a WiFi network, etc.), an indication of an amount or cost ofdata usage associated with the application program, an indication of aprojected amount or a projected cost of data usage associated with theapplication program (e.g., a projection based on a past or historicaldata usage associated with the application program), an indication of anamount or cost of data usage associated with the application programduring a particular period of time (possibly user-configured oruser-selected), an indication that an amount or cost of data usageassociated with the application satisfies a condition relative to alimit setting (e.g., exceeds a threshold, meets a threshold, is lessthan a threshold, etc.), an indication of an amount or cost ofbackground data usage by the application program, etc. In someembodiments, the policy is associated with an application identifier(e.g., a credential associated with the application, possibly stored onthe end-user device). In some embodiments, the application program issecured by an application credential (which may be the applicationidentifier). In some embodiments, the one or more device agents arefurther configured to prevent modifications, updates, or replacements ofthe application program unless software purporting to be a modification,update, or replacement of the application program is associated with acredential that is consistent with (e.g., matches) the applicationcredential.

In some embodiments, at least one of the one or more device agents issecured by an agent credential, and one of the one or more device agentsis configured to prevent modifications, updates, or replacements of theat least one of the one or more device agents unless software purportingto be a modification, update, or replacement of the at least one of theone or more device agents is associated with a credential that isconsistent with (e.g., matches) the agent credential.

In some embodiments, the agent credential comprises one or more of agentkernel software present with a proper signature, certificate, or hashresult; agent framework software present with a proper signature,certificate, or hash result; and agent application software present witha proper signature, certificate, or hash result.

In some embodiments, the end-user device is further secured byconfiguring the one or more device agents to perform one or more of thefollowing checks: determining if a hosts file is present and properlyconfigured; determining if a service processor on the end-user devicesuccessfully completed an authentication procedure with a servicecontroller in the network; determining if the end-user device has beenrooted.

In some embodiments, a network system is configured to provide accessnetwork services to an end-user device, and the end-user device isresponsible for implementing an access network policy. In someembodiments, the network system is configured to obtain a trustedmeasure of access network usage by the end-user device and to use thetrusted measure to confirm that the end-user device is properlyimplementing the access network policy, where the trusted measure isobtained from a network element, from a secure processor on the end-userdevice, or from a trusted third party.

In some embodiments, the network system is configured to apply amulti-tiered policy verification process comprising at least two of thefollowing policy verification steps, performed in any order: (a)determining if the end-user device is failing to send service usagereports, even though the network system is receiving trusted reports ofthe end-user device's service usage; (b) comparing a trusted serviceusage measure to a limit or range of usage expected if the end-userdevice is properly implementing the access network policy; (c) comparinga trusted service usage measure to a non-secure (e.g., device-generated)usage measure to determine if the difference between the two usagemeasures is within a specified tolerance; (d) comparing a non-secure(e.g., device-based) service usage measure to a limit or range of usageexpected if the end-user device is properly implementing the accessnetwork policy; (e) comparing a classification of the end-user device'susage to a limit or range of usage expected if the end-user device isproperly implementing the access network policy; (f) comparing anaggregation of two or more classifications of the end-user device'susage to an aggregate limit on usage to determine if the differencebetween the two measures is within a specified tolerance; (g) comparinga trusted measure of usage of a class (e.g., an application, a group ofapplications, a network destination, a group of network destinations,etc.) to a limit or range of usage expected if the end-user device isproperly implementing the access network policy; (h) comparing a trustedmeasure of usage of a class (e.g., an application, a group ofapplications, a network destination, a group of network destinations,etc.) to a non-secure (e.g., device-based) measure of usage of the sameclass to determine if the difference between the two measures is withina specified tolerance; (i) comparing a statistical characterization ofusage by a population of end-user devices to a trusted measure of theend-user device's service usage to determine if the difference betweenthe two measures is within a specified tolerance; (j) comparing astatistical characterization of usage of a particular class (e.g., anapplication, a group of applications, a network destination, a group ofnetwork destinations, etc.) by a population of end-user devices to atrusted measure of the end-user device's usage of that same class todetermine if the difference between the two measures is within aspecified tolerance; (k) comparing a statistical characterization ofusage by a population of end-user devices to a non-secure measure of theend-user device's service usage to determine if the difference betweenthe two measures is within a specified tolerance; (1) comparing astatistical characterization of usage of a class (e.g., an application,a group of applications, a network destination, a group of networkdestinations, etc.) to a non-secure (e.g., device-based) measure ofusage of the same class to determine if the difference between the twomeasures is within a specified tolerance; (m) comparing detailed class(e.g., an application, a group of applications, a network destination, agroup of network destinations, etc.) usage information in a usage report(trusted or non-secure) to determine whether the access network policyallows the classified activity; (n) determining whether a serviceprocessor on the end-user device successfully authenticated with aservice controller in the network; (o) determining whether the end-userdevice is sending reports to a network element in an expected manner;(p) determining whether usage of one or more classes (e.g., anapplication, a group of applications, a network destination, a group ofnetwork destinations, etc.) is consistently slightly under particularlimits that would indicate likely fraud on the part of the end-userdevice; (q) comparing an amount or percentage of unknown or unclassifieddata usage allocated by the end-user device to a particular class to anexpected amount or percentage of unknown or unclassified data usage,where the expected amount or percentage is determined using informationfrom a trusted source (e.g., a web crawler, domain object model, etc.).

In some embodiments, the result of one or more of the policyverification steps is a pass/fail criterion, and the overall passcriterion is a number of failures less than a limit on the number offailures. In some embodiments, the result of one or more of the policyverification steps is a quantized value associated with an errorlikelihood or non-error likelihood, and the overall fail/pass criterionis based on a combination of one or more quantized values. In someembodiments, a policy implementation error action is taken if an erroroccurs, where the error action comprises one or more of: flagging theend-user device or the user for further evaluation; charging for theend-user device's usage at a pre-defined rate associated with an errorcondition; notifying the user of the end-user device; notifying anetwork or system administrator; quarantining the end-user device or auser access to the access network; suspending the end-user device oruser's access to the access network.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The invention can be implemented in numerous ways, including as aprocess; an apparatus; a system; a composition of matter; a computerprogram product embodied on a computer readable storage medium; and/or aprocessor, such as a processor configured to execute instructions storedon and/or provided by a memory coupled to the processor. In thisspecification, these implementations, or any other form that theinvention may take, may be referred to as techniques. In general, theorder of the steps of disclosed processes may be altered within thescope of the invention. Unless stated otherwise, a component such as aprocessor or a memory described as being configured to perform a taskmay be implemented as a general component that is temporarily configuredto perform the task at a given time or a specific component that ismanufactured to perform the task. As used herein, the term “processor”refers to one or more devices, circuits, and/or processing coresconfigured to process data, such as computer program instructions.

A detailed description of one or more embodiments of the invention isprovided below along with accompanying figures that illustrate theprinciples of the invention. The invention is described in connectionwith such embodiments, but the invention is not limited to anyembodiment. The scope of the invention is limited only by the claims andthe invention encompasses numerous alternatives, modifications andequivalents. Numerous specific details are set forth in the followingdescription in order to provide a thorough understanding of theinvention. These details are provided for the purpose of example and theinvention may be practiced according to the claims without some or allof these specific details. For the purpose of clarity, technicalmaterial that is known in the technical fields related to the inventionhas not been described in detail so that the invention is notunnecessarily obscured.

FIG. 1 illustrates, at a high level, the various components of adevice-assisted services (DAS) implementation in accordance with someembodiments. Service processor 115 resides on an end-user device (notshown) and communicates with service controller 122, which, in theembodiment of Figure A, resides in the cloud. As will be describedbelow, service processor 115 and service controller 122 communicate overan access network to facilitate providing device-assisted services.

As illustrated in the embodiment of Figure A, service controller 122communicates with existing network, information technology (IT), andbilling infrastructure 14 of the network operator in various ways thatare described herein and in the applications listed in the section“Cross Reference to Related Applications.” Service design center 20provides an interface that allows operator personnel or other authorizedpersons to configure service plan information for end-user devices.Service design center 20 communicates with service controller 122, whichin turn assists in provisioning service plans by communicating withexisting network, IT, and billing infrastructure 14 and serviceprocessor 115.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example embodiment of a device-based serviceprocessor system in communication with a network-based servicecontroller system. End-user device 100 includes service processor 115.Service processor 115 is responsible for identifying access networkcommunication activity by end-user device 100 and applying an accessservice policy to govern the communication activity. The communicationactivity in general comprises end-user device 100's use of or attempteduse of access network 10 for data communications to or from, forexample, Internet 12.

In some embodiments, service processor 115 assists in classifyingservice usage by end-user device 100 into sub-categories (e.g., classes)for the purpose of assisting in usage accounting policy enforcement,access control policy enforcement, applying service usage limits, ornotification policy enforcement that differs according to the category(or class). In some embodiments, the classification can be for one ormore device applications (e.g., a class comprises one or moreapplication programs). In some embodiments the classification can be forone or more network destinations (e.g., a class comprises one or morenetwork destinations). In some embodiments the classification can be forone or more network types (e.g., a class comprises one or more networktypes). In some embodiments a classification of service usage referredto as a sponsored service (or an ambient service) can be performed tofacilitate allocating access network costs, in whole or in part,associated with the sponsored service to a service sponsor, the servicesponsor being an entity other than the user or subscriber associatedwith end-user device 100.

In some embodiments, the communication activity is classified forpurposes of access policy enforcement by service processor 115, or by anetwork element, based on one or more network destinations associatedwith the communication activity, such as, for example, a collection ofone or more of: a network address, a domain, a URL, a website, a WAPsite, a server configured to communicate with a device application, acontent distribution site, a network tunnel or tunnel server (such as,for example, a VPN, APN, or other tunnel), a network gateway, or a proxyserver. In some embodiments, the communications activity is classifiedfor the purposes of network access policy enforcement by serviceprocessor 115 or by a network element based on a collection of one ormore device application programs or device operating system (OS)components participating in the communications activity.

Service processor 115 comprises one or more software or firmwareprograms that execute on end-user device 100. To aid in disclosure ofthe invention, service processor 115 is explained using the functionalelements or agents shown in FIG. 2 . The specific allocation offunctional elements within service processor 115 can take many forms,and the form presented in FIG. 2 is intended to illustrate basicelements but is not intended to be an exhaustive or limiting descriptionof possible functional breakdowns of service processor 115.

FIG. 2 shows several device application programs. TCP application 1604,IP application 1605, and voice application 1602 are shown in FIG. 2 ,but other application programs may be present in addition or instead.Each of these applications is in general initiated by user interactionwith end-user device 100, generally through user interface 1697. In theembodiment of FIG. 2 , data path processing elements of serviceprocessor 115 include application interface agent 1693, policyimplementation agent 1690, modem selection and control 1811, and severalaccess network modem drivers (dial/DSL modem driver 1831, Ethernet modemdriver 1815, WPAN modem driver 1814, WLAN modem driver 1813, and WWANmodem driver 1812).

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 monitors deviceapplication-layer communication activity to identify attempted orsuccessful access network communication activity. In some embodiments,application interface agent 1693 monitors application layer accessnetwork communication activity to identify and classify the accessnetwork communication activity. In some embodiments, the monitoring ofaccess network communication activity by application interface agent1693 is reported to service monitor agent 1696. In some embodiments, themonitoring of access communications activity by application interfaceagent 1693 comprises classifying data traffic flows based on inspectionand characterization of which application (e.g., TCP application 1604,IP application 1605, voice application 1602, or any other application onend-user device 100) each flow is associated with. In some embodiments,the monitoring of access communications activity by applicationinterface agent 1693 comprises classifying data traffic flows based oninspection and characterization of which network destination each flowis associated with.

In some embodiments, service monitor agent 1696, application interfaceagent 1693, and/or other agents implement virtual traffic tagging bytracking or tracing packet flows through various communication stackformatting, processing and encryption steps, and providing the virtualtag information to the various agents that monitor, control, shape,throttle or otherwise observe, manipulate or modify the traffic. Thistagging approach is referred to herein as virtual tagging, because thereis not a literal data flow, traffic flow or packet tag that is attachedto flows or packets, and the book-keeping to tag the packet is donethrough tracking or tracing the flow or packet through the stackinstead.

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 and/or otheragents identify a traffic flow, associate it with a service usageactivity and cause a literal tag to be attached to the traffic orpackets associated with the activity. This tagging approach is referredto herein as literal tagging. There are various advantages to both thevirtual tagging and the literal tagging approaches. For example, it canbe preferable in some embodiments to reduce the inter-agentcommunication required to track or trace a packet through the stackprocessing by assigning a literal tag so that each flow or packet hasits own activity association embedded in the data. As another example,it can be preferable in some embodiments to re-use portions of standardcommunication stack software or components, enhancing the verifiabletraffic control or service control capabilities of the standard stack byinserting additional processing steps associated with the variousservice agents and monitoring points rather than re-writing the entirestack to correctly process literal tagging information, and in suchcases, a virtual tagging scheme may be desired. As yet another example,some standard communication stacks provide for unused, unspecified orotherwise available bit fields in a packet frame or flow, and theseunused, unspecified or otherwise available bit fields can be used toliterally tag traffic without the need to re-write all of the standardcommunication stack software, with only the portions of the stack thatare added to enhance the verifiable traffic control or service controlcapabilities of the standard stack needing to decode and use the literaltagging information encapsulated in the available bit fields. In thecase of literal tagging, in some embodiments, the tags are removed priorto passing the packets or flows to the network or to the applicationsutilizing the stack. In some embodiments, the manner in which thevirtual or literal tagging is implemented can be developed into acommunication standard specification so that various device or serviceproduct developers can independently develop the communication stackand/or service processor 115 hardware and/or software in a manner thatis compatible with service controller 122 specifications and theproducts of other device or service product developers.

In some embodiments, an agent or combination of agents uses tags toassist in applying a policy (e.g., a notification, charging, or controlpolicy) when an application program on end-user device 100 initiatescommunications or successfully communicates over an access network. Insome such embodiments, the agent or combination of agents determineswhen an application program initiates or attempts to initiate acommunication over the first wireless access network by: identifying adata flow comprising one or more related data transfers or attempteddata transfers associated with the application program; assigning a flowtag to the data flow, where the flow tag is a traffic flow identifier;monitoring an access network service usage or attempted service usageassociated with the flow tag; and, after identifying the data flow,applying the policy to the first wireless access network service usageor attempted service usage associated with the flow tag. As will beappreciated by a person having ordinary skill in the art, the steps ofidentifying, assigning, and monitoring can occur in any order.

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 applies,implements, or enforces service usage accounting or charging policy forapplication layer access network communication activity. In someembodiments, this policy implementation function is used to apply,implement, or enforce service usage accounting or charging policy thatvaries with the classification of the access communication activity asdiscussed above.

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 implements trafficcontrol policy for application layer access network communicationactivity. In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693implements application-level control policy to allow an application toexecute on end-user device 100 or to prevent an application fromexecuting. In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693implements notification policy for application layer access networkcommunication activity.

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 providesapplications with an access network service application interface sothat the application (e.g., TCP application 1604, IP application 1605,voice application 1602, etc.) can request or provision special accessnetwork service permissions such as, for example, an access networkquality-of-service (QoS) channel class, a background service usageclass, a service usage accounting particular to an application orapplication class, or a sponsored service usage particular to anapplication or application class, wherein a sponsor entity other than auser of the end-user device subsidizes an access network usage costassociated with the application or application class. In suchembodiments, application interface agent 1693 can communicate with acounterpart in the access network to provide for provisioning of thespecial access network service permissions for a particular applicationor class of applications.

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 interacts withapplication programs (e.g., TCP application 1604, IP application 1605,voice application 1602, or another application on end-user device 100)to arrange application settings to aid in implementing application-levelservice policy implementation or billing. In some embodiments,application interface agent 1693 arranges an application setting byposting, sending, or otherwise communicating a message comprising asetting configuration. In some embodiments, the application settingassists in traffic control (e.g., allow, block, throttle, rate-limit,transmit on a particular network, background traffic control, etc.),notification (e.g., to a user of end-user device 100, to a networkelement such as service controller 122, etc.), or charging (e.g., toaccount for usage of access network resources by end-user device 100).

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 interacts with anapplication program stored on end-user device 100 and configured toaccess a data service over an access network. In some such embodiments,the application program has an associated policy (e.g., a notification[e.g., of an amount or cost of access network usage associated with theapplication program, an amount or cost of access network usageassociated with the application program over a particular (possiblyuser-selected) period of time, background or foreground data usageinformation, etc.], charging, or control policy) to be applied when theapplication program initiates or attempts to initiate communicationsover the first access network, and application interface agent 1693 (oranother agent on end-user device 100) assists in policy implementationby arranging a setting of the application program by posting, sending,or otherwise communicating the setting to the application program.

In some embodiments, one or more agents on end-user device 100 areconfigured to prevent unauthorized modifications, updates, orreplacements of the application software by: detecting an attemptedinstallation of update software on end-user device 100, where the updatesoftware purports to be a modification, update, or replacement of theapplication program; obtaining a credential associated with theapplication program; obtaining a credential associated with the updatesoftware; and allowing the update software to be installed on end-userdevice 100 if the credential associated with the purported modification,update, or replacement of the application program matches the credentialassociated with the application program.

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 is associated withor comprises a credential, and another agent on end-user device 100(e.g., access control integrity agent 1694, policy control agent 1692,etc.) is configured to prevent unauthorized modifications, updates, orreplacements of application interface agent 1693. In some embodiments,the other agent detects an attempted installation of software purportingto be a modification, update, or replacement of application interfaceagent 1693, obtains the credential associated with application interfaceagent 1693, obtains a credential associated with the software purportingto be a modification, update, or replacement of application interfaceagent 1693, and allows the software to be installed on end-user device100 if the credential associated with the software matches thecredential associated with application interface agent 1693.

In some embodiments, application interface agent 1693 intercepts certainapplication traffic to modify traffic application layer parameters, suchas email file transfer options or browser headers. In some embodiments,application interface agent 1693 transmits or receives a service usagetest element to aid in verifying service policy implementation, servicemonitoring or service billing. In some embodiments, applicationinterface agent 1693 performs a transaction billing intercept functionto aid the billing agent 1695 in transaction billing. In someembodiments, application interface agent 1693 transmits or receives abilling test element to aid in verifying transaction billing or servicebilling.

In some embodiments, policy implementation agent 1690 monitors devicenetwork traffic layer communication activity to identify attempted orsuccessful access network communication activity. In some embodiments,policy implementation agent 1690 monitors network traffic layercommunication activity to identify and classify the access communicationactivity. In some embodiments, the monitoring of access networkcommunications activity by policy implementation agent 1690 is reportedto service monitor agent 1696. Traffic layer communication monitoringcan be conducted at one or more layers between the application layer(generally referred to as layer 7) and the access network media accesscontrol layer (generally referred to as layer 2). In some embodiments,traffic layer communication monitoring comprises classifying datatraffic flows based on inspection and characterization of layer 7communication traffic parameters (for example, one or more ofapplication program identifier or credential, network destinationclassifiers, communication protocol parameters, communication contentclassifiers, or secure communication protocol parameters such as SSL orTLS connection parameters) and associating the classification with oneor more resulting traffic flows, socket flows, or packet flows. In someembodiments, traffic layer communication monitoring comprisesclassifying data traffic flows based on inspection and characterizationof layer 4 communication traffic parameters such as, for example, socketflow tuples. In some embodiments, traffic layer communication monitoringcomprises classifying data traffic flows based on inspection andcharacterization of layer 3 communication traffic parameters (forexample, IP addresses). In some embodiments, traffic layer communicationmonitoring comprises classifying data traffic flows based on inspectionand characterization of VPN tunnel parameters, APN tunnel parameters,etc.

In some embodiments, policy implementation agent 1690 applies,implements, or enforces access network policy at one or more of thecommunications traffic layers of a device operating system. As discussedabove, in some embodiments access network policy can be applied at oneor more traffic layers. Traffic layer policy enforcement can be appliedat any layer(s) between and including the application layer (generallyreferred to as layer 7) and the access network media access controllayer (generally referred to as layer 2).

In some embodiments, communications traffic layer policy applicationcomprises policy applied to a classification of data traffic flows basedon inspection and characterization of layer 7 communication trafficparameters (for example, one or more of application program identifieror credential, network destination classifiers, communication protocolparameters, communication content classifiers, or secure communicationprotocol parameters such as SSL or TLS connection parameters) andassociating the classification with one or more resulting traffic flows,socket flows, or packet flows. In some embodiments, communicationstraffic layer policy application comprises policy applied to aclassification of data traffic flows based on inspection andcharacterization of layer 4 communication traffic parameters such as,for example, socket flow tuples. In some embodiments, communicationstraffic layer policy application comprises policy applied to aclassification of data traffic flows based on inspection andcharacterization of layer 3 communication traffic parameters (e.g., IPaddresses). In some embodiments, communications traffic layer policyapplication comprises policy applied to a classification of data trafficflows based on inspection and characterization of VPN tunnel parameters,APN tunnel parameters, etc.

Connection manager 1804 determines which access network the device isconnected to and provides this information to other agents on end-userdevice 100. In some embodiments, connection manager 1804 also chooses anetwork connection based on available network connections and a networkselection policy instruction from policy control agent 1692.

Service monitor agent 1696 is responsible for accounting and reportingthe access network service usage for end-user device 100. In someembodiments, the service monitoring (e.g., a measure of the accessnetwork service usage) is reported to a user of end-user device 100. Insome embodiments, the service monitoring is reported to a networkelement. In some embodiments, the access network service usage isclassified by an application breakdown indicating the amount of serviceusage attributed to one or more applications. In some embodiments, theaccess network service usage is classified by a network destination ornetwork service breakdown indicating the amount of service usageattributed to one or more network destinations or network services. Insome embodiments, the access network service usage is classified by anetwork type breakdown indicating the amount of service usage attributedto one or more network types. In some embodiments, the network typebreakdown includes a roaming network. In some embodiments, the networktype breakdown includes a cellular network (e.g., 2G, 3G, 4G, etc.).

Policy control agent 1692 is responsible for monitoring applicationlayer activity or traffic communication layer activity to identifyconditions in which a network access policy should be implemented, andthen causing a policy enforcement agent (for example applicationinterface agent 1693 or policy implementation agent 1690) to apply thepolicy. In some embodiments, policy control agent 1692 receivesinformation about an end-user device connection state from other deviceagents (e.g., connection manager 1804, one of modem drivers 1831, 1815,1814, 1813, 1812, modem selection and control 1811, an operating systemfunction, etc.) to aid in determining the access network policy settingsthat should be applied at a given time. For example, without limitation,device connection state information can comprise one or more ofapplication classification information, network destination identifierinformation, network service identifier information, type of networkinformation, time of day or day of week information, and geographiclocation information.

The access network policy instruction provided by policy control agent1692 to a policy enforcement agent (for example, application interfaceagent 1693 or policy implementation agent 1690) can comprise a serviceusage accounting or charging policy in which the service usage isaccounted and reported for the purpose of access network service usageaccounting or billing. In some embodiments, the service usage isaccounted to or billed to a device account or device user account. Insome embodiments, the service usage accounting is accounted to or billedto a service sponsor account, where the service sponsor is an entitythat is not the device user or a subscriber associated with end-userdevice 100. In some embodiments, the service usage accounting orcharging policy includes modifications in accounting policy based on oneor more classifications of service usage and one or more deviceconnection states, with classifications of service usage and connectionstate including but not limited to those disclosed herein.

The access network policy instruction provided by policy control agent1692 to a policy enforcement agent can comprise a service usage controlpolicy wherein the service usage is governed, limited, or regulatedaccording to a service plan policy. In some embodiments, the serviceusage control policy includes modifications in control policy based onone or more classifications of service usage and one or more deviceconnection states, with classifications of service usage and connectionstate including but not limited to those disclosed herein.

The access network policy instruction provided by policy control agent1692 to a policy enforcement agent can comprise a service notificationpolicy in which a notification associated with the access networkservice is presented through a user interface of end-user device 100(e.g., user interface 1697) when a pre-determined notification triggercondition is met. In some embodiments, the notification indicates anamount of service used. In some embodiments, the notification indicatesan amount of service remaining. In some embodiments, the notificationcomprises an offer to acquire service. In some embodiments, the servicenotification policy includes modifications in control policy based onone or more classifications of service usage and one or more deviceconnection states, with classifications of service usage and connectionstate including but not limited to those disclosed herein. In someembodiments, the notification includes an offer to acquire service basedon the occurrence of a pre-determined attempted or successful deviceaccess to an application or combination of applications. In someembodiments, an offer to acquire service is based on the occurrence of apre-determined attempted or successful device access to a networkdestination or combination of network destinations. In some embodiments,an offer to acquire service is based on detection of a condition inwhich a new service plan may be of interest to a device user whocurrently has an existing service plan or no service plan. In someembodiments, the notification comprises an offer to increase a serviceallowance. In some embodiments, the notification comprises an indicationof potential or likely service usage. In some embodiments, thenotification indicates a roaming service usage. In some embodiments, thenotification comprises an offer to acquire roaming services. In someembodiments, the notification indicates that service authorization isabout to expire under a current service plan.

In some embodiments, user interface 1697 provides a user of end-userdevice 100 with input capability to modify an access network serviceaccording to a user preference and/or to receive access network servicenotifications. In some embodiments, user interface 1697 accepts userinputs for modifying access network policy, such as limiting access byone or more applications or access to one or more network destinations.In some embodiments, user interface 1697 accepts user inputs formodifying end-user device 100's access to particular access networks(e.g., one or more roaming networks, one or more cellular networks, oneor more WiFi networks, etc.). In some embodiments, user interface 1697accepts user inputs for choosing or modifying a service plan.

Service control device link 1691 provides a secure communication linkand heartbeat function between service processor 115 and servicecontroller 122. In some embodiments, using the heartbeat function,agents on end-user device 100 provide certain reports to servicecontroller 122 for the purpose of service policy implementationverification (e.g., verification-related reports on certain aspects ofservice processor 115) or for other purposes. Such agent heartbeatmessages can be sent unencrypted or encrypted, signed, or otherwisesecured. In some embodiments, these messages include one or more of anagent information message, an agent check-in message, and an agent crosscheck message.

In some embodiments, an agent information message is included in a agentheartbeat service policy implementation verification message, whichincludes, for example, any information the agent needs to communicate toservice controller 122 as part of the operation of the service policyimplementation system. For example, an agent response to a servicecontroller challenge, as described below, can be included in the agentheartbeat service policy implementation verification message.

In some embodiments, an agent check-in message is included in an agentheartbeat service policy implementation verification message, whichincludes, for example, a transmission of a unique agent identifier,secure unique identifier, and/or hashed encrypted and signed messagebeginning with some shared secret or state variable for the hash. Forexample, an agent self-check can be included in the agent heartbeatservice policy implementation verification message, which includesreporting on agent configuration, agent operation, agent code status,agent communication log, agent error flags, and/or other agentassociated information potentially hashed, encrypted, signed orotherwise secured in the message (e.g., using a shared secret unique tothat agent).

In some embodiments, an agent cross-check message is included in theagent heartbeat service policy implementation verification message,which includes, for example, reports on the status, configuration,operation observations, communication log or other aspects of anotheragent. For example, agent environment reports can be included in theagent heartbeat service policy implementation verification message,which includes, for example, reports on certain aspects of the serviceprocessor 115 operating environment, such as software presence (e.g.,installation status of certain operating system and/or applicationsoftware and/or components thereof), observed communication with agentsor communication attempts, memory accesses or access attempts, networkaccesses or access attempts, software downloads or attempted downloads,software removal or download blocking, service policy implementationverification or compromise event error conditions with respect to theoperating environment for service processor 115, and/or other messagesregarding the verification or possibility of compromise associated withservice processor 115 operating environment or agents.

In some embodiments, the agent heartbeat function also provides regularupdates for information important to user service notification services.For example, the network-based elements can provide regularsynchronization updates for the device based service usage or serviceactivity counters in which service usage or service activity measuresavailable from one or more network service history elements aretransmitted to end-user device 100. This allows the service usagecounter errors between the device service counter and the counters usedfor central billing to be minimized. A common service usage or serviceactivity measure is total traffic usage associated with one or moreapplications or one or more network destinations measured to date withina time frame over which a service limit is applicable. Other serviceusage or service activity measures can also be tracked and reconciled ina similar manner.

In some embodiments of the heartbeat function, service controller 122verifies that the scheduled agent reports are being received and thatthe reports are within expected parameters. In some embodiments, accesscontrol integrity server 1654 issues signed challenge/response sequencesto policy implementation agent 1690. For example, the challenges can beasynchronous, issued when an event or error condition occurs, issued ona schedule, or issued when a certain amount of data has been used. Thisapproach, for example, provides a second layer of service policyimplementation verification that strengthens the service usage orservice activity measurement verification. For example, achallenge/response can be sent over the heartbeat link for the purposeof verifying device agent integrity.

In some embodiments, the challenge/response heartbeat message caninclude sending any kind of command or query, transmitted securely ortransmitted in the open, receiving a response from the agent and thenevaluating the response to determine if the response is within a rangeof parameters expected for a correctly configured agent, an agent thatis operating properly, an agent that is not partially compromised, or anagent that is not entirely compromised. In some embodiments, the agentis only required to respond with a simple acknowledgement of thechallenge. In some embodiments, the agent is required to respond with amessage or piece of information that is known by the agent. In someembodiments, the agent is required to respond with a message or piece ofinformation that would be difficult for the agent to supply if it wereto be partially or entirely compromised. In some embodiments, the agentis required to respond back with information regarding the operation orconfiguration of the agent that would be difficult for the agent tosupply if the agent were not properly configured, not operatingproperly, partially compromised, or entirely compromised. In someembodiments, a first agent is required to respond back with informationregarding the operation, configuration, status or behavior of a secondagent, and this information is difficult for the first or second agentto supply if the first or second agent is not properly configured, notoperating properly, is partially compromised or is entirely compromised.In some embodiments, the agent is required to respond with a responsethat includes a shared secret. In some embodiments, the agent isrequired to respond with information regarding the presence,configuration, operating characteristics or other information regardingother programs in the operating environment of the agent. In someembodiments, the agent is required to respond with hashed information ofportions of code or a code sample (e.g., the code portion or code samplecan be specified by service controller 122).

In some embodiments, the information the agent responds with is aresponse to a signed or encrypted message from service controller 122,and the agent must know how to decode the encrypted controller messagein order to respond correctly, or it would be difficult for the agent torespond properly if the agent is not configured properly, is notoperating within appropriate limits, is partially compromised, or isentirely compromised. In some embodiments, the agent signs or encryptsinformation in such a manner that it is difficult for the agent torespond correctly, and for service controller 122 to decode the message,unless the agent is configured properly, is operating within appropriatelimits, is not partially compromised, and is not entirely compromised.In some embodiments, the agent is required to respond with a signed orencrypted hash of information that is difficult for the agent togenerate unless the agent is configured properly, is operating withinappropriate limits, is not partially compromised and is not entirelycompromised. For example, the hashed information can be local deviceconfiguration information, portions of code, or all of the code, and/orthe code portion to be used in the response can be specified by servicecontroller 122. In another example, the hashed information the agentresponds with can include a shared secret, and/or the hashed informationcan be information regarding the presence, configuration, operatingcharacteristics or other information regarding other programs in theoperating environment of the agent.

Accordingly, as described above, the agent heartbeat function providesan important and efficient system in some embodiments for verifying theservice policy implementation or protecting against compromise events(e.g., fraud). There are many other functions the agent heartbeatservice can perform; some are described herein, and others will beapparent to one of ordinary skill in the art given the principles,design background, and various embodiments provided herein.

In some embodiments, service downloader 1663 provides for one or moreof: download of application programs that have an associated servicepolicy; download of application credentials; and download of serviceprocessor 115 components or component updates. In some embodiments,service downloader 1663 requires a secure signed version of softwarebefore a download is accepted. For example, the download can require aunique key or credential. In some embodiments, service downloader 1663is stored or executed in secure memory or executes in a secure memorypartition in the CPU memory space. Those of ordinary skill in the artwill appreciate that there are a variety of other security techniquesthat can be used to ensure the integrity of service downloader 1663.

Access control integrity agent 1694 monitors the operational integrityof one or more service processor 115 elements to determine ifunauthorized user modification or unauthorized user software programmodification of the service processor configuration or operation hasoccurred. In some embodiments, access control integrity agent 1694collects device information on one or more of service policy, serviceusage, service activity, agent configuration, and agent behavior. Insome embodiments, access control integrity agent 1694 also cross-checksthis information to identify integrity breaches in the service policyimplementation and control system. In some embodiments, access controlintegrity agent 1694 initiates action when a service policy violation ora system integrity breach is suspected. In some embodiments, accesscontrol integrity agent 1694 takes an action (e.g., generating a fraudalert, blocking end-user device 100 from accessing access network 10,blocking an application from accessing access network 10, directing thedevice to a quarantine network status in which end-user device 100 can,for example, only access functions generally controlled by the accessnetwork service provider or the central service provider, etc.) whenunauthorized conditions are detected. In some embodiments, accesscontrol integrity agent 1694 also performs asynchronous or periodicagent checks to verify the presence, configuration, or proper operationof other agents. In some embodiments, access control integrity agent1694 also performs challenge-response sequence verification of otheragents.

In some embodiments, access control integrity agent 1694 monitors agentself-check reports to verify that agents are properly configured. Insome embodiments, access control integrity agent 1694 reports the agentself check reports to service controller 122. In some embodiments,access control integrity agent 1694 performs a role in service usagetest transmission, reception and/or monitoring, with the usage testbeing tailored to test monitoring or control aspects for any subset ofservice activities. In some embodiments, access control integrity agent1694 performs a role in billing test event generation and/or monitoring.In some embodiments, access control integrity agent 1694 checks andreports the result of service usage monitoring verification tests,service usage billing verification tests and/or transaction billingverification tests.

In some embodiments, access control integrity agent 1694 receives agentaccess attempt reports to determine if unauthorized agent accessattempts are occurring. In some embodiments, access control integrityagent 1694 acts as a central secure communications hub foragent-to-agent or service-controller-to-agent communication. Forexample, access control integrity agent 1694 can be used so that noother software or function can access agents or so that agents cannotaccess other agents except through a secure point-to-multipointcommunications hub. In some embodiments, this approach further enhancescompromise resistance for the agents. In some embodiments, some or allof the agent communications, including agent-to-agent orservice-controller-to-agent communications, and possibly includingunauthorized attempts to communicate with agents, are monitored andlogged so that a trace log of some or all agent communications can bemaintained. For example, the agent communication trace log can besummarized and/or compressed for transmission efficiency or regularlyreported, such as through the heartbeat function, or the agentcommunication trace log can be reported only when service controller 122requests the agent communication trace log or when there is averification error event.

In some embodiments, access control integrity agent 1694 obtains serviceusage or service activity measures from service monitor agent 1696 andcompares one or more first service usage measurement points against oneor more second service usage measurement points to verify service policyimplementation.

As illustrated in the embodiment of FIG. 2 , service processor 115 is incommunication with service controller 122 via access network 10 (andoptionally including an additional connection path via Internet 12 inembodiments in which service controller 122 is not directly connected toaccess network 10, such as the embodiment of FIG. 2 ). Servicecontroller 122 includes service control server link 1638, which providesa secure communication link and heartbeat function between serviceprocessor 115 and service controller 122.

In some embodiments, service history server 1650 records service usagereports for end-user device 100. In some embodiments, service historyserver 1650 collects and records service usage or service activityreports (e.g., accounting reports) from a network element (e.g., accessnetwork AAA server 1621) or end-user device 100 (e.g., service monitoragent 1696). In some embodiments, the service usage reports aregenerated by service processor 115. In some embodiments, the serviceusage reports include service usage classification information (e.g.,usage per application, per group of applications, per networkdestination, per group of applications, per network type, etc.) asdescribed herein.

Although service usage reports from the network elements can in certainembodiments be less detailed than service usage reports from end-userdevice 100, the reports from the network can provide a valuable sourcefor verification of device service policy implementation, because, forexample, it is unlikely that a device error or compromise event onend-user device 100 will compromise network-based equipment or software.In some embodiments, service history server 1650 provides the servicehistory on request to other servers and/or one or more agents. In someembodiments, service history server 1650 provides the service usagehistory to device service history 1618.

In some embodiments, policy management server 1652 includes storage ofaccess network service policies that are provided to service processor115 from a network element. In some embodiments, policy managementserver 1652 provides known-application credentials to service processor115. In some embodiments, policy management server 1652 evaluatesrun-time application credentials provided by service processor 115.

In some embodiments, policy management server 1652 transmits policies toservice processor 115 via service control link 1653. In someembodiments, policy management server 1652 manages policy settings onend-user device 100 (e.g., various policy settings as described hereinwith respect to various embodiments) in accordance with a device serviceprofile. In some embodiments, policy management server 1652 setsinstantaneous policies on policy implementation agents (e.g., policyimplementation agent 1690). For example, policy management server 1652can issue policy settings, monitor service usage and, if necessary,modify policy settings.

In some embodiments, policy management server 1652 provides adaptivepolicy management on end-user device 100. For example, policy managementserver 1652 can issue policy settings and objectives and rely on thedevice-based policy management (e.g., by service processor 115) for someor all of the policy adaptation. This approach can require lessinteraction with end-user device 100, thereby reducing network chatteron service control link 1653 for purposes of device policy management.This approach can also provide robust user privacy embodiments byallowing the user to configure the device policy for user privacypreferences/settings so that, for example, sensitive information (e.g.,geo-location data, website history) is not communicated to the networkwithout the user's approval. In some embodiments, policy managementserver 1652 adjusts service policy based on time of day. In someembodiments, policy management server 1652 receives, requests orotherwise obtains a measure of network availability and adjusts trafficshaping policy and/or other policy settings based on available networkcapacity.

In some embodiments, policy management server 1652 performs a servicecontrol algorithm to assist in managing overall network capacity orapplication QoS. In some embodiments, policy management server 1652performs an algorithm to determine which access network is best toconnect to, such as based on network capacity or application QoS,service usage costs, and/or any other criteria.

In some embodiments, access control integrity server 1654 monitors theintegrity of the access policy system to establish a trusted servicepolicy implementation. In some embodiments, access control integrityserver 1654 collects end-user device 100 information on service policy,service usage, agent configuration and/or agent behavior. In someembodiments, access control integrity server 1654 cross-checks thisinformation to identify integrity breaches in the service policyimplementation and control system.

In some embodiments, access control integrity server 1654 initiatesaction when a service policy violation or a system integrity breach orerror is suspected or detected. In some embodiments, access controlintegrity server 1654 (and/or some other agent of service controller122) acts on access control integrity agent reports and errorconditions. In some embodiments, checks performed by access controlintegrity agent 1654 include one or more of the following: service usagemeasure against usage range consistent with policies (e.g., usagemeasure from the network and/or from the device); configuration ofagents; operation of the agents; and/or dynamic agent download.

In some embodiments, access control integrity server 1654 (and/or someother agent of service controller 122) verifies device service policyimplementations by comparing various service usage measures (e.g., basedon network-monitored information and/or local service usage monitoringinformation) against expected service usage behavior given the policiesthat are intended to be in place. For example, device service policyimplementations can include measuring total data passed, data passedthat is associated with a particular application or group ofapplications, data passed that is associated with a particular networkdestination or group of network destinations, data passed in a period oftime, IP addresses, data per IP address, data per network, data pernetwork type, and/or other measures (such as location, downloads, emailaccessed, URLs, etc.), and comparing such measures to expected serviceusage behavior given the policies that are supposed to be in place.

In some embodiments, access control integrity server 1654 (and/or someother agent of service controller 122) verifies device service policy,and the verification error conditions that can indicate a mismatch inservice measure and service policy include one or more of the following:unauthorized network access (e.g., access beyond sponsored servicepolicy limits); unauthorized network speed (e.g., average speed beyondservice policy limit); network data amount does not match policy limit(e.g., device not stopping at limit without re-up/revising servicepolicy); unauthorized network address; unauthorized service usage (e.g.,VOIP, email, and/or web browsing when not authorized); unauthorizedapplication usage (e.g., email, VOIP, email, and/or web when notauthorized); service usage rate too high for plan, and policy controllernot controlling/throttling it down; and/or any other mismatch in servicemeasure and service policy.

In some embodiments, access control integrity server 1654 (and/or someother agent of service controller 122) verifies device service policybased at least in part on, for example, various error conditions thatindicate a mismatch in service measure and service policy. For example,various verification error conditions that can indicate a mismatch inservice measure and service policy include one or more of the following:mismatch in one service measure and another service measure; agentfailure to report in; agent failure to respond to queries (e.g.,challenge-response sequence and/or expected periodic agent reporting);agent failure to respond correctly to challenge/response sequence; agentimproperly configured; agent failure in self checks; agent failure incross-checks; unauthorized agent communication or attempted unauthorizedcommunication; failure in service policy implementation test; failure inservice usage reporting test; failure in service usage billing test;failure in transaction billing test; failure in download sequence;environment compromise event, such as unauthorized software load orexecution (or attempt), unauthorized memory access (or attempt),unauthorized agent access (or attempt), known harmful software, and/orknown harmful communications signature; and/or failure to respond tovarious messages, such as send message and suspend and/or send messageand quarantine.

In some embodiments, access control integrity server 1654 (and/or someother agent of service controller 122) verifies device service policy byperforming automated queries and analysis, which are then reported(e.g., anomalous/suspicious report results can be reported for furtheranalysis by a person responsible for determining whether such activitiesindicate out of policy activities or to provide information to the userto inform the user of such anomalous/suspicious report results that mayindicate out-of-policy activities). For example, the user can review thereport to authorize whether such activities were performed by the user(e.g., website access requests, specific transactions, and/or phonecalls) and/or indicate that such activities were not authorized by theuser (e.g., indicate a potential compromise of the device, such as bymalware or other unauthorized software/user use of the device). Asanother example, the user can also be connected to communicate withservice support of the service provider regarding such reportedactivities (e.g., by text/chat, voice/phone, and/or video conference toa service support). Accordingly, in some embodiments, access controlintegrity server 1654 (and/or some other agent of service controller122) provides a policy/service control integrity service to verify(e.g., periodically and/or based on trigger events) that the servicecontrol of the device has not been compromised and/or is not behavingout of policy.

In some embodiments, upon detection of one or more service verificationerrors, such as the various service verification errors discussed above,end-user device 100 is directed to a quarantine network status in whichend-user device 100 can, for example, only access network control planefunctions, billing functions, and other functions generally controlledby the access network service provider or the central service provider.In some embodiments, end-user device 100 is completely suspended fromthe network. In some embodiments, end-user device 100's network access,service capabilities and/or traffic shaping are limited, partiallyrestricted or completely restricted. For example, these limitationsand/or restrictions can be implemented in the device and/or in thenetwork. For example, implementing a device quarantine (e.g., using aRADIUS server to quarantine the device) can involve assigning the deviceto a different billing profile.

In some embodiments, service download control server 1660 provides forone or more of: download of application programs that have an associatedservice policy; download of application credentials; and download ofservice processor 115 components or component updates.

In some embodiments, billing event server 1662 provides for billing ofaccess network service usage. In some embodiments, the billing ismodified based on one or more of the classifications of access networkservice usage described herein. In some embodiments, the billing ismodified based on one or more of the device connection state conditionsdescribed herein.

In some embodiments, device service history 1618 provides trusted (e.g.,network-based, third-party-based, or certain device-based) service usagemeasures for billing purposes or for the purpose of verifying a trustedservice policy implementation. In some embodiments, a trusted servicepolicy implementation is verified by service controller 122 (e.g.,access control integrity server 1654) by comparing the trusted serviceusage records with the usage limitations expected to be in place if theservice policy is being properly implemented by end-user device 100. Insome embodiments, these trusted service usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on application. In someembodiments, these trusted service usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on network destination or networkservice identifier. In some embodiments, these trusted service usagemeasures include a classification of service usage based on networktype. In some embodiments, these trusted service usage measures includea classification of service usage based on time of day. In someembodiments, these trusted service usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on QoS class. In some embodiments,these trusted service usage measures include a classification of serviceusage based on geography. In some embodiments, these trusted serviceusage measures include a classification of service usage based on aroaming network.

In some embodiments, central billing 1619 provides for billing ofservice usage. In some embodiments, central billing 1619 provides amediation function for central provider billing events. For example,central billing 1619 can accept service plan changes. In someembodiments, central billing 1619 provides updates on device serviceusage, service plan limits and/or service policies. In some embodiments,central billing 1619 collects billing events, formulates bills, billsservice users, provides certain billing event data and service planinformation to the service controller 122 and/or end-user device 100.

In some embodiments, access network AAA server 1621 assists inauthentication of service processor 115 by providing one or more of adevice credential database, a user credential database, a serviceprocessor credential database, and an authentication service for thedevice. In some embodiments, access network AAA server 1621 provides thenecessary access network AAA services (e.g., access control andauthorization functions for the device access layer) to allow end-userdevices 100 onto the central provider access network and the serviceprovider network. In some embodiments, access network AAA server 1621also provides the ability to suspend service for a device and resumeservice for a device based on communications received from servicecontroller 122. In some embodiments, access network AAA server 1621 alsoprovides the ability to direct routing for device traffic to aquarantine network or to restrict or limit network access when a devicequarantine condition is invoked. In some embodiments, access network AAAserver 1621 also records and reports device network service usage (e.g.,to device service history 1618).

Although many of the embodiments disclosed herein include servicecontroller 122, a service controller is not necessary in embodiments inwhich a user of end-user device 100 is in full control of access networkpolicies via user interface 1697. For example, the user can determineaccess network service policies that limit service for end-user device100 in general or for one or more of the access network service usageclassifications described herein, including application limitations,network destination or network service limitations, network typelimitations, etc. In some embodiments, based solely on user preferencesinput via user interface 1697 of end-user device 100, the serviceprocessor access network service policy limitations can specifyblocking, allowing, or capping service usage according to, for example,application, application class, or destination. In some embodiments,these user-defined limitations can be modified based on the type ofnetwork the device is connected to. In some embodiments, these userdefined limitations can be modified based on whether the user wishes toallow the access network communication activity for a givenclassification to occur in the background or not, or to cap such serviceusage when end-user device 100 is connected to a particular network type(e.g., a roaming network, a cellular network, a WiFi network, etc.). Insome embodiments, these user-defined limitations can be modified basedon whether the user wishes to allow the access network communicationactivity for a given classification to occur while end-user device 100is connected to a roaming network, or to cap such service usage whileend-user device 100 is roaming.

FIG. 3 illustrates an alternative embodiment of functional elements fora network access service policy implementation. In FIG. 3 , the carriernetwork system is shown as having multiple radio access networks (RAN1657 and RAN 1659 are shown, but additional networks may also bepresent), carrier core gateways 1656, carrier core network usagemonitors 640, carrier network 11, and carrier billing 139. In thisembodiment, the service controller function is augmented byauthentication credential server 220, application credential data base221, application policy database 223, service usage reconciliation andfraud detection 642, and service design center 20. In some embodiments,authentication credential server 220 is incorporated in servicecontroller 122.

Internet 12 provides a connection to user device application programsources (e.g., third-party app stores 500) and user device applicationservice destinations (e.g., app developer servers 600 and otherwebsites, servers, or content sources connected to Internet 12).Application developer service design center (SDC) user interface (UI)610 provides a user interface to allow application developers or websitedevelopers who choose to sponsor (e.g., partially or entirely subsidize)access network usage costs associated with particular applicationsand/or websites to define sponsored-service parameters. Usage ortransaction monitors 620 track device usage of application developerservers 600 (e.g., by generating customer usage or transaction feedback630) for the purpose of verifying access network service policy forsponsored services.

Authentication credential server 220 interfaces with applicationcredential database 221, with application policy database 223, and withservice controller 122. Authentication credential server 220 has atleast three embodiments, each with a different mode of operation. In oneembodiment or mode of operation, authentication credential server 220provides application credentials and associated access network policiesto end-user device 100 (e.g., to service processor 115) for the purposeof identifying a device application program and associating it withaccess network policies that are to be applied to attempted orsuccessful access network communications associated with thatapplication. A device application program credential can be a programidentifier, a name, a signature, a certificate, a hash, or any otheridentifier that uniquely identifies the application. In anotherembodiment or mode of operation, authentication credential server 220receives a device application credential from end-user device 100 (e.g.,service processor 115), determines if the credential matches aknown-application credential in application credential database 221,and, if so, provides the associated application access service policyfrom application policy database 223 to the device. In a variation ofthis embodiment, if authentication credential server 220 determines thatthe application credential does not match a known-application credentialin application credential database 221, then, in some embodiments,authentication credential server 220 retrieves an access policyassociated with unknown applications from application policy database223 and provides it to end-user device 100. In some embodiments in whichthe application credential does not match a known-applicationcredential, end-user device 100 is informed that no policy exists forthe application associated with the credential. In some embodiments inwhich the application credential does not match a known-applicationcredential, no action is taken.

Carrier core network usage monitors 640 monitor usage of access networkresources by each end-user device 100. Carrier core network usagemonitors 640 may include a deep packet inspection (DPI) element or anyother network element capable of monitoring usage of access networkresources by end-user devices.

Service design center 20 provides a means for specifying service planpolicies for the access network service policy implementation system.Co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/248,025, which isentitled “Service Design Center for Device Assisted Services” and isincorporated herein by reference, describes some of the information thatmay be configured via service design center 20. Example of informationthat can be configured using service design center 20 include but arenot limited to: a list of available service plans; the priorities oflisted service plans, where the priorities identify the order in whichthe classification function on the end-user device should apply filtersassociated with the available, selected, or purchased service plans,e.g., to determine under which plan a particular service activity by anend-user device falls; how available service plans will be displayed onan end-user device, such as end-user device 100; a categorization ofservice plans (e.g., whether a service plan is a temporary activationplan, a sponsored plan subsidized or paid for by an entity other than auser or subscriber associated with the end-user device, a user-paidplan, etc.); promotional messages to be displayed on one or moreend-user devices, such as end-user device 100; upsell offers (e.g.,conditions that trigger the display of an upsell offer, informationcharacterizing the upsell offer, etc.); events that cause a “no capableplan” notification (e.g., a notification that is presented when a userof an end-user device that is not associated with or subscribed to anapplicable data plan attempts to access a data service, etc.) on theend-user device; templates for notification messages (e.g., messageforegrounds and backgrounds, colors, logos, etc.); subscriber groups(e.g., by importing a list, manually typing individual subscriberidentifiers, etc.); requests for reports containing information about agroup of end-user devices or a group of subscribers; information aboutan end-user device associated with a subscriber (e.g., data usagemeasures, service plan information, cost or account balance information,notification settings for the end-user device, etc.).

In some embodiments, service usage reconciliation and fraud detection642 provides service usage comparisons for the purpose of service frauddetection and corrective action. As disclosed herein, service usagemeasures used by service usage reconciliation and fraud detection 642can originate from end-user device service usage measures, trustedservice usage measures (e.g., measures from carrier core network usagemonitors 640 or another trusted source), or both. As also disclosedherein, the service usage measures can be associated with variousclassifications (e.g., by application, network destination, devicenetwork connection state, network type, etc.). In some embodiments, atrusted service policy implementation is verified by service controller122 by performing one or more of the following operations: (a) comparingthe trusted access network usage records with the usage limitationsexpected to be in place if the service policy is being properlyimplemented; (b) comparing a trusted service usage measure against adevice service processor-based service usage measure; (c) comparing afirst device service processor service usage measure against a seconddevice service processor service usage measure; (d) comparing deviceservice usage against a population statistic for the device-basedservice usage measure.

In some embodiments, service usage reconciliation and fraud detection642 uses customer usage or transaction feedback 630 from usage ortransaction monitors 620 integrated into application developer servers600 to aid in detection of service policy error events. In someembodiments, the service usage information provided from customer usageor transaction feedback 630 is used to determine the service usage thatshould be accounted to an application classification service, a websiteclassification service, a network content classification service, or anetwork classification service defined by a connection to a networkgateway, proxy server, or tunnel server (e.g., an APN tunnel server, aVPN tunnel server, etc.). In some embodiments, the service usageprovided from customer usage or transaction feedback 630 is compared todevice-based service usage measures to determine if the two measures areaccurate to within a tolerance.

In some embodiments, third-party app stores 500 provide end-user device100 with an application program source for downloading deviceapplication programs associated with an access network policy. In someembodiments, when (as disclosed herein) a device user interfacenotification offers a user a service plan comprising an applicationprogram and an associated access network policy for the applicationprogram, and the application program is not pre-loaded on the device,when the user selects the service plan, service processor 115automatically downloads the application from one of third-party appstores 500.

In some embodiments, application developer service design center UI 610allows application developers, website developers, or other Internetcontent providers or service providers to log into a sponsored servicedefinition server in order to sign up for sponsored payments tosubsidize user accounting for access network service usage for a certainapplication, certain website, certain content site, certain shoppingsite, or another Internet based service associated with a networkdestination, a group of network destinations, an application, a group ofapplications, a network type, etc. In some embodiments, an applicationcredential can be uploaded or specified via application developerservice design center UI 610 and associated with a sponsored serviceplan policy. In some embodiments, a network destination identifier canbe uploaded or specified via application developer service design centerUI 610 and associated with a sponsored service plan policy.

In some embodiments carrier billing 139 provides for billing of serviceusage.

Secure Service Controller Hardware Architectures

The elements of service controller 122 described herein can beimplemented in various advantageous architectural embodiments to assistin securing device-assisted services (DAS). FIG. 4 illustrates anexample embodiment of a secure service controller architecture for DASsystems. FIG. 4 shows several of the functions that may be accomplishedby a service controller (e.g., service controller 122) that communicateswith one or more end-user devices over access network 10. In particular,FIG. 4 shows four service controller functions: a portal function, afile transfer function, a gateway function, and a credentialingfunction.

In the embodiment of FIG. 4 , the portal function is accomplished byportal user 102, optional load balancer 106, optional portal proxyserver 108, portal application server 112, and database cluster 116. Insome embodiments, the portal function allows a user (e.g., carrierpersonnel, mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) personnel, virtualservice provider (VSP) personnel, etc.) to enter information toconfigure or manage access network services or end-user devices, such asby using service design center 20 or application developer servicedesign center UI 610. In some embodiments, the portal function allows aportal user to collect information about provisioned end-user devices(e.g., reports containing information about an end-user device's serviceplan activity, reports containing information about an end-user device'saccess network usage, etc.). An example embodiment of the portalfunction is described in more detail below using FIG. 9 .

In some embodiments, the file transfer function allows secure filetransfers between a carrier (e.g., a service provider, an MVNO, a VSP,etc.) and the service controller. As illustrated in FIG. 4 , carrierfile 118 is placed on file server 126 through optional load balancer124. EAI server 128 retrieves carrier file 118. In some embodiments, EAIserver 128 processes carrier file 118. EAI server 128 configures outputfile 120. In some embodiments, EAI server 128 configures output file 120using information in database cluster 116. EAI server 128 places outputfile 120 on file server 126. An example embodiment of the file transferfunction is described below using FIG. 10 .

In the embodiment of FIG. 4 , the credentialing function is accomplishedby end-user device 100, optional load balancer 142, optionalcredentialing proxy server 144, credentialing application server 146,and database cluster 116. In some embodiments, the credentialingfunction authenticates end-user devices and provides those devices withthe credentials they need in order to communicate with the servicecontroller gateway and to use access network services. An exampleembodiment of the credentialing function is described below using theexample embodiment of FIG. 6 .

In the embodiment of FIG. 4 , the gateway function is accomplished byend-user device 100, optional load balancer 134, optional gateway proxyserver 136, gateway application server 138, and database cluster 116. Insome embodiments, the gateway function supports an end-user device's DAScommunications, including the sending of device-based usage reports fromend-user device 100 (e.g., using service processor 115) to servicecontroller 122, after the end-user device has completed thecredentialing procedure. An example embodiment of the gateway functionis described below using FIG. 11 .

In some service controller 122 embodiments, security is provided bymaking data flowing through the service controller accessible only tothe functions and elements that process it. For example, in theembodiment of FIG. 4 , information flowing from end-user device 100 tocredentialing application server 146 is not available to networkelements supporting the portal, file server, or gateway functions. FIG.4 also illustrates several different security zones. The security zonesare protected (e.g., separated) by firewalls that limit the reach of anentity once that entity has gained access to a hardware element orfunction within a hardware element that performs a service controllerfunction. As would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in theart, a firewall comprises one or more devices that permit or denynetwork traffic to pass through the firewall based on a set of rules.When interposed between two network elements, a firewall can preventunauthorized access between elements while permitting legitimatecommunications to pass. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 , once anentity has gained access to an element in one security zone, the entitymust pass through a firewall to communicate with an entity in adifferent security zone. For example, firewall 104 protects optionalload balancer 106 and portal proxy server 108 from unauthorized accessby portal user 102; firewall 110 protects portal application server 112from unauthorized access by optional portal proxy server 108; andfirewall 114 protects database cluster 116 from unauthorized entry byportal application server 112. Thus, in order to gain access to databasecluster 116, portal user 102 must successfully navigate through threefirewalls.

FIG. 4 illustrates seven security zones, each indicated by a dashedline. The zone labeled “DMZ 1” includes optional load balancer 106 andoptional portal proxy server 108. DMZ1 is separated from portal user 102by firewall 104, and DMZ1 is separated from portal application server112, which is in the “App VLAN” security zone, by firewall 110. The zonelabeled “DMZ 2” includes optional load balancer 124 and file server 126.Incoming carrier file 118 must pass through firewall 18 to reach fileserver 126, and through firewall 110 to reach EAI server 128. Likewise,retrieving output file 120 from file server 126 requires navigationthrough firewall 18. The zone labeled “DMZ 3” includes optional loadbalancer 134 and optional gateway proxy server 136. Communications fromend-user device 100 must pass through firewall 132 to reach optionalgateway proxy server 136, and through firewall 110 to reach gatewayapplication server 138. The zone labeled “DMZ 4” includes optional loadbalancer 142 and optional credentialing proxy server 144. Communicationsfrom end-user device 100 must pass through firewall 140 to reachcredentialing proxy server 144 and through firewall 110 to reachcredentialing application server 146. FIG. 4 also shows a security zonelabeled “Database VLAN,” which includes database cluster 116 and isprotected from the elements in the App VLAN security zone by firewall114. Database cluster 116 comprises one or more database elements. Theinformation in and use of database cluster 116 is described below. Thezone labeled “DMZ 5” contains carrier IT/billing element 139 and isseparated from EAI server 128 and the other elements in the App VLANzone by firewall 235.

The zone labeled “App VLAN” is the applications security zone. Asillustrated in FIG. 4 , App VLAN includes portal application server 112,EAI server 128, message bus 130, fraud server 129, reconciliation server131, gateway application server 138, and credentialing applicationserver 146. FIG. 4 illustrates direct communication paths between someof the elements within the App VLAN zone. For example, there are directcommunication paths between EAI server 128 and portal application server112; between EAI server 128 and message bus 130; between fraud server129 and message bus 130; between reconciliation server 131 and messagebus 130; and between gateway application server 138 and message bus 130.FIG. 4 also shows that several of the elements within the App VLANsecurity zone do not communicate directly, but rather use message bus130. For example, there is no direct communication path between EAIserver and reconciliation server 131, but both elements havecommunication paths with message bus 130. As would be appreciated by aperson having ordinary skill in the art, elements with communicationpaths through message bus 130 could have direct communication paths, andelements with direct communication paths could instead communicate usingmessage bus 130. The communication paths shown in FIG. 4 are merelyexemplary.

Although FIG. 4 shows the various elements within App VLAN as beingwithin a single security zone, a person of ordinary skill in the artwould recognize that there may be multiple security zones, separated byfirewalls, within the App VLAN zone to provide added security. Forexample, there could be a firewall between portal application server 112and EAI server 128. Also, although FIG. 4 illustrates separate elements(e.g., portal application server 112, EAI server 128, etc.) within theApp VLAN security zone, this representation is merely a functionalrepresentation. As would be appreciated by a person having ordinaryskill in the art in light of the disclosures herein, some or all of theelements shown may be combined in a single element (e.g., two or more ofthe illustrated elements could be performed by a single processor, asingle server, etc.).

Although FIG. 4 illustrates credentialing application server 146 as notcommunicating with any of the other elements within the App VLANsecurity zone, in some embodiments it may be advantageous forcredentialing application server 146 to communicate with other elementsin the App VLAN security zone, such as, for example, EAI server 128 orportal application server 112, to assist in tasks such as, for example,preventing a particular end-user device or a particular subscriber frombeing allocated a credential or revoking the credential of a particularend-user device or a particular subscriber. As another example, in someembodiments, credentialing application server 146 communicates directlywith fraud server 129 to flag fraudulent uses of credentials.

Although FIG. 4 illustrates firewalls as separate elements, eachphysical machine implementing one or more functions or elements shown inFIG. 4 could contain its own firewall. Furthermore, each logical elementin each layer could be further firewalled beyond what is shown in FIG. 4. As an example, the logical elements that only communicate with messagebus 130 could be individually firewalled so they are only allowed tosend traffic to and receive traffic from message bus 130.

As illustrated in FIG. 4 , in addition to communicating with portalapplication server 112 and message bus 130, EAI server 128 communicateswith carrier IT/billing 139 through firewall 235. In this embodiment,EAI server 128 has an interface that allows it to communicate withcarrier IT/billing 139. The information flowing to and from EAI server128 over the various communication paths shown in FIG. 4 is describedbelow in more detail using the example embodiment of FIG. 7 .

FIG. 5 illustrates an example embodiment that is similar to theembodiment of FIG. 4 , except without the optional load balancers andwithout the optional proxy servers. As shown in FIG. 5 , communicationsfrom portal user 102 or from end-user device 100 must pass through twofirewalls, firewall 110 and firewall 114, to reach database cluster 116.Three firewalls (122, 110, and 114) separate carrier file 118 anddatabase cluster 116. Carrier IT/billing element 139 must pass throughfirewall 235, EAI server 128, and firewall 114 to reach database cluster116.

FIG. 6 illustrates an example embodiment without the optional loadbalancers and without the optional proxy servers of FIG. 4 , and with anexternal EAI interface between EAI server 128 and carrier IT/billing139. As illustrated in FIG. 6 , firewall 237 is interposed between EAIinterface 238 and carrier IT/billing 139 to provide additional security,and EAI interface 238 resides in a security zone labeled “DMZ 6.” In theembodiment of FIG. 6 , communications from/to EAI server 128 to/fromcarrier IT/billing 139 must pass through two firewalls (235 and 237).

FIG. 7 illustrates a more general representation of the communicationswithin the App VLAN security zone illustrated in FIGS. 1A through 1C. InFIG. 7 , portal application server 112, credentialing application server146, gateway application server 138, reconciliation server 131, fraudserver 129, and EAI server 128 all communicate using message bus 130.Message bus 130 may be any kind of inter-process communication. Someexamples of inter-process communication are: a named pipe, a sharedmemory, a message queue, a web service call, an IP socket, an remoteprocedure call (RPC), and a Java messaging services (JMS) queue. Messagebus 130 may be multi-functional and simultaneously support multipletypes of inter-process communication between the elements shown in FIG.7 . Specifically, message bus 130 may support one kind of inter-processcommunication between one pair of elements shown in FIG. 7 and adifferent kind of inter-process communication between a different pairof elements. For example, message bus 130 might support web servicecalls for communications between portal application server 112 and EAIserver 128, and a message queue for communications between EAI server128 and fraud server 129.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example embodiment that provides geo-redundancy.For clarity, FIG. 8 omits several details present in FIGS. 1A through1C, including firewalls. FIG. 8 shows service controller 162 and servicecontroller 164. Service controller 162 includes portal function 154,gateway function 158, credentialing function 157, file server function156, and database cluster 116. Service controller 164 has correspondingfunctions (portal 168, gateway 172, credentialing 173, and file 170) anddatabase cluster 174. Service controller 162 and service controller 164are functionally equivalent but physically distinct. In someembodiments, one of service controller 162 and service controller 164 isactive (i.e., in use to service portal user 102 and end-user device 100,and able to process carrier file 118), and the other service controlleris in a stand-by state (e.g., fully functional but not in active use).In some embodiments, both of service controller 162 and servicecontroller 164 are active.

Portal user 102, end-user device 100, and carrier file 118 access one orboth of service controllers 162 and 164 through global load balancer150, which routes carrier file 118 and communications to and from portaluser 102 and end-user device 100. In some embodiments in which both ofservice controller 162 and service controller 164 are active, globalload balancer 150 determines (e.g., based on the level of busyness oroutage state of elements within service controller 162 and servicecontroller 164) whether to route a particular communication to servicecontroller 162 (potentially through optional load balancer 152) or toservice controller 164 (potentially through optional load balancer 166).In some embodiments in which one of service controller 162 and servicecontroller 164 is active and the other is in a stand-by state, globalload balancer 150 routes communications to and from the active servicecontroller unless or until there is a need to use functions in thestand-by service controller (e.g., if one or more elements in the activeservice controller fail, if the active service controller's ability toservice communications becomes compromised for some reason, etc.). Thearchitecture shown in FIG. 8 provides reliability in that a failurewithin either service controller 162 or service controller 164 will notdisable the network's ability to provide service controller services toportal user 102, end-user device 100, or carrier usage record 118. If,for example, one or more of the hardware elements responsible forcredentialing function 157 in service controller 162 fails, global loadbalancer 150 can route credentialing requests from end-user device 100to credentialing function 173 in service controller 164. As will now beunderstood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of thisdisclosure, additional service controllers may be deployed in a similarmanner (e.g., connected to load balancer 150, load balancer 152, or loadbalancer 166) to provide redundancy and to help ensure servicecontroller resources are available for DAS.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example embodiment of the portal function, suchas, for example, portal function 154 or portal function 168 illustratedin FIG. 8 . FIG. 9 illustrates optional load balancer 106 and optionalportal proxy server 108, but, as described previously, these elementsand either firewall 104 or firewall 110 may be omitted. Co-pending U.S.patent application Ser. No. 13/248,025, which is entitled “ServiceDesign Center for Device Assisted Services” and is incorporated hereinby reference, describes some of the information that portal user 102could configure for use by portal application server 112. In someembodiments, portal user 102 configures a list of available serviceplans. In some embodiments, portal user 102 configures the priorities oflisted service plans, where the priorities identify the order in whichthe classification function on the end-user device should apply filtersassociated with the available, selected, or purchased service plans,e.g., to determine under which plan a particular service activity by anend-user device falls. In some embodiments, portal user 102 entersinformation pertaining to how available service plans will be displayedon an end-user device, such as end-user device 100. In some embodiments,portal user 102 enters information about a classification of serviceplans (e.g., whether a service plan is a temporary activation plan, asponsored plan subsidized or paid for by an entity other than a user ofthe end-user device, a user-paid plan, etc.). In some embodiments,portal user 102 configures promotional messages to be displayed on oneor more end-user devices, such as end-user device 100. In someembodiments, portal user 102 configures upsell offers (e.g., conditionsthat trigger the display of an upsell offer, information characterizingthe upsell offer, etc.). In some embodiments, portal user 102 definesevents that cause a “no capable plan” notification (e.g., a notificationthat is presented when a user of an end-user device that is notassociated with or subscribed to a data plan attempts to access a dataservice, etc.) on the end-user device. In some embodiments, portal user102 configures templates for notification messages (e.g., messageforegrounds and backgrounds, colors, logos, etc.). In some embodiments,portal user 102 creates (e.g., imports a list, manually types individualsubscriber identifiers, etc.) or manages (e.g., views, edits, etc.)subscriber groups. In some embodiments, portal user 102 requests reportscontaining information about a group of end-user devices or a group ofsubscribers. In some embodiments, portal user 102 is a subscriber (e.g.,a person who uses the end-user device), and portal function 154 allowsthe subscriber to access information about an end-user device associatedwith the subscriber (e.g., data usage measures, service planinformation, cost or account balance information, notification settingsfor the end-user device, etc.). In some embodiments, portal user 102accesses optional portal proxy server 108 or portal application server112 using a password. In some embodiments, the password is stored inlocal storage as a salted SHA-1 hash. In some embodiments, differentportal users 102 are given different sets of privileges so that onlyauthorized administrative users can view, enter, or modify particularinformation, such as, for example, subscriber lists, device lists, etc.

Portal user 102 accesses optional portal proxy server 108 (if present)through firewall 104 and (if present) optional load balancer 106. Insome embodiments, portal user 102 establishes a virtual private network(VPN) connection over the Internet to communicate with optional portalproxy server 108. If present, optional portal proxy server 108communicates with portal application server 112 through firewall 110.

As illustrated in FIG. 9 , portal application server 112 alsocommunicates with EAI server 128. In some embodiments, portalapplication server 112 sends instructions associated with the deliveryof information to end-user device 100 to EAI server 128. In someembodiments, the instructions cause EAI server 128 to configurenotification messages (e.g., promotional messages, offers,advertisements, etc.), which EAI server 128 then stores on database 116for gateway application server 138 to retrieve and send to end-userdevice 100. In some embodiments, portal application server 112 sendsinstructions to reset a subscriber or an end-user device to EAI server128. In some embodiments, portal application server 112 sendsinstructions to cancel an end-user device service plan to EAI server128. In some embodiments, portal application server 112 receivesmessages from EAI server 128 that indicate EAI server 128 carried out arequested task or completed its portion of a requested task thatrequires action by another network element.

Portal application server 112 retrieves information from and storesinformation in database cluster 116 by establishing a connection throughfirewall 114. In some embodiments, portal application server 112retrieves information requested by portal user 102 from database cluster116. In some embodiments, portal application server 112 storesinformation entered by portal user 102 in database cluster 116.

FIG. 9 shows three agents that communicate with monitoring element 188.Monitoring element 188 is located in a security zone labeled “Ops VLAN,”which is the operations security zone. In some embodiments, the Ops VLANincludes authentication, monitoring, and logging functions. In someembodiments, elements within the Ops VLAN have controlled connectivityto and from the servers shown in FIGS. 1A through 1C (e.g., portalapplication server 112, EAI server 128, fraud server 129, reconciliationserver 131, gateway application server 138, credentialing applicationserver 146) based on service controller application requirements. Asillustrated in FIG. 9 , portal proxy server 108 includes notificationagent 180, which communicates through firewall 186 with monitoringelement 188, and portal application server 112 includes notificationagent 182 and log forwarder 184, both of which also communicate withmonitoring element 188 through firewall 186.

Notification agent 180 and notification agent 182 provide information tomonitoring element 188. In some embodiments, one or both of notificationagents 180 and 182 are SNMP agents. In some embodiments, the informationprovided by one or both of notification agents 180 and 182 includesunsolicited notifications of events (e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMPtraps, etc.). In some embodiments, information provided by one or bothof notification agents 180 and 182 is in response to a request frommonitoring element 188.

In some embodiments, monitoring element 188 responds to information sentby notification agent 180 or 182. For example, in some embodiments,monitoring element 188 sends notification agent 180 or 182 a messagedirecting (respectively) portal proxy server 108 or portal applicationserver 112 to perform an action (e.g., run a program, run a test queryto validate that the system is functional, run a program to determinewhether a connected system is functional, etc.). In some embodiments,monitoring element 188 directs portal proxy server to test thecommunication path to portal application server 112.

Log forwarder 184 also sends information to monitoring element 188. Insome embodiments, log forwarder 184 sends logs of accesses by oractivities of portal users, such as portal user 102, to monitoringelement 188. In some embodiments, portal application server 112 trackssystem level commands and login attempts. In some embodiments, logforwarder 184 sends information about system-level commands and loginattempts to monitoring element 188. In some embodiments, log forwarder184 sends information configured to assist in diagnosing problems with asystem or service controller application. For example, in someembodiments, portal application server 112 generates log files, and logforwarder 184 sends the log files to monitoring element 188. In someembodiments, the log files are generated for individual servicecontroller applications. In some embodiments, log forwarder 184 sends asystem log, an information log, a debug log, an error log, informationabout a fatal event, etc. In some embodiments, monitoring element 188includes a log file harvester. In some embodiments, portal applicationserver 112 initiates the transfer of information from log forwarder 184to monitoring element 188.

FIG. 10 illustrates an example embodiment of file transfer function 156(functionally equivalent to file transfer function 170 shown in FIG. 8). Carrier file transfer agent 199 establishes a connection with filetransfer agent 190 on file server 126 through firewall 18 and optionalload balancer 124. The connection enables the transfer of carrier file118 to file server 126. In some embodiments, carrier file transfer agent199 establishes a VPN connection over the Internet to communicate withtransfer agent 190.

Carrier file 118 can contain various information, such as, for example:a measure of an access network usage by end-user device 100; informationto provision an access network service for one or more end-user devices,such as end-user device 100; a list of end-user devices or subscribersauthorized to use a particular service.

In some embodiments, carrier file 118 comprises a subscriber list. Asubscriber list includes one or more subscriber identifiers, where asubscriber identifier is associated with a particular end user. As willbe appreciated by a person having ordinary skill in the art, asubscriber identifier may also be associated with a particular end-userdevice or with a group of end-user devices, or the subscriber identifiermay not be associated with any particular end-user device. Examples ofsubscriber identifiers are: an IMSI, an MSID, a MDN, an MSISDN, an MEID,an ESN, an IPv4/6 MAC or IP address, a key, a certificate, a globallyunique identifier (GUID), a unique identifier (UID).

In some embodiments, carrier file 118 includes one or more flow datarecords (FDRs). A flow data record contains detailed information relatedto one or more network communications (e.g., source IP, source port,destination IP, destination port, bytes transmitted, bytes received,time flow started, time flow ended, traffic protocol (e.g., TCP/UDP),etc.).

In some embodiments, carrier file 118 includes a plan catalog thatincludes information about service plans for the access network that areavailable to one or more end-user devices. Examples of the informationthat may be included in a plan catalog are: a list of service plans andtheir characteristics (e.g., notification, charging, and controlpolicies associated with each plan, access network activities qualifyingfor each plan, etc.); the priorities of the service plans, where thepriorities identify the order in which the classification function onthe end-user device should evaluate the filters associated with theavailable service plans; how the service plans are displayed on end-userdevices (e.g., the order in which they are displayed, etc.); whetheraccess network costs associated with a plan are paid by a sponsor entityor by a subscriber; whether a plan is an activation plan (e.g., aservice plan that governs a device when a subscriber has not selected aplan); promotional messages; upsell offers; subscriber groups;notifications for which no service plan applies.

In some embodiments, carrier file 118 includes a list of end-userdevices or subscribers authorized to use a particular service (e.g., atethering service for sharing an access network connection with otherdevices through other input/output ports on the end-user device).

In some embodiments, carrier file 118 includes one or moreclassification rules. A classification rule is any rule thatdistinguishes between any characteristics of service plans, subscribers,end-user devices, network destinations, or network types. For example, aclassification rule may distinguish between sponsor-paid andsubscriber-paid service plans, between applications or groups ofapplications, between groups of subscribers, between end-user devicesusing valid profiles and those using fraudulent profiles, betweenauthorized network destinations and unauthorized destinations, betweennetwork access types (e.g., home, roaming, 2G, 3G, WiFi, etc.), betweentime-of-day rules, etc.

In the embodiment shown in FIG. 10 , after being transferred to fileserver 126, carrier file 118 is transferred to EAI server 128. In someembodiments, the transfer of carrier file 118 to EAI server 128 isinitiated by EAI server 128. EAI server 128 processes carrier file 118and generates output file 120. In some embodiments, EAI server 128 usesinformation from another source to generate output file 120. In someembodiments, EAI server 128 uses information from carrier file 118 andinformation from end-user device 100 (e.g., a data usage measureproviding information about the end-user device's use of the accessnetwork or of a particular service, etc.) to generate output file 120.In some embodiments, EAI server 128 uses information stored in database116 to generate output file 120. This information can include, forexample, individualized or statistical information related to planusage, popularity of plans, notification acknowledgements, time-of-dayusage statistics, average use per plan, subscriber info, subscriberbehavior, etc. In some embodiments, EAI server 128 uses information fromfraud server 129 to generate output file 120. This information caninclude, for example, fraud alerts indicating that subscriber serviceplan usage activity has been detected as abnormal or fraudulent, as wellas a confidence score (e.g., to indicate a level of confidence that theuser is committing fraud); end-user device fraud events; authenticationissues; etc. In some embodiments, EAI server 128 uses information fromreconciliation server 131 to generate output file 120. This informationcan include, for example, detailed or high-level end-user device serviceusage records, including subscriber identifier, device identifier,service plan identifier, service plan usage (bytes), start time ofreport, end time of report, etc. In some embodiments, EAI server 128uses information from gateway application server 138 to generate outputfile 120. This information can include, for example, information aboutusers, roles, and permissions, or user directory synchronization. Insome embodiments, EAI server 128 uses information from portalapplication server 112 to generate output file 120. This information caninclude, for example, usage reports requested by portal user 102,subscriber data (e.g., provisioning information) import requests fromportal user 102, information about accesses by portal users, informationabout revoked portal user access, etc.

In some embodiments, output file 120 is a batch report. In someembodiments, output file 120 is a real-time report. In some embodiments,output file 120 includes a measure of an access network usage or cost byan end-user device, such as end-user device 100. In some embodiments,output file 120 is a charging data report (CDR). In some embodiments,output file 120 includes a promotional message or advertisement. In someembodiments, output file 120 includes a subscriber list or an end-userdevice list. In some embodiments, output file 120 includes informationabout a service plan purchase made by a user of an end-user device, suchas end-user device 100. In some embodiments, output file 120 includesinformation profiling an end-user device's usage of the access networkor of an access network service. In some embodiments, output file 120includes a fraud alert. A fraud alert is any indication that the servicecontroller or an end-user device has detected activity or an event thatsuggests that an end-user device may be being used in a manner thatviolates a policy (e.g., a notification, control, or charging policy)that should be in effect or that the end-user device or device clienthas been tampered with in a way that compromises the security of theend-user device or an element of the end-user device (e.g., a softwareapplication, an agent, an operating system, etc.). A fraud alert may bein any form, for example, a simple flag or a message containing detailedinformation about the activity or event that caused the fraud alert toissue. A fraud alert can also include information such as, for example,the time the event was detected, the associated subscriber identifier,device identifier, suggested remediation actions, an error code, a ruleto be added in the network elements that perform policy charging andrules function (PCRF) or policy charging and enforcement function (PCEF)tasks or to the gateway GPRS support node (GGSN), or any otherinformation that could be useful to understand or mitigate fraudulentactivity.

In some embodiments, EAI server 128 initiates the transfer of outputfile 120 to file server 126. In some embodiments, the transfer of outputfile 120 to file server 126 is initiated by file server 126. In someembodiments, output file transfer agent 203 establishes a connection tofile transfer agent 213 to retrieve output file 120. In someembodiments, output file transfer agent 203 establishes a secureconnection over the Internet to communicate with file transfer agent 213through firewall 18. In some embodiments, file server 126 pushes outputfile 120 to output file transfer agent 203.

As illustrated in FIG. 10 , file server 126 also includes notificationagent 201, notification agent 196, and file transfer agent 198.Notification agent 201 establishes a connection to message bus 130through firewall 110. In some embodiments, notification agent 201 placesa message for EAI server 128 on message bus 130 to inform EAI server 128that carrier file 118 is available on file server 126. This notificationmay be advantageous to increase the speed at which EAI server 128processes carrier file 118.

Notification agent 196 provides information to monitoring element 188,communicating through firewall 186. In some embodiments, notificationagent 196 is an SNMP agent. In some embodiments, the informationprovided by notification agent 196 includes unsolicited notifications ofevents (e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMP traps, etc.). In someembodiments, information provided by notification agent 196 is inresponse to a request from monitoring element 188.

File transfer agent 198 provides information to monitoring element 188through firewall 186. This information can include, for example, filetransfer activity, CPU load, disk usage, successful transfers, failedtransfers, failed logins, operating environment info (e.g., ambienttemperature, humidity, nominal voltage, etc.), system errors, etc. Insome embodiments, monitoring element 188 initiates the transfer ofinformation from file transfer agent 198.

FIG. 11 illustrates an example embodiment of gateway function 158 (whichis functionally equivalent to gateway function 172). End-user device 100(e.g., using service processor 115) establishes a connection withoptional gateway proxy server 136 through firewall 132 and optional loadbalancer 134. In some embodiments, optional gateway proxy server 136includes an access control list used to allow access to one or moredestination IP addresses only from IP addresses in the access controllist (e.g., the list specifies IP addresses that may pass through), orto deny access from all IP addresses in the access control list andallow access from all other IP addresses (e.g., the list specifies IPaddresses that will be blocked). Gateway proxy server 136 establishes aconnection to gateway application server 138 through firewall 110.

In the embodiment shown in FIG. 11 , end-user device 100 can receive avariety of information from gateway application server 138. For example,end-user device can receive information or instructions based on entriesby portal user 102 (e.g., available service plans, how to present theavailable service plans on a user interface, service planclassifications (e.g., user-paid, sponsored, etc.), promotionalmessages, service offers, notification messages, etc.). As anotherexample, end-user device 100 can receive information in response to arequest from end-user device 100 (e.g., a request for an accountbalance, a request for a record of purchase history, etc.). As anotherexample, end-user device 100 can receive administrative content, suchas, for example, software updates.

In some embodiments, gateway application server 138 determines when tosend information to end-user device 100. In some embodiments, gatewayapplication server 138 sends information to end-user device 100 aftercompleting an authentication protocol. In some embodiments, gatewayapplication server 138 sends information to end-user device 100 inresponse to request or activity by another element or function in theservice controller (e.g., EAI server 128, portal application server 112,fraud server 129, reconciliation server 131, or credentialingapplication server 146). In some embodiments, gateway application server138 sends information to end-user device 100 in response to acommunication from end-user device 100. In some embodiments, thecommunication from end-user device 100 is a message in an authenticationprotocol. In some embodiments, gateway application server 138 sendsinformation to end-user device 100 over a secure communication link.

As illustrated in FIG. 11 , end-user device 100 can also sendinformation to gateway application server 138. For example, end-userdevice 100 may send reports containing measures of or costs associatedwith end-user device 100's access network usage, user acknowledgments orresponses to notification messages, device-detected fraud events,authentication messages, heartbeats (e.g., communications sent atregular intervals to provide information about the status of end-userdevice 100, such as, for example, to indicate that end-user device 100is functioning properly), or requests (e.g., to purchase a service plan,to retrieve a purchase history, to check an account balance, etc.). Aswill now be understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art inview of the disclosures herein, the communication link between end-userdevice 100 and gateway application server 138 can be used to support awide variety of information exchanges between end-user device 100 andthe service controller.

As illustrated in FIG. 11 , gateway application server 138 is alsocapable of receiving information through message bus 130. In someembodiments, gateway application server 138 passes messages only withinthe same security zone. In some embodiments, gateway application server138 receives information through message bus 130 from portal user 102 orfrom EAI server 128. As mentioned previously, message bus 130 may be anyinter-process communication mechanism and may be different betweendifferent pairs of elements. In some embodiments, message bus 130provides web services connectivity between EAI server 128 and gatewayapplication server 138, and EAI server 128 uses web services to sendinformation to gateway application server 138. In some embodiments, theweb services calls occur only within the same security zone.

Gateway application server 138 retrieves information from and storesinformation in database cluster 116, communicating through firewall 114.In some embodiments, gateway application server 138 stores informationfrom end-user device 100 in database cluster 116. In some embodiments,gateway application server 138 retrieves queued messages destined forend-user device 100 from database cluster 116. For example, gatewayapplication server 138 may retrieve from database 116 and send toend-user device one or more of the following types of information:control, charging, or notification policies; promotional messages;service plan updates; end-user device configuration updates (e.g.,related to the look and feel of a user interface on end-user device 100,etc.); a link to a software download.

In some embodiments, gateway application server 138 receives anauthentication request from end-user device 100 and, based on theauthentication request, retrieves a stored credential from databasecluster 116 to assist in authenticating end-user device 100. In someembodiments, the authentication request from end-user device 100comprises a credential associated with end-user device 100 or associatedwith a subscriber. In some embodiments, the credential is associatedwith a device identifier, or a subscriber identifier, or both a deviceidentifier and a subscriber identifier. In some embodiments, thecredential is one or more of a certificate, a key, a shared secret, apassword, a hash, or a shared algorithm. In some embodiments, gatewayapplication server 138 determines, based on the received credential andthe stored credential, whether to proceed with communications withend-user device 100. In some embodiments, gateway application server 138determines whether the credential sent by end-user device 100 is valid.In some embodiments, gateway application server 138 checks whether thecredential sent by end-user device 100 has been revoked. In someembodiments, gateway application 138 determines whether the credentialsent by end-user device 100 appears on a revocation list. In someembodiments, if the credential is a certificate, gateway applicationserver 138 checks whether the certificate is on a certificate revocationlist, where the certificate revocation list may be stored within orexternal to service controller 122 (e.g., in database cluster 116, incredentialing application server 146, in a separate certificaterevocation list server, etc.).

In some embodiments, if the credential sent by end-user device 100 isvalid, gateway application server 138 communicates with end-user device100 using the credential for the purpose of exchanging service-relatedinformation or software. In some embodiments, the communication usingthe credential is over a secure communication link. In some embodiments,the secure communication link uses the SSL protocol. In someembodiments, the service-related information comprises a plan catalog.In some embodiments, the service-related information comprises acontrol, charging, or notification policy. In some embodiments, theservice-related information comprises a promotional message oradvertisement. In some embodiments, the service-related informationcomprises a usage measure or a cost measure. In some embodiments, theservice-related information comprises an account balance. In someembodiments, the service-related information comprises a fraud alert. Insome embodiments, the service-related information comprises a requestfrom end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the service-relatedinformation comprises a response to a request from end-user device 100.In some embodiments, the service-related information comprises a requestto end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the service-relatedinformation comprises a response to a request to end-user device 100. Insome embodiments, the service-related information is configured to causeend-user device 100 to take a specific action. In some embodiments, thespecific action is to be taken immediately. In other embodiments, thespecific action is to be scheduled. In some embodiments, the specificaction is to block, allow, rate-limit, or delay access to the accessnetwork by end-user device 100.

FIG. 11 shows three agents that communicate with monitoring element 188.As illustrated in FIG. 11 , gateway proxy server 136 includesnotification agent 200, which communicates through firewall 186 withmonitoring element 188, and gateway application server 138 includesnotification agent 202 and log forwarder 204, both of which alsocommunicate with monitoring element 188 through firewall 186.

Notification agent 200 and notification agent 202 provide information tomonitoring element 188. In some embodiments, one or both of notificationagents 200 and 202 are SNMP agents. In some embodiments, the informationprovided by one or both of notification agents 200 and 202 includesunsolicited notifications of events (e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMPtraps, etc.). In some embodiments, information provided by one or bothof notification agents 200 and 202 is in response to a request frommonitoring element 188.

In some embodiments, monitoring element 188 responds to information sentby notification agent 200 or 202. For example, in some embodiments,monitoring element 188 sends notification agent 200 or 202 a messagedirecting (respectively) gateway proxy server 136 or gateway applicationserver 138 to perform an action (e.g., run a program, run a test queryto validate that the system is functional, run a program to determinewhether a connected system is functional, etc.). In some embodiments,monitoring element 188 directs gateway proxy server 136 to test thecommunication path to gateway application server 138.

Log forwarder 204 also sends information to monitoring element 188. Insome embodiments, log forwarder 204 sends information configured toassist in diagnosing problems with a system or service controllerapplication. For example, in some embodiments, gateway applicationserver 138 generates log files, and log forwarder 204 sends the logfiles to monitoring element 188. In some embodiments, the log files aregenerated for individual service controller applications. In someembodiments, log forwarder 204 sends a system log, an information log, adebug log, an error log, information about a fatal event, etc. In someembodiments, gateway application server 138 initiates the transfer ofinformation from log forwarder 204 to monitoring element 188.

FIG. 12 illustrates an example embodiment of credentialing function 157(which is functionally equivalent to credentialing function 173 shown inFIG. 8 ). End-user device 100 communicates with optional credentialingproxy server 144 through firewall 140 and optional load balancer 142. Insome embodiments, end-user device 100 establishes a secure connectionover the Internet to communicate with credentialing proxy server 144.Credentialing proxy server 144 communicates through firewall 110 withcredentialing application server 146. Credentialing application server146 retrieves information from and stores information in databasecluster 116, communicating through firewall 114.

As described herein, the credentialing function enhances the security ofDAS systems. In some embodiments, credentialing application server 146receives a request from end-user device 100 (e.g., using serviceprocessor 115) for a credential. In some embodiments, the credentialrequest from end-user device 100 to credentialing application server 146includes a device identifier (e.g., any identifier associated with theend-user device) and a subscriber identifier (e.g., any identifierassociated with the subscriber who uses or authorizes the use of theend-user device). In some embodiments, the credential request comprisesa hash of a device identifier and a subscriber identifier. In someembodiments, the hash is salted. In some embodiments, credentialingapplication server 146 generates a credential based on the credentialrequest from end-user device 100, stores the credential in databasecluster 116, and sends the credential to end-user device 100. In someembodiments, credentialing application server 146 stores the deviceidentifier and the new credential separately in database cluster 116. Insome embodiments, credentialing application server 146 stores the deviceidentifier and new credential as a single entry comprising theircombination (e.g., a hash). In some embodiments, end-user device 100stores the credential in local memory and thereafter uses the credentialfor secure communications with the service controller (e.g., withgateway application server 138).

FIG. 12 shows three agents that communicate with monitoring element 188.As illustrated in FIG. 12 , credentialing proxy server 144 includesnotification agent 210, which communicates through firewall 186 withmonitoring element 188, and credentialing application server 146includes notification agent 212 and log forwarder 214, both of whichalso communicate with monitoring element 188 through firewall 186.

Notification agent 210 and notification agent 212 provide information tomonitoring element 188. In some embodiments, one or both of notificationagents 210 and 212 are SNMP agents. In some embodiments, the informationprovided by one or both of notification agents 210 and 212 includesunsolicited notifications of events (e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMPtraps, etc.). In some embodiments, information provided by one or bothof notification agents 210 and 212 is in response to a request frommonitoring element 188.

In some embodiments, monitoring element 188 responds to information sentby notification agent 210 and 212. For example, in some embodiments,monitoring element 188 sends notification agent 210 and 212 a messagedirecting (respectively) credentialing proxy server 144 or credentialingapplication server 146 to perform an action (e.g., run a program, run atest query to validate that the system is functional, run a program todetermine whether a connected system is functional, etc.). In someembodiments, monitoring element 188 directs credentialing proxy server144 to test the communication path to credentialing application server146.

Log forwarder 214 also sends information to monitoring element 188. Insome embodiments, log forwarder 214 sends information configured toassist in diagnosing problems with a system or service controllerapplication. For example, in some embodiments, credentialing applicationserver 146 generates log files, and log forwarder 214 sends the logfiles to monitoring element 188. In some embodiments, the log files aregenerated for individual service controller applications. In someembodiments, log forwarder 214 sends a system log, an information log, adebug log, an error log, information about a fatal event, etc. In someembodiments, credentialing application server 146 initiates the transferof information from log forwarder 214 to monitoring element 188.

FIG. 13 illustrates an example embodiment of EAI server 128 when itsupports the communication paths shown in FIGS. 1A, 1B, and 1C. Asillustrated in FIG. 13 , EAI server 128 retrieves carrier file 118 fromfile server 126 and places output file 120 on file server 126. In someembodiments, EAI server 128 initiates the transfer of carrier file 118from file server 126 and the transfer of output file 120 to file server126. As shown in FIG. 13 , transfers of information between EAI server128 and file server 126 are through firewall 110. As shown in FIG. 13 ,there is no message queue to allow file server 126 to inform EAI server128 that there is a file available for EAI server 128.

FIG. 13 also illustrates one embodiment of a communication path betweenEAI server 128 and gateway application server 138. Information flowsdirectly from EAI server 128 to gateway application server 138.Information from gateway application server 138 to EAI server 128 flowsthrough message bus 130.

EAI server 128 also communicates directly with portal application server122 through web services interface 226. EAI server 128 communicates withcarrier IT/billing 139 using EAI interface 231, with information passingthrough firewall 235.

EAI server 128 communicates through firewall 114 with database cluster116. In some embodiments, EAI server 128 retrieves service-relatedinformation from database cluster 116 (e.g., information entered by orderived from information entered by portal user 102) and provides theinformation to gateway application server 138 for sending to end-userdevice 100.

FIG. 13 shows that EAI server 128 includes two agents that communicatewith monitoring element 188 through firewall 186. Notification agent 228provides information to monitoring element 188. In some embodiments,notification agent 228 is an SNMP agent. In some embodiments, theinformation provided by notification agent 228 includes unsolicitednotifications of events (e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMP traps,etc.). In some embodiments, information provided by notification agent228 is in response to a request from monitoring element 188.

In some embodiments, monitoring element 188 responds to information sentby notification agent 228. For example, in some embodiments, monitoringelement 188 sends notification agent 228 a message directing EAI server128 to perform an action (e.g., run a program, run a test query tovalidate that the system is functional, run a program to determinewhether a connected system is functional, etc.).

Log forwarder 230 also sends information to monitoring element 188. Insome embodiments, log forwarder 230 sends information configured toassist in diagnosing problems with a system or service controllerapplication. For example, in some embodiments, EAI server 128 generateslog files, and log forwarder 230 sends the log files to monitoringelement 188. In some embodiments, the log files are generated forindividual service controller applications. In some embodiments, logforwarder 230 sends a system log, an information log, a debug log, anerror log, information about a fatal event, etc. In some embodiments,EAI server 128 initiates the transfer of information from log forwarder230 to monitoring element 188.

FIG. 14 illustrates an example embodiment that is similar to theembodiment shown in FIG. 13 . In FIG. 14 , file server 126 accessesmessage bus 130 through firewall 110. In some embodiments, file server126 places information for EAI server 128 on message bus 130. Theembodiment of FIG. 14 allows file server 126 to notify EAI server 128that there is a file available on file server 126, thus potentiallyreducing the time before EAI server 128 retrieves the file.

FIG. 15 illustrates an example embodiment with an alternate mechanism toallow file server 126 to notify EAI server that there is a fileavailable on file server 126. In the embodiment of FIG. 15 , EAI server128 includes dedicated message bus 233, and file server 126 placesinformation on message bus 233, communicating through firewall 110. EAIserver 128 consumes message bus 233 and then initiates a procedure toretrieve the file from file server 126.

FIG. 16 illustrates an example embodiment that is similar to theembodiment of FIG. 13 , except that EAI server 128 communicates withcarrier IT/billing element 139 through external EAI interface 238, whichit reaches through firewall 235. As would be understood by a person ofordinary skill in the art in view of the disclosures herein, externalEAI interface 238 may be used in the embodiments of FIGS. 7A, 7B, and7C, as well.

FIG. 17 illustrates an example embodiment of fraud server 129. Asillustrated in FIG. 17 , fraud server 129 communicates with EAI server128 through message bus 130. EAI server 128 communicates with carrierIT/billing element 139 through firewall 235, external EAI interface 238,and firewall 237. Although EAI interface 238 is illustrated as externalto EAI server 128, one of ordinary skill in the art will understand inlight of the disclosures herein that the EAI interface may be part ofEAI server 128, and, in such a case, either firewall 235 or firewall 237may be eliminated. Fraud server 129 retrieves information from andstores information on database cluster 116 through firewall 114. In someembodiments, fraud server 129 stores fraud events on database cluster116. In some embodiments, fraud server 129 retrieves information to meeta request from EAI server 128 or gateway application server 138 (e.g.,carrier data usage records, device-assisted usage records, etc.). Insome embodiments, fraud server 129 places a message on message bus 130to tell EAI server 128 that fraud server 129 has completed a task.

As illustrated in FIG. 17 , fraud server 129 includes notification agent234 and log forwarder 236. Notification agent 234 provides informationto monitoring element 188. In some embodiments, notification agent 234is an SNMP agent. In some embodiments, the information provided bynotification agent 234 includes unsolicited notifications of events(e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMP traps, etc.). In some embodiments,information provided by notification agent 234 is in response to arequest from monitoring element 188.

In some embodiments, monitoring element 188 responds to information sentby notification agent 234. For example, in some embodiments, monitoringelement 188 sends notification agent 234 a message directing fraudserver 129 to perform an action (e.g., run a program, run a test queryto validate that the system is functional, run a program to determinewhether a connected system is functional, etc.).

Log forwarder 236 also sends information to monitoring element 188. Insome embodiments, log forwarder 236 sends information configured toassist in diagnosing problems with a system or service controllerapplication. For example, in some embodiments, fraud server 129generates log files, and log forwarder 236 sends the log files tomonitoring element 188. In some embodiments, the log files are generatedfor individual service controller applications. In some embodiments, logforwarder 236 sends a system log, an information log, a debug log, anerror log, information about a fatal event, etc. In some embodiments,fraud server 129 initiates the transfer of information from logforwarder 236 to monitoring element 188.

FIG. 18 illustrates an example embodiment of reconciliation server 131.As illustrated in FIG. 18 , reconciliation server 131 communicates withEAI server 128 through message bus 130. EAI server 128 communicates withcarrier IT/billing element 139 through firewall 235, external EAIinterface 238, and firewall 237. Although EAI interface 238 isillustrated as external to EAI server 128, one of ordinary skill in theart will understand in light of the disclosures herein that the EAIinterface may be part of EAI server 128, and, in such a case, eitherfirewall 235 or firewall 237 may be eliminated. EAI server 128 alsocommunicates with file server 126 through firewall 110, as described inthe context of FIGS. 7A through 7D. Reconciliation server 131 retrievesinformation from and stores information on database cluster 116 throughfirewall 114. In some embodiments, reconciliation server 131 storesoutbound usage records to be sent to the carrier on database cluster116. In some embodiments, the outbound usage records comprisedevice-assisted measures of access network usage by an end-user device,such as end-user device 100. In some embodiments, reconciliation server131 places a message on message bus 130 to tell EAI server 128 or fileserver 126 that reconciliation server 131 has completed a task. In someembodiments, reconciliation server 131 retrieves information fromdatabase cluster 116 to meet a request from EAI server 128 or gatewayapplication server 138 (e.g., carrier data usage records,device-assisted usage records, etc.).

As illustrated in FIG. 18 , reconciliation server 131 includesnotification agent 238 and log forwarder 240. Notification agent 238provides information to monitoring element 188. In some embodiments,notification agent 238 is an SNMP agent. In some embodiments, theinformation provided by notification agent 238 includes unsolicitednotifications of events (e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMP traps,etc.). In some embodiments, information provided by notification agent238 is in response to a request from monitoring element 188.

In some embodiments, monitoring element 188 responds to information sentby notification agent 238. For example, in some embodiments, monitoringelement 188 sends notification agent 238 a message directingreconciliation server 131 to perform an action (e.g., run a program, runa test query to validate that the system is functional, run a program todetermine whether a connected system is functional, etc.).

Log forwarder 240 also sends information to monitoring element 188. Insome embodiments, log forwarder 240 sends information configured toassist in diagnosing problems with a system or service controllerapplication. For example, in some embodiments, reconciliation server 131generates log files, and log forwarder 240 sends the log files tomonitoring element 188. In some embodiments, the log files are generatedfor individual service controller applications. In some embodiments, logforwarder 240 sends a system log, an information log, a debug log, anerror log, information about a fatal event, etc. In some embodiments,reconciliation server 131 initiates the transfer of information from logforwarder 240 to monitoring element 188.

FIG. 19 illustrates an example embodiment of message bus 130 as depictedin FIGS. 1A through 1C. EAI server 128 both places information on andretrieves information from message bus 130 through message queue 242.Gateway application server 138 places information on message bus throughmessage queue 242. As needed to manage the message bus, message queue242 moves entries in message queue 242 to or from master/slave messagequeue storage 248.

As illustrated in FIG. 19 , message bus 130 includes notification agent244 and log forwarder 246. Notification agent 244 provides informationto monitoring element 188. In some embodiments, notification agent 244is an SNMP agent. In some embodiments, the information provided bynotification agent 244 includes unsolicited notifications of events(e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMP traps, etc.). In some embodiments,information provided by notification agent 244 is in response to arequest from monitoring element 188.

In some embodiments, monitoring element 188 responds to information sentby notification agent 244. For example, in some embodiments, monitoringelement 188 sends notification agent 244 a message directing message bus130 to perform an action (e.g., run a program, run a test query tovalidate that the system is functional, run a program to determinewhether a connected system is functional, etc.).

Log forwarder 246 also sends information to monitoring element 188. Insome embodiments, log forwarder 246 sends information configured toassist in diagnosing problems with a system or service controllerapplication. For example, in some embodiments, message bus 130 generateslog files, and log forwarder 246 sends the log files to monitoringelement 188. In some embodiments, the log files are generated forindividual service controller applications. In some embodiments, logforwarder 246 sends a system log, an information log, a debug log, anerror log, information about a fatal event, etc. In some embodiments,message bus 130 initiates the transfer of information from log forwarder246 to monitoring element 188.

FIG. 20 illustrates an example embodiment incorporating two datacenters, data center 242 and data center 250, to assist in providinggeo-redundancy in the network. Data centers 242 and 250 are functionallyequivalent but physically distinct. Database node 260 illustrates thefunctionalities that are also present in database node 254. Databasenode 260 is part of database cluster 116, and database node 254 is partof database cluster 174 (both shown in FIG. 8 ). Database node 260includes cluster service 262, which is responsible for managing thecluster of database nodes (e.g., verifying the node operatingenvironment, verifying consistency of data stored in storage 264,performing failover to secondary database node, receiving and processingmessages from listener 270, etc.), and storage 264, which is thedatabase used for storing all of the data provided by portal applicationserver 112, gateway application server 138, EAI server 128, fraud server129, reconciliation server 131, credentialing application server 146,etc., for persistence and retrieval at a later time. Database node 260also includes listener 270, which detects database access requests madeby portal application server 112, EAI server 128, fraud server 129,reconciliation server 131, gateway application server 138, andcredentialing application server 146 through firewall 114.

As illustrated in FIG. 20 , database node 260 also includes notificationagent 266 and log forwarder 268, which communicate with monitoringelement 188 through firewall 186. Notification agent 266 providesinformation to monitoring element 188. In some embodiments, notificationagent 266 is an SNMP agent. In some embodiments, the informationprovided by notification agent 266 includes unsolicited notifications ofevents (e.g., disk full, memory error, SNMP traps, etc.). In someembodiments, information provided by notification agent 266 is inresponse to a request from monitoring element 188.

In some embodiments, monitoring element 188 responds to information sentby notification agent 266. For example, in some embodiments, monitoringelement 188 sends notification agent 266 a message directing databasenode 260 to perform an action (e.g., run a program, run a test query tovalidate that the system is functional, run a program to determinewhether a connected system is functional, etc.).

Log forwarder 268 also sends information to monitoring element 188. Insome embodiments, log forwarder 268 sends information configured toassist in diagnosing problems with a system or service controllerapplication. For example, in some embodiments, database node 260generates log files, and log forwarder 268 sends the log files tomonitoring element 188. In some embodiments, the log files are generatedfor individual service controller applications. In some embodiments, logforwarder 268 sends a system log, an information log, a debug log, anerror log, information about a fatal event, etc. In some embodiments,database node 260 initiates the transfer of information from logforwarder 268 to monitoring element 188.

Secure Service Processor Operating Environments

In some embodiments, it is advantageous to store or implement certainportions or all of service processor 115 (e.g., agents, etc.) inprotected or secure memory so that other undesired programs (and/orunauthorized users) have difficulty accessing the functions or softwarein service processor 115. In some embodiments, service processor 115, atleast in part, is placed in a secure area of the operating system (e.g.,in a kernel) so that it cannot be removed or, if it is removed, it mustbe replaced for proper device operation to resume. In some embodiments,service processor 115, at least in part, is implemented in and/or storedon secure non-volatile memory (e.g., non volatile memory can be securenon-volatile memory) that is not accessible without pass keys and/orother security mechanisms. In some embodiments, the ability to load atleast a portion of service processor 115 software into protectednon-volatile memory also requires a secure key and/or signature and/orrequires that the service processor 115 software components being loadedinto non-volatile memory are also securely encrypted and appropriatelysigned by an authority that is trusted by a secure software downloaderfunction, such as service downloader 1663 shown in FIG. 2 . In someembodiments, a secure software download embodiment also uses a securenon-volatile memory. Those of ordinary skill in the art will alsoappreciate that all memory can be on-chip, off-chip, on-board and/oroff-board.

Agent communication bus 1630 represents a functional description forproviding communication for the various service processor 115 agents andfunctions. In some embodiments, such as the embodiment shown in FIG. 2 ,the architecture of agent communication bus 1630 is generallymultipoint-to-multipoint so that any agent can communicate with anyother agent, service controller 122, or in some cases other componentsof end-user device 100, such as user interface 1697 and/or modemcomponents. The architecture can also be point-to-point for certainagents or communication transactions, or point-to-multipoint within theagent framework so that all agent communication can be concentrated, orsecured, or controlled, or restricted, or logged, or reported. In someembodiments, agent communication bus 1630 is secured, signed, encrypted,hidden, partitioned and/or otherwise protected from unauthorizedmonitoring or usage.

In some embodiments, there are multiple layers of security applied toagent communication bus 1630 communication protocols, such as includingone or more of the following: point-to-point message exchange encryptionusing one or more keys that are partially shared or shared within theservice processor 115 agent group and/or service controller 122,point-to-point message exchange that using one or more keys that areprivate to the two endpoints of the communication, a bus-level messageexchange encryption that can be in place of or in addition to otherencryption or security, or using one or more keys that are partiallyshared or shared within the service processor 115 agent group and/orservice controller 122, a set of secure messages that can only bedecoded or observed by the agents they are intended for, a set of securemessages that allow communication between certain agents or serviceprocessor functions and entities outside of the service processoroperating environment. In some embodiments, and as described herein,service control device link 1691 is assumed to be equivalent to an agentfor communication purposes, and, in the case of service control devicelink 1691, the communication is not restricted to agent communicationbus 1630 but also extends to service control communications link 1653.In some embodiments, the system has the capability to replace keys orsignatures on occasion or on a regular basis to further secure againstmonitoring, eavesdropping or compromise of the agent communicationsystem.

Various forms of message encryption and security framework techniquescan be applied to encrypt and/or secure agent communication bus 1630,including one or more of the following: agent bus encryption usingshared key for all agents provided and updated by the secure server;agent bus encryption using point to point keys in which the secureserver informs the bus and agents of keys and updates as appropriate;agent level encryption using agent to agent shared keys in which thesecure server informs agents of the key and updates the key asappropriate; agent level encryption using agent to agent point to pointkey in which the secure server informs agent of the point to point keysthat are required and updates the keys as appropriate; agent levelaccess authorization, which only allows access to the agents that are onthe secure authorization list and in which the list is provided by thesecure server and signatures are provided by the secure server; userinterface (UI) messages are only analyzed and passed, in which userinterface 1697 cannot have access to configuration information andcannot issue challenges; agent level heartbeat encryption, which can bepoint to point or shared key for that agent; control link levelheartbeat encryption; TLS (Transport Layer Security) communicationprotocols; server level heartbeat encryption, which can be point topoint or shared key for that secure server; and/or access controlintegrity agent 1694 or heartbeat function can become point tomultipoint secure communications hubs.

In some embodiments, the design of agent communication bus 1630 dependson the nature of the design embodiments for the agents and/or otherfunctions. For example, if the agents are implemented largely orentirely in software, then agent communication bus 1630 can beimplemented as an inter-process software communication bus. In someembodiments, such an inter-process software communication bus is avariant of D-bus (e.g., a message bus system for inter-process softwarecommunication that, for example, helps applications/agents to talk toone another), or another inter-process communication protocol or system,running a session bus in which all communications over the session buscan be secured, signed, encrypted or otherwise protected. For example,the session bus can be further protected by storing all software (e.g.,software components, applications and/or agents) in secure memory,storing all software in encrypted form in secure memory, and/orexecuting all software and communications within a secure executionenvironment, hardware environment and/or protected memory space. In someembodiments, if the agents and other functions are designed with amixture of software and hardware, or primarily with hardware, then theimplementation of the bus design will vary, and the principles andembodiments described herein will enable one of ordinary skill in theart to design the specifics of agent communication bus 1630 to meet aparticular set of product and desired functional requirements.

In some embodiments, service processor 115 includes a DDR processorlocated in a secure execution environment, and this DDR processor can beused advantageously to improve security of device-assisted servicessystems. Co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/247,998,entitled “Secured Device Data Records” and incorporated by referenceherein, describes embodiments of a DDR processor. In some embodiments,the DDR processor sends a sequence of secure device data records (DDRs)to a network element (e.g., via a secure channel). In some embodiments,the DDR processor is configured with an access controller that restrictsend-user device 100's network access to a predetermined set of networkdestinations or functions if any of the DDR processor, service processor115, or service controller 122 detects an error or potential fraud inone or more reports in the sequence of secure DDRs.

Service Processor Enrollment

In some embodiments, before service processor 115 of end-user device 100participates in device-assisted services, it enrolls with servicecontroller 122. In the enrollment process, service controller 122(using, e.g., credentialing application server 146, a network elementsuch as authentication credential server 220, etc.) allocates a devicecredential to service processor 115. In some embodiments, the credentialis one or more of a certificate, a key, a shared secret, a password, ahash, a shared algorithm, or any other item of information that allowsservice controller 122 to confirm the identity of service processor 115.After service controller 122 has allocated the device credential,service controller 122 can use the device credential when it needs toauthenticate service processor 115, such as, for example, beforeend-user device 100 sends device-based usage reports to gatewayapplication server 138.

FIG. 21 illustrates a set of steps end-user device 100 takes to obtain acredential from service controller 122 in accordance with someembodiments. At step 1000, end-user device 100 creates a key pair. Atstep 1002, end-user device 100 generates an identity credential usingthe key pair. In some embodiments, the identity credential comprises adevice identifier and a subscriber identifier. At step 1004, using theidentity credential generated in step 1002, end-user device 100generates a request for the service controller credential. At step 1006,end-user device 100 sends the request for the service controllercredential to the service controller. At step 1008, end-user device 100receives a credential from service controller 122. In some embodiments,the service controller credential is a public key credential. At step1010, end-user device 100 verifies the service controller credentialsigning chain. As will be appreciated by a person having ordinary skillin the art, the process of verifying the authenticity and validity of anewly received credential involves checking all of the credentials inthe chain of credentials from the original, universally trustedcertificate authority, through any intermediate certificate authorities,down to the credential just received, which may be referred to as theend credential. The end credential is trusted if each credential in thatcredential's chain is properly issued and valid.

If end-user device 100 successfully verifies the service controllercredential signing chain in step 1010, at step 1012 end-user device 100generates a credential signing request using the service controllercredential received in step 1008. In some embodiments, the credentialsigning request comprises a subscriber identifier and a deviceidentifier. At step 1014, end-user device 100 sends the credentialsigning request to the service controller. In some embodiments, thecredential signing request comprises a challenge password. At step 1016,end-user device 100 receives a device credential from service controller122. At step 1018, end-user device 100 stores the device credential inlocal memory. In some embodiments, service controller 122 (e.g.,credentialing application server 146) comprises a simple certificateenrollment protocol (SCEP) server, and the credential is a certificate.In some embodiments, messages sent and received by end-user device 100are encrypted. In some embodiments, the service controller credentialand device credential are 2048-bit RSA public key credentials. In someembodiments, service controller 122 and end-user device 100 communicateusing a session key.

FIG. 22 illustrates the steps service controller 122 (e.g., usingcredentialing application server 146) performs to provide a devicecredential to end-user device 100 in some embodiments. At step 1030,service controller 122 receives a request for a service controllercredential from end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the requestcomprises a device identifier and a subscriber identifier. At step 1032,service controller 122 sends the service controller credential toend-user device 100. At step 1034, service controller 122 receives acredential signing request comprising a challenge password from end-userdevice 100. In some embodiments, the request comprises a deviceidentifier and a subscriber identifier. At step 1036, service controller122 verifies that the subscriber identifier is listed in databasecluster 116. At optional step 1038, service controller 122 verifies thedevice identifier from a device table. In some embodiments, the devicetable resides in database cluster 116 and contains a list of validdevices that are allowed to connect to service controller 122. At step1040, service controller 122 validates the challenge password using thedevice identifier. At step 1042, service controller 122 stores thedevice identifier in database cluster 116 as associated with thesubscriber identifier associated with end-user device 100. At step 1044,service controller 122 generates a device credential for end-user device100 by obtaining a primary key from database cluster 116. At step 1046,service controller 122 stores the device credential in database cluster116 as associated with the subscriber identifier and the deviceidentifier associated with end-user device 100. At step 1048, servicecontroller 122 sends the device credential to end-user device 100. Insome embodiments, service controller 122 (e.g., using credentialingapplication server 146) comprises a simple certificate enrollmentprotocol (SCEP) server, and the credential is a certificate. In someembodiments, messages sent and received by service controller 122 areencrypted. In some embodiments, the service controller credential anddevice credential are 2048-bit RSA public key credentials. In someembodiments, service controller 122 and end-user device 100 communicateusing a session key.

Although the steps are presented in FIGS. 6B and 6C in a particularorder, as will be appreciated by a person having ordinary skill in theart in light of the disclosures herein, the ordering of some steps canbe modified. As simple examples, steps 1010 and 1012 of FIG. 21 can beinterchanged, and in FIG. 22 , step 1048 can be performed before 1046,step 1038 can be performed before step 1036, etc.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 is configured to allocatemultiple credentials to different end-user devices associated with asingle subscriber identifier. FIG. 23 illustrates an example of such anembodiment. As shown in FIG. 23, at step 1050, service controller 122(e.g., using credentialing application server 146) receives anauthentication request comprising a device identifier and a subscriberidentifier from end-user device 100. At step 1052, service controller122 verifies that the subscriber identifier is listed in databasecluster 116. If the subscriber identifier is listed in database cluster116, at step 1054, service controller 122 verifies that the deviceidentifier sent by end-user device 100 is not already in databasecluster 116. If the device identifier sent by end-user device 100 is notalready in database cluster 116, at step 1056, service controller 122obtains (e.g., by generating or allocating) a new credential forend-user device 100. At step 1058, service controller 122 stores boththe device identifier and the new credential in database 116 asassociated with the subscriber identifier. In some embodiments, thedevice identifier and the new credential are stored in separate fieldsof database cluster 116. In some embodiments, the device identifier andnew credential are stored as a single entry comprising their combination(e.g., a hash). In some embodiments, service controller 122 monitors ortracks end-user device enrollment attempts. In some embodiments,credentialing application server 146 or another element of the servicecontroller (e.g., a fraud element such as fraud server 129) notifies thecarrier about credentialing enrollment attempts, successful enrollments,or unsuccessful enrollments.

Service Processor Authentication; Starting and Stopping a Data Session

To achieve an overall network service policy, the network portion of theaccess network service policy may be configured to work in conjunctionwith the device-based portion of the access network service policy toachieve an overall combined network service policy. If the device agentsrequired to implement the device portion of the access network servicepolicy are not present on the device or are not properly configuredbecause of tampering or other undesirable activities, then the overallcombined network service policy can be in error or may not be possibleto achieve, potentially resulting in an undesired network service policyimplementation. In such cases, it is desirable for a network system tobe employed to detect this condition and modify the network portion ofan access network service policy enforced by the network-based elementsso that a desired network service policy enforcement may be achieved.

Examples of when it may be advantageous to adapt the network portion ofan access network service policy in order to account for a missing orimproperly configured service processor include but are not limited to:(i) a device credential has been moved to a device that does not have aservice processor, (ii) a device credential has been moved to a devicewith a service processor with a different configuration than the serviceprocessor originally associated with the device credential, (iii) adevice service processor has been tampered with or has an improperconfiguration.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 detects the presence andproper configuration of a service processor, or lack thereof, in theend-user device. If the service processor is present and properlyconfigured, service controller 122 causes a first network portion of anaccess network service policy to be enforced in the network, the firstnetwork portion of an access network service policy being configured toprovide counterpart policy enforcement to a device portion of an accessnetwork service policy to achieve a first desired overall access networkservice policy. If, on the other hand, the service processor is not bothpresent and properly configured, service controller 122 causes a secondnetwork portion of an access network service policy to be enforced inthe network, wherein the second network portion of the access networkservice policy is configured to operate without a device counterpartpolicy to achieve a second desired overall access network servicepolicy.

In some embodiments, a trusted service policy implementation comprisesservice controller 122 authenticating and authorizing service processor115. In some embodiments, the authentication comprises receiving andconfirming a service processor certificate. In some embodiments, theauthentication comprises receiving and confirming a service processorcertificate that is based on a shared secret between service processor115 and service controller 122. In some embodiments, the shared secretis unique for a given service processor 115.

In some embodiments, the process to establish a trusted service policyimplementation comprises service processor 115 sharing two or more typesof credentials with service controller 118, wherein the credentialsinclude two or more of a service processor credential, a devicecredential, and a user or subscriber credential. In some embodiments, aportion of the process to establish a trusted service policyimplementation includes end-user device 100 (e.g., service processor115) sharing a service processor credential, a device credential, and auser or subscriber credential with service controller 122.

In some embodiments, establishing a trusted service policyimplementation comprises service controller 122 receiving a certificateor hash result from a service processor element or agent acting on aportion of service processor 115 (for example, access control integrityagent 1694 performing a hash or certificate check on another serviceprocessor agent).

FIG. 24 illustrates an example embodiment of a process to start or stopa data session with SGSN notification. End-user device 100 attempts tostart a data session by sending a “GPRS Attach” message to SGSN 2230.SGSN 2230 notifies service controller 122 that end-user device 100 hasstarted a data session. Service controller 122 waits for apre-determined time, for example, one minute, to receive a login orauthentication request from service processor 115. In some embodiments,service controller 122 sets a login timer. If service controller 122receives the login or authentication request before the timer expires,it attempts to authenticate service processor 115.

One or more authentication errors may occur when service controller 122attempts to authenticate service processor 115. For example, serviceprocessor 115 may have invalid credentials. As another example, serviceprocessor 115 may send invalid application or kernel signatures. Asanother example, service processor 115 may report end-user device “root”detection errors. As another example, service processor 115 may contactservice controller 122 using an identifier that is already in use by adifferent end-user device.

If service controller 122 does not receive the request from serviceprocessor 115 within the pre-determined time, or if service controller122 is unable to authenticate service processor 115 for some reason,service controller 122 assumes that either (1) end-user device 100 doesnot contain a service processor, and is therefore unable to participatein device-assisted services, or (2) although end-user device 100 has aservice processor, service processor 115 has been disabled. Servicecontroller 122 sends a notification (“No active SP” message) to datarating element 2220 to indicate that end-user device 100 does not havethe ability to provide the information necessary for data mediationelement 2210 to generate detailed data usage reports (referred to hereinas “micro-CDRs”). In some embodiments, service controller 122 sends atrigger to data mediation element 2210 to indicate that end-user device100 should be charged for usage at “standard” bulk rates. In someembodiments, service controller 122 specifies a “standard” bulk ratecharging code in the charging data records (CDRs) it sends to datamediation element 2210. In some embodiments, data rating element 2220determines data usage by end-user device 100 based on carrier-basedrecords (e.g., records of end-user device 100's usage of data overaccess network 10).

If service controller 122 receives the login or authentication requestfrom service processor 115 within the pre-determined time andsuccessfully authenticates service processor 115, service controller 122sends a notification (“Device OK” message) to data rating element 2220to indicate that end-user device 100 has a service processor and iscapable of supporting device-assisted services. In some embodiments,data rating element 2220 expects to receive “micro-CDR” reports fromdata mediation element 2210 when service controller 122 has determinedthat end-user device 100 has an active service processor. In someembodiments, data rating element 2220 determines usage based on themicro-CDRs, which contain more granular information than ordinary CDRs.For example, whereas an ordinary CDR might simply report that anend-user device used 100 Megabytes (MB) of data, a set of micro-CDRsmight report that the end-user device used 15 MB of e-mail, 35 MB ofsocial networking, and 50 MB of streaming video.

In some embodiments, data mediation element 2210 sends carrier-basedusage reports (e.g., CDRs) to service controller 122. Service controller122 queries usage database 2200 for device-based usage reports (e.g.,micro-CDRs) for end-user device 100. Service controller 122 determinesthe data usage of end-user device 100 from the carrier-based usagereports. Service controller 122 also determines the data usage ofend-user device 100 from the device-based usage reports. In someembodiments, described in more detail below, service controller 122compares the usage determined from the carrier-based usage reports tothe usage determined from the device-based usage reports. If servicecontroller 122 determines that the two usage measures do not match(e.g., are not identical or are not within a threshold of each other),service controller 122 sends a notification (e.g., a fraud alert) todata rating element 2220 to indicate that the end-user device is in apotential fraud state, and data rating element 2220 should bill usagefor end-user device 100 based on carrier-based usage reports. Servicecontroller 122 sends the carrier-based usage reports and device-basedusage reports to data mediation element 2210.

When the “GPRS detach” message is received by SGSN 2230, SGSN 2230 sendsa notification to service controller 122 that the data session forend-user device 100 is closed.

FIG. 25 illustrates an example embodiment of a process to start or stopa data session with GGSN notification. The process is similar to thatdescribed with reference to FIG. 24 , except in how the data sessionstarts and ends. End-user device 100 starts a data session by sendingdata traffic to GGSN 2240. GGSN 2240 recognizes the start of a new datasession and notifies service controller 122 that end-user device 100 hasstarted a data session. When GGSN 2240 determines that the data sessionhas closed, it sends a notification to service controller 122 that thedata session for end-user device 100 is closed.

FIG. 26 illustrates an example embodiment of a process to start or stopa data session when a AAA or RADIUS server (e.g., access network AAAserver 1621) provides start/stop accounting in a GSM/GPRS core datanetwork. The process is similar to that described with reference to FIG.24 , except that AAA or RADIUS 2242 authorizes the start of a new datasession and notifies service controller 122 that end-user device 100 hasstarted a data session. When AAA or RADIUS 2242 determines that the datasession has closed, it sends a notification to service controller 122that the data session is closed.

FIG. 27 illustrates an example embodiment of a process to start or stopa data session when an OCS provides start/stop accounting in a GSM/GPRScore data network. The process is similar to that described withreference to FIG. 24 , except that after GGSN 2240 recognizes the startof a new data session with end-user device 100, GGSN 2240 queries OCS2246 for a data lease. OCS 2246 authorizes the data session by returninga value representing an amount of data to GGSN 2240 (e.g., OCS 2246sends a value of X bytes to GGSN 2240). OCS 2246 uses API 2244 to notifyservice controller 122 that end-user device 100 has started a datasession. When GGSN 2240 determines that the data session has closed, itsends a notification to OCS 2246 indicating the amount of data left inthe amount of data authorized by OCS 2246. OCS 2246 uses API 2244 tonotify service controller 122 that the data session is closed.

Service processor 115 may successfully authenticate with servicecontroller 122 but then subsequently send one or more fraudnotifications. Examples of device fraud notifications that serviceprocessor 115 might send are: invalid service processor kernelsignature, invalid service processor framework signature, invalidservice processor application signature, service processor applicationunable to connect to service processor kernel, service processorapplication not receiving heartbeat messages from service processorkernel, service processor kernel missing, service processor frameworkmissing, service processor application missing, hosts file tampered withor missing, service processor to service controller encryption failure,or device “root” detected. In some embodiments, in response to receivinga device fraud notification from service processor 115, servicecontroller 122 generates a fraud alert.

End-User Device Kernel/Software Component Verification

In some embodiments, establishing a trusted service policyimplementation comprises two service processor 115 elements performing amutual authentication of one another and then acting on an error resultif one occurs. FIG. 28 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedurethat a verifying software component on end-user device 100 may performto verify the integrity of another software component on end-user device100. Each of the software components can be, for example, a kernel, alibrary, an executable file, one or more interpreted, machine-readableinstructions, a script, a service processor, or any other softwarecomponent.

At step 1100, a verifying software component obtains the public key of ato-be-verified software component. At step 1102, the verifying softwarecomponent generates a random number. At step 1104, the verifyingsoftware component generates an encrypted challenge using the randomnumber and the to-be-verified software component's public key. At step1106, the verifying software component sends the encrypted challenge tothe to-be-verified software component. At step 1108, the verifyingsoftware component obtains an encrypted response from the to-be-verifiedsoftware component. At step 1110, the verifying software componentobtains its own private key. At step 1112, the verifying softwarecomponent uses its own private key and the encrypted response to obtaina first decoded random number. At step 1114, the verifying softwarecomponent verifies that the first decoded random number matches thegenerated random number. In some embodiments, if the first decodedrandom number does not match the generated random number, the verifyingsoftware component takes an action. In some embodiments, if theto-be-verified software component is an application, the actioncomprises restricting the application's ability to communicate over anaccess network. In some embodiments, the action comprises notifying auser of end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the action comprisesnotifying a network administrator. In some embodiments, if theto-be-verified software component is an application, the action is toapply a policy to attempted or successful communications associated withthe application. In some embodiments, the action is to take acountermeasure, such as, for example, preventing a user from accessingthe to-be-verified software component, preventing the to-be-verifiedsoftware component from executing, or terminating the to-be-verifiedsoftware component (if it is running).

In some embodiments, if, in step 1114, the first decoded random numbermatches the generated random number, the verifying software componentsends a message to service controller 122 (or another network element)indicating that the to-be-verified software component passed the test.

FIG. 29 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that theto-be-verified software component can perform in response to theprocedure of FIG. 28 . At step 1120, the to-be-verified softwarecomponent obtains the encrypted challenge from the verifying softwarecomponent. At step 1122, the to-be-verified software component obtainsits own private key. At step 1124, the to-be-verified software componentuses its own private key and the encrypted challenge to obtain a seconddecoded random number. At step 1126, the to-be-verified softwarecomponent obtains the verifying component's public key. At step 1128,the to-be-verified software component uses the verifying component'spublic key and the second decoded random number to generate an encryptedchallenge response. At step 1130, the to-be-verified component sends theencrypted challenge response to the verifying component.

End-User Device Application Authentication

In some embodiments, an installed software application on end-userdevice 100 cannot be modified, updated, or replaced unless the softwarepurporting to be a modification, update, or replacement includes acredential that matches a credential associated with the installedapplication. In some embodiments, the installed-application credentialis a name identifier. In some embodiments, the installed-applicationcredential is a secure signature, certificate, or hash of the installedsoftware application. In some embodiments, the installed-applicationcredential is stored on end-user device 100. In some embodiments, theinstalled-application credential is accessible to service processor 115(for example, via policy control agent 1692). In some embodiments, whenan attempt is made to modify, update, or replace the installed softwareapplication, service processor 115 and/or a device operating system (OS)obtains both the installed-application credential and a credentialassociated with the purported modification, update, or replacement. Ifthe credential associated with the purported modification, update, orreplacement matches the installed-application credential, serviceprocessor 115 allows the installed application to be modified, updated,or replaced.

FIG. 30 illustrates a procedure to determine whether to allow amodification, update, or replacement of an installed software program.At step 1300, a component of end-user device 100 (e.g., serviceprocessor 115 or an operating system) obtains a credential associatedwith a software application installed on end-user device 100. At step1302, a component of end-user device 100 (e.g., service processor 115 oran operating system) obtains a credential associated with softwarepurporting to be a modification, update, or replacement of the installedsoftware application. At step 1304, a component of end user-device 100(e.g., service processor 115 or an operating system) determines whetherthe credential associated with the software purporting to be amodification, update, or replacement of the installed softwareapplication matches the credential associated with the installedsoftware application. If there is a match, then at step 1306, acomponent of end-user device 100 (e.g., service processor 115 or anoperating system) takes a first action. In some embodiments, the firstaction comprises allowing the software purporting to be a modification,update, or replacement of the installed application software to beinstalled on end-user device. In some embodiments, the first actionfurther comprises notifying the service controller or a user of end-userdevice 100 of the modification, update, or replacement of the installedapplication software.

If, at step 1304, the credential associated with the software purportingto be a modification, update, or replacement of the installed softwareapplication does not match the credential associated with the installedsoftware application, then at step 1308, a component of end-user device100 (e.g., service processor 115 or an operating system) takes a fraudaction. In some embodiments, the fraud action comprises restrictingend-user device 100's access to an access network. In some embodiments,the fraud action comprises restricting an application's (e.g., theinstalled software application's) ability to communicate over an accessnetwork. In some embodiments, the fraud action comprises notifying auser of end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the fraud actioncomprises notifying a network administrator or a network element of thecredential mismatch. In some embodiments, the fraud action comprisesapplying a pre-determined billing rate for service usage by end-userdevice 100. In some embodiments, the fraud action comprises applying apre-determined billing rate to service usage associated with theinstalled software application.

In some embodiments, end-user device 100 stores in memory (e.g.,application program store 830 of FIG. 38 ) an application programconfigured to execute on end-user device 100 to access one or more dataservices over an access network. The application program is associatedwith a credential that is also stored on end-user device 100 (e.g., inapplication program store 830, in application credential and policystore 810, etc.). End-user device 100 also stores (e.g., in applicationcredential and policy store 810) a network access policy comprising oneor more first instructions to be applied when the application programinitiates or attempts to initiate communications over the first wirelessaccess network. A device agent or a combination of device agents (e.g.,application interface agent 1693, policy implementation agent 1690,modem selection and control 1811, etc.) determines when the applicationprogram initiates or attempts to initiate a communication over theaccess network (e.g., by monitoring end-user device 100 traffic flows,etc.) and applies the network access policy to the communication overthe access network.

In some embodiments, end-user device 100 further comprises one or moredevice agents (e.g., service downloader 1663, access control integrityagent 1694, service monitor agent 1696, etc.) that detect when an entity(e.g., a user of end-user device 100, service controller 122, etc.)wishes or attempts to install update software on end-user device 100,where the update software purports to be a modification, update, orreplacement of the application program. To improve security, the one ormore device agents prevent modifications, updates, and replacements ofthe application software unless a credential associated with thepurported update matches a credential of the installed application. Forexample, the one or more device agents obtain a credential associatedwith the application program that is already installed on end-userdevice 100, and a credential associated with a purported update to theinstalled application program. If the one or more device agentsdetermine that the credentials match, they allow the update software tobe installed or to execute on end-user device 100.

In some embodiments, security of end-user device 100 is enhanced usingagents on end-user device 100. In some embodiments, an agent on end-userdevice 100 (e.g., policy implementation agent 1690, policy control agent1692, access control integrity agent 1694, or any other agent that canperform verification functions) determines if a hosts file is present onthe end-user device and configured in an expected manner. If the hostsfile is not present or is not configured in an expected manner, in someembodiments, the agent takes an action. In some embodiments, the actionis to generate a fraud alert. In some embodiments, the action is to takea countermeasure, such as, for example, to block, delay, rate-limit, orquarantine access to the access network by end-user device 100. In someembodiments, the action is to provide a notification to a user ofend-user device 100. In some embodiments, the action is to send amessage to service controller 122.

In some embodiments, an agent on end-user device 100 (e.g., policyimplementation agent 1690, policy control agent 1692, access controlintegrity agent 1694, or any other agent that can perform verificationfunctions) determines if service processor 115 successfully completedthe authentication procedure with service controller 122. In someembodiments, if the agent determines that service processor 115 hasfailed to complete the authentication procedure, the agent takes anaction. In some embodiments, the action is to generate a fraud alert. Insome embodiments, the action is to take a countermeasure, such as, forexample, to block, delay, rate-limit, or quarantine access to the accessnetwork by end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the action is toprovide a notification to a user of end-user device 100. In someembodiments, the action is to send a message to service controller 122.

In some embodiments, an agent on end-user device 100 (e.g., policyimplementation agent 1690, policy control agent 1692, access controlintegrity agent 1694, or any other agent that can perform verificationfunctions) determines whether the end-user device has been “rooted” or“jailbroken.” As will be appreciated by a person having ordinary skillin the art, rooting (or “jailbreaking”) is a process that allows a userof a mobile device to attain privileged access (known as “root access”)to the device's operating system, thereby potentially circumventingvarious limitations that might otherwise govern operation of the device.In some embodiments, if the agent determines that end-user device 100has been rooted or jailbroken, the agent takes an action. In someembodiments, the action is to generate a fraud alert. In someembodiments, the action is to take a countermeasure, such as, forexample, to block, delay, rate-limit, or quarantine access to the accessnetwork by end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the action is toprovide a notification to a user of end-user device 100. In someembodiments, the action is to send a message to service controller 122.

In embodiments in which service processor 115 applies an access networkpolicy that includes classification of attempted or successful serviceusage attributed to a device software application program, theidentification of the software application program and association ofthe access network policy to the software application program comprisesassociating the access network policy with a known-applicationcredential. In some embodiments, the credential is a name identifier. Insome embodiments, the credential is a secure signature, certificate, orhash of the software application program. In some embodiments, thecredential is stored on end-user device 100 by service processor 115(for example, by policy control agent 1692), and service processor 115and/or a device operating system (OS) obtains a run-time applicationcredential for an application that intends to initiate execution andobtain access network service or has successfully initiated executionand obtained access network service usage. Policy control agent 1692compares the run-time credential to the stored known-applicationcredential, and if there is a credential match the access network policyassociated with the known-application credential is applied to theapplication access network service usage.

In some embodiments, the known-application credential is stored onend-user device 100 and used for the comparison with the run-timeapplication credential. In some embodiments, the run-time applicationcredential is provided to an element of service controller 122 (forexample, policy management server 1652) that in turn determines if itmatches a known-application credential and, if so, the element ofservice controller 122 provides the appropriate policy to serviceprocessor 115 (e.g., using gateway application server 138). In someembodiments, service processor 115 performs an application identitycheck on the run-time software program (for example, a secure hash, asecure hash based on a key provided by an element of service controller122, or a signature check), and the result of this identity check isprovided to the element of service controller 122, which in turndetermines if it matches a known-application credential; if so, theelement of service controller 122 provides the appropriate policy toservice processor 115.

In some embodiments, if service processor 115 determines that a run-timeapplication credential is intended, or may indicate an attempt, to spoofa known-application credential, a fraud action is taken. In someembodiments, if service controller 122 determines that a run-timeapplication credential is intended, or may indicate an attempt, to spoofa known-application credential, a fraud action is taken. In someembodiments, the fraud action comprises restricting access to an accessnetwork for end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the fraud actioncomprises restricting an application's ability to communicate over anaccess network. In some embodiments, the fraud action comprisesnotifying a user of end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the fraudaction comprises notifying a network administrator. In some embodiments,the fraud action comprises applying a pre-determined billing rate forservice usage by end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the fraudaction comprises applying a pre-determined billing rate for run-timeapplication service usage by end-user device 100.

FIG. 31 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that anend-user device, such as end-user device 100, can use to validate thatan application installed on the end-user device is authentic. Theapplication installed on the end-user device is associated with acredential that is stored in memory on the end-user device (e.g.,application credential and policy store 810 of FIG. 38 ). The credentialmay be any type of credential, such as, for example, a certificate, akey, a shared secret, a password, a hash, or a shared algorithm. At step1160, the end-user device obtains a known-valid credential associatedwith the application that is installed on the end-user device. Theknown-valid credential may be any type of credential, such as, forexample, a certificate, a key, a shared secret, a password, a hash, or ashared algorithm. In some embodiments, the end-user device obtains theknown-valid credential from a trusted source. In some embodiments, thetrusted source is the service controller. In some embodiments, thetrusted source is a marketplace, an app store, an application author, adistributor, or a reseller. At step 1162, the end-user device determineswhether the known-valid credential matches the credential of theinstalled application. If the credentials do not match, then in someembodiments the end-user device takes a first action at step 1164. Insome embodiments, the first action is to generate a fraud alert. In someembodiments, the first action is to apply an unknown-application policy.In some embodiments, the first action is to notify a user of theend-user device. In some embodiments, the first action is to take acountermeasure, such as, for example, preventing a user from accessingthe installed application, preventing the installed application fromexecuting, or terminating the installed application (if it is running).In some embodiments, the first action is to send a notification to anetwork element.

If, in step 1162, the credentials match, the end-user device takes asecond action at step 1166. In some embodiments, the second action is toapply a policy associated with the installed application. In someembodiments, the second action is to send a message to a serverindicating that the end-user device is in a healthy state.

FIG. 32 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that a servicecontroller can use to validate that an application installed on anend-user device is authentic. At step 1170, the service controllerobtains an application package from a trusted source. In someembodiments, the trusted source is a marketplace, an app store, anapplication author, a distributor, or a reseller. In some embodiments,the service controller obtains the application package in response to arequest from the end-user device. At step 1172, the service controllerextracts an application credential from the application package. Thecredential may be any type of credential, such as, for example, acertificate, a key, a shared secret, a password, a hash, or a sharedalgorithm. At step 1174, the service controller sends the applicationcredential to the end-user device. In some embodiments, the servicecontroller later receives a status message from the end-user deviceafter sending the application credential to the end-user device.

FIG. 33 illustrates an example embodiment of another procedure that aservice controller may use to validate that an application installed onan end-user device is authentic. At step 1180, the service controllerreceives a first application credential from the end-user device. Thecredential may be any type of credential, such as, for example, acertificate, a key, a shared secret, a password, a hash, or a sharedalgorithm. At step 1182, the service controller obtains an applicationpackage from a trusted source. In some embodiments, the trusted sourceis a marketplace, an app store, an application author, a distributor, ora reseller. At step 1184, the service controller extracts a secondapplication credential from the application package. At step 1186, theservice controller determines whether the first application credentialmatches the second application credential. In some embodiments, if thecredentials do not match, the service controller is configured to takean action (e.g., send a message to the end-user device, generate a fraudalert, send a message to the carrier, etc.).

FIG. 34 illustrates an example embodiment of another procedure that anend-user device may use to validate that an application installed on theend-user device is authentic. At step 1190, the end-user device obtainsa credential associated with an installed application. The credentialmay be any type of credential, such as, for example, a certificate, akey, a shared secret, a password, a hash, or a shared algorithm. At step1192, the end-user device generates a signed application credentialusing the installed-application credential and a device credentialstored in local memory. The device credential may be any type ofcredential, such as, for example, a certificate, a key, a shared secret,a password, a hash, or a shared algorithm. At step 1194, the end-userdevice sends the signed application credential to the servicecontroller. At step 1196, the end-user device receives a message fromthe service controller regarding the authenticity of the installedapplication. In some embodiments, the message comprises, or is followedby a message with, instructions to take an action, such as, for example,to block the installed application from accessing the access network.

FIG. 35 illustrates an example embodiment of another procedure that aservice controller may use to validate that an application installed onan end-user device is authentic. At step 1200, the service controllerreceives a signed application credential comprising aninstalled-application credential and a device credential from theend-user device. The device credential may be any type of credential,such as, for example, a certificate, a key, a shared secret, a password,a hash, or a shared algorithm. In some embodiments, the signedapplication credential comprises a combination of theinstalled-application credential and the device credential (e.g., ahash). At step 1202, the service controller uses the device credentialto process the signed application credential to obtain a firstapplication credential. At step 1204, the service controller obtains asecond application credential from a trusted source. In someembodiments, the service controller obtains an application package fromthe trusted source and extracts the second credential from theapplication package. In some embodiments, the trusted source is amarketplace, an app store, an application author, a distributor, or areseller. At step 1206, the service controller determines whether thefirst application credential matches the second application credential.In some embodiments, if the first application credential does not matchthe second application credential, the service controller takes anaction (e.g., sends a message to the end-user device, generates a fraudalert, sends a message to the carrier, etc.).

FIG. 36 illustrates an example embodiment of another procedure that anend-user device may use to validate that an application installed on theend-user device is authentic. At step 1210, the end-user device receivesa signed application credential from the service controller. Thecredential may be any type of credential, such as, for example, acertificate, a key, a shared secret, a password, a hash, or a sharedalgorithm. At step 1212, the end-user device uses a device credential,stored in local memory, and the signed application credential todetermine a first application credential. At step 1214, the end-userdevice obtains an installed-application credential that is associatedwith an application installed on the end-user device. The credential maybe any type of credential, such as, for example, a certificate, a key, ashared secret, a password, a hash, or a shared algorithm. At step 1216,the end-user device determines whether the first application credentialmatches the installed-application credential. In some embodiments, ifthe first application credential does not match theinstalled-application credential, the end-user device takes an action(e.g., sends a message to the service controller, blocks the applicationfrom accessing the access network, executes instructions set by acontrol, charging, or notification policy, etc.). In some embodiments,the end-user device sends a message to the service controller to provideinformation about the authenticity of the application installed on theend-user device.

FIG. 37 illustrates an example embodiment of another procedure that aservice controller may use to validate that an application installed onan end-user device is authentic. At step 1220, the service controllerobtains an application credential from a trusted source, wherein theapplication credential is associated with the installed application. Theapplication credential may be any type of credential, such as, forexample, a certificate, a key, a shared secret, a password, a hash, or ashared algorithm. In some embodiments, the trusted source is amarketplace, an app store, an application author, a distributor, or areseller. At step 1222, the service controller generates a signedapplication credential using the application credential and a devicecredential stored in local memory. In some embodiments, local memory isdatabase cluster 116. In some embodiments, the device credential is acertificate, a key, a shared secret, a password, a hash, or a sharedalgorithm. At step 1224, the service controller sends the signedapplication credential to the end-user device. In some embodiments,after sending the signed application credential to the end-user device,the service controller receives a message from the end-user deviceproviding information about the authenticity of the applicationinstalled on the end-user device.

FIG. 38 illustrates an example embodiment of end-user device 100 forimplementing access network policy specific to a device applicationprogram. In the embodiment of FIG. 38 , end-user device 100 includescommunication modem 880, memory that includes application program store830 and application credential and policy store 810, applicationexecution environment 850, and application policy control 820.Communication modem 880 enables end-user device 100 to communicate overat least a first access network. Application program store 830 stores arun-time application program. Application credential and policy store810 stores a known-application credential associated with a knownapplication program and a known application access network policyassociated with the known-application credential. In some embodiments,the run-time application credential is stored with the run-timeapplication program. In some embodiments, the known-applicationcredential is a security certificate, signature, or hash for the knownapplication program. In some embodiments, end-user device 100 is furtherconfigured to obtain the known-application credential from a networkelement by way of a secure data connection between end-user device 100and the network element.

Application execution environment 850 retrieves the run-time applicationprogram from memory and executes it, determines a run-time applicationcredential associated with the run-time application program, andassociates the run-time application credential with a run-timecommunication activity comprising a run-time application program's useof or intended use of the first access network. Application policycontrol 820 receives the run-time application credential, receivesinformation associated with the run-time application communicationactivity, and determines whether the run-time application credentialmatches the known-application credential. If so, application policycontrol 820 causes the known application access network policy to beapplied to the run-time application communication activity.

In some embodiments, end-user device 100 is further configured toprovide the run-time application credential to a network element by wayof a secure data connection between end-user device 100 and the networkelement. In some embodiments, end-user device 100 is further configuredto receive information from the network element indicating the validityof the run-time application credential. In some embodiments, end-userdevice 100 is further configured to receive the information about theapplication policy from the network element by way of a secure dataconnection between end-user device 100 and the network element.

In some embodiments, end-user device 100 protects particular elements(e.g., software) from unauthorized user modification or unauthorizedapplication program modification. For example, in some embodiments,end-user device 100 stores the known-application credential and theknown application access network policy in a secure location. In someembodiments, end-user device 100 performs various functions, such as:determining the run-time application credential associated with therun-time application program (e.g., the credential-reporting element inthe application execution environment); associating the run-timeapplication credential with the run-time application communicationactivity (e.g., the credential-reporting element in the applicationexecution environment); receiving the run-time application credential(e.g., application policy control 820); receiving information indicatingthe run-time application communication activity (e.g., the applicationpolicy control 820); determining if the run-time application credentialmatches the known-application credential (e.g., the application policycontrol 820); causing the known application access network policy to beapplied to the run-time application communication activity (e.g.,application policy control 820 instructing either the run-timecontroller element of the application execution environment 850 or theapplication policy enforcement element in the communications stack 860).

In some embodiments, the run-time application communication activity isan attempted access or successful access to access network 10 by therun-time application program, and the known application access networkpolicy specifies allowing the access, blocking the access, limiting theaccess, or accounting for the access.

In some embodiments, the run-time application communication activity isan attempted access or successful access to an access network by therun-time application program, and the known application access networkpolicy specifies a usage notification policy for notifying the user ofthe attempted or successful access. In some embodiments, the usagenotification policy is configured to present to a user through userinterface 1697 an access network service usage breakdown showing theservice usage for the run-time application program. In some embodiments,the usage breakdown includes a breakdown by application. In someembodiments, the usage breakdown includes a breakdown by network type.In some embodiments, the usage breakdown includes a breakdown by bothapplication and network type. In some embodiments, the usage breakdownincludes a breakdown by network type. In some embodiments, the usagebreakdown includes a roaming network breakdown. In some embodiments, theusage breakdown includes a breakdown by roaming network usage and byapplication.

In some embodiments, the usage notification policy is configured topresent to a user through user interface 1697 a warning of the potentialrate of service usage for the known application program. In someembodiments, the usage notification policy is configured to present to auser through user interface 1697 an offer to purchase service for therun-time application program. In some embodiments, the usagenotification policy is configured to present to a user through userinterface 1697 an indication of how much of a service allowanceallocated to the known application program has been used or is remainingto be used.

In some embodiments, the run-time application communication activity isan attempt to execute or successful execution of the run-timeapplication program, and the known application access network policyspecifies allowing execution of the run-time application program,blocking execution of the run-time application program, or notifying theuser of the attempted or successful execution.

In some embodiments, end-user device 100 is further configured withsecond access modem 890 to communicate with a second access network, andthe run-time application communication activity comprises a run-timeapplication program's use of or attempted use of the first accessnetwork or the second access network. In some embodiments, the knownapplication access network policy settings or instructions differ basedon whether end-user device 100 is connected to the first access networkor to the second access network.

In some embodiments, user interface 1697 provides a user of end-userdevice 100 with input capability to modify access network serviceaccording to user preference and to receive access network servicenotifications. In some embodiments, user interface 1697 accepts userinputs for modifying access network policy, such as limiting access byone or more applications or access to one or more network destinations.In some embodiments, user interface 1697 accepts user inputs forchoosing or modifying a service plan.

In some embodiments, at least an aspect of the known application accessnetwork policy is entered by a device user through user interface 1697.In some embodiments, at least an aspect of the known application accessnetwork policy is obtained from a network element.

In some embodiments, the memory is further configured to store anunknown application access network policy to be applied to the run-timeapplication communication activity when the run-time applicationcredential does not match the known-application credential. In some suchembodiments, the application policy decision agent is further configuredto determine if the run-time application credential does not match theknown-application credential, and, if the run-time applicationcredential does not match the known-application credential, cause theunknown application access network policy to be applied to the run-timeapplication communication activity.

In some embodiments, end-user device 100 further comprises a policyenforcement agent (e.g., either a run-time controller element ofapplication execution environment 850 or application policy enforcementelement 862 in communications stack 860) configured to apply the knownapplication access network policy to the run-time applicationcommunication activity and to cause the known application access networkpolicy to be applied to the run-time application communication activity.In some embodiments, the known application access network policy isapplied to the run-time application communication activity by providingan instruction to the policy enforcement agent. In some embodiments, thepolicy enforcement agent (e.g., the run-time controller element ofapplication execution environment 850 or application policy enforcementelement 862 in communications stack 860) applies the known applicationaccess network policy at the application layer of a device operatingsystem. In some embodiments, the policy enforcement agent applies theknown application access network policy at the library or frameworklayer of a device operating system. In some embodiments, the policyenforcement agent applies the known application access network policy byinteracting with communications stack 860 or modifying communicationsstack traffic flows. In some embodiments, the policy enforcement agentapplies the known application access network policy at the kernel or lowlevel OS layer of an operating system of end-user device 100.

FIG. 39 illustrates an example embodiment wherein end-user device 100 iscapable of connecting to Internet 12 through more than one accessnetwork (e.g., wireless access network 822 and wireless access network824). In some embodiments, end-user device 100 is further configuredwith a second access modem to enable end-user device 100 to communicateover a second access network, and the run-time application communicationactivity includes a run-time application program's use of or intendeduse of the first access network or the second access network, and theusage notification policy is configured to provide a user notificationthat is dependent on which network end-user device 100 is connected to.

End-User Device Agent Verification

It may be advantageous in some embodiments to validate particular agentson the end-user device that assist in the provisioning and/or managementof device-assisted services. In some embodiments, end-user device 100includes one or more verification agents that may be used to validateone or more device-assisted services agents. There are many possibledevice-assisted agents that may be verified, such as, for example: ausage reporting agent (e.g., an agent that reports aggregate or finer(e.g., per-service or classification) measures of access network usageby the end-user device), a usage counting agent (e.g., an agent thatreports counts of access network usage by the end-user device), a policyenforcement agent, a notification agent, a policy decision agent, anetwork state agent, a kernel communication agent, a user interfaceagent, a persistence agent (e.g., an agent that reads or writes from adata store, such as a local memory), a plan catalog agent, a servicecontroller communication agent, a tethering detection agent, atime-of-day agent (e.g., an agent that manages a policy based on time ofday), a kernel agent, or an analytics agent. Examples of agents areshown in FIG. 2 and other figures and are described herein.

There are a number of ways in which the verification agent can validatea device-assisted services agent, including, for example: by performinga hash operation, by performing a checksum operation, by determiningwhether a digital signature is valid, by performing a fingerprint, bygenerating a random challenge and checking a response by thedevice-assisted services agent to the challenge, by extracting featuresfrom the agent for analysis by an artificial intelligence element (e.g.,a support vector machine, a hidden Markov model, a decision tree, or adecision forest), etc. In some embodiments, the verification agent sendsa verification message to the service controller with information aboutthe results of the verification operation. In some embodiments, theverification message contains information about the integrity status ofone or more of the device-assisted services agents. In some embodiments,the verification message comprises a hash, where the hash is the resultof one or more of: a hash operation on a kernel component, a hashoperation on a system component, a hash operation on an application. Insome embodiments, the verification message comprises a hash that is acombination of two or more hashes. In some embodiments, the verificationmessage comprises a salted hash. In some embodiments, the end-userdevice receives a verification result from the service controller. Insome embodiments, the end-user device takes an action based on theverification result (e.g., blocks, allows, rate-limits, or delays anaccess to the access network by the end-user device; quarantines theend-user device; provides a notification to a user of the end-userdevice; heals a device-assisted services agent; etc.).

FIG. 40 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure that a servicecontroller may use to verify a software component on an end-user devicebased on a verification message from the end-user device. At step 1230,the service controller receives a verification message from the end-userdevice. In some embodiments, the verification message comprises theresult of a hash operation performed by the end-user device. At step1232, the service controller processes the verification message toobtain a software identifier. In some embodiments, the softwareidentifier is a credential, such as a program identifier, a name, asignature, a certificate, a hash, or any other identifier that uniquelyidentifies the software. At step 1234, the service controller determineswhether the software identifier matches an entry in a locally-storedlist of valid software identifiers. If the software identifier matchesan entry in the locally-stored list of valid software identifiers, theprocess ends at step 1238, or, in some embodiments, the servicecontroller takes an action (e.g., sends a message to the carrier, sendsa message to the end-user device, initiates a notification to a user ofthe end-user device, etc.). If the software identifier does not match anentry in a locally-stored list of valid software identifiers, then atstep 1236 the service controller takes an action (e.g., generates afraud event, takes a countermeasure such as, for example, blocking theend-user device from the access network, notifies the carrier, sends amessage to the end-user device, etc.).

In some embodiments, one or more agents on end-user device 100 comprisesoftware components that are associated with installed-agentcredentials. In some such embodiments, an agent associated with aninstalled-agent credential cannot be modified, updated, or replacedunless the software purporting to be a modification, update, orreplacement is associated with a credential that matches theinstalled-agent credential. An installed-agent credential may comprisean agent kernel software being present with a proper signature,certificate, or hash result; an agent framework software being presentwith a proper signature, certificate, or hash result; or an agentapplication software being present with a proper signature, certificate,or hash result.

Fraud Detection and Mitigation

In some embodiments, service controller 122 (using, e.g., fraud server129) is configured to detect fraudulent, or potentially fraudulent,activities by end-user device 100. There are several ways servicecontroller 122 can detect fraud, including, for example, by observingwhether service processor 115 exhibits expected behavior; by determiningwhether device-generated usage reports indicate fraudulent use of theaccess network resources; by examining the contents of trusted reports(e.g., reports from a trusted or secure source) of end-user device 100'sdata usage; by comparing contents of non-secure device-based usagereports to contents of trusted usage reports; by comparing end-userdevice 100's usage to expected usage based on population statistics; bydetecting SIM card irregularities that may indicate attempts to stealsponsored services. In some embodiments, service controller 122 obtainsa trusted measure of end-user device 100's service usage and uses thetrusted measure, alone or in combination with another measure, todetermine whether end-user device is properly implementing a policy thatshould be in place.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 applies a policy errordetection procedure to generate a fraud score, wherein the fraud scoreindicates a level of confidence or a likelihood that the analyzedactivity or set of activities is fraudulent. In some embodiments,service controller 122 (using, e.g., fraud server 129) determineswhether data usage by end-user device 100 is fraudulent by using whatmay be called a “layered” or “tiered” approach. In some suchembodiments, service controller applies at least two tests to determinewhether end-user device 100 is behaving fraudulently. In some suchembodiments, a trusted service policy implementation is verified byservice controller 122 by performing at least two of the followingoperations in conjunction with a multi-step service usage analysisprocedure: (a) comparing a trusted access network usage records with theusage limitations expected to be in place if the service policy is beingproperly implemented, (b) comparing a trusted service usage measure to anon-secure (e.g., device-generated) service processor-based serviceusage measure, (c) comparing a first device service processor serviceusage measure against a second device service processor service usagemeasure, and (d) comparing a device service usage measure against apopulation statistic for the device-based service usage measure.

FIG. 41 illustrates an example embodiment of a layered approach thatservice controller 122 (or another suitable network element) can use toassess the likelihood that end-user device 100 (e.g., service processor115) is behaving fraudulently. At step 2750, service controller 122receives a notification from a network element that a data session hasstarted. The notification may be, for example, a “GPRS attach” messagefrom SGSN 2230, or a “data session started” message from GGSN 2240, AAAor RADIUS 2242, or API 2244 (or OCS 2246), etc. Service controller 122sets a timer or waits for some amount of time for service processor 115to authenticate. If service processor 115 fails to start or complete theauthentication procedure at step 2752, then at step 2754, servicecontroller 122 takes an action. The action may be, for example, one ormore of the following: generate a fraud alert, notify a user of end-userdevice 100, notify a network element, notify a network administrator,block end-user device 100 from accessing access network 10, block anapplication on end-user device 100 from accessing access network 10,direct the device to a quarantine network status in which end-userdevice 100 can, for example, only access functions generally controlledby the access network service provider or the central service provider,etc. If service processor 115 successfully completes the authenticationprocedure at step 2752, then at step 2756, service controller 122performs one or more additional fraud tests. At step 2758, servicecontroller determines whether the results of the tests indicate thatend-user device 100 is behaving fraudulently. If the results do notindicate that end-user device 100 is behaving fraudulently, then theprocess ends at step 2760. If the results do indicate that end-userdevice 100 is behaving fraudulently, then at step 2762, servicecontroller 122 takes an action, such as generating a fraud alert,notifying a user of end-user device 100, notifying a network element,notifying a network administrator, blocking end-user device 100 fromaccessing access network 10, blocking an application from accessingaccess network 10, directing the device to a quarantine network statusin which end-user device 100 can, for example, only access functionsgenerally controlled by the access network service provider or thecentral service provider, etc.

FIG. 42 illustrates a layered approach to fraud detection in accordancewith some embodiments. Trusted source 2800 (e.g., a network element, asecure DDR processor on end-user device 100, a third-party, etc.)generates trusted records. In some embodiments, the trusted recordsinclude service usage records. In some embodiments, the trusted recordsalso (or instead) include information from trusted source 2800 about thebehavior of end-user device 100 (e.g., whether service processor 115successfully authenticated with service controller 122, whether serviceprocessor 115 is sending reports or other communications to servicecontroller 122 in an expected manner, whether end-user device 100'susage of one or more classes (e.g., an application, a group ofapplications, a network destination, a group of network destinations,etc.) is consistently slightly under particular limits that wouldindicate likely fraud on the part of end-user device 100, etc.).Non-secure source 2802 (e.g., service processor 115 on end-user device100) generates non-secure records. Trusted source 2800 and non-securesource 2802 send records to record normalization and pre-processing2804. In some embodiments, trusted source 2800 and non-secure source2802 send records to record normalization and pre-processing 2804 atregular intervals. In some embodiments, record normalization andpre-processing 2804 or another element of service controller 122requests records from trusted source 2800 and non-secure source 2802.Record normalization and pre-processing 2804 time-normalizes andpre-processes the trusted and non-secure records, putting the recordsinto a uniform format. The normalized, pre-processed trusted records andthe normalized, pre-processed non-secure records then serve as inputs toa set of N tests, where N is greater than or equal to two. Test 1 2806and Test N 2808 are illustrated in FIG. 42 . Each of the N tests outputsa test result that provides an indication of fraud likelihood. Theresults are inputs to combiner 2810, which processes the test results togenerate a fraud score.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 applies at least two tests,and combiner 2810 generates a fraud score based on the results of the atleast two tests. In some embodiments, service controller 122 applies oneor more of the following tests to determine the fraud score: (a)determining if service processor 115 is failing to send non-trusted(e.g., device-based) service usage reports even though servicecontroller 122 is receiving trusted reports of end-user device 100'sservice usage (b) comparing a trusted service usage measure to a limitor range of usage expected if end-user device 100 is properlyimplementing a service policy that should be in place; (c) comparing atrusted service usage measure to a non-secure (e.g., device-based) usagemeasure to determine if the difference between the two usage measures iswithin a specified tolerance; (d) comparing a non-secure (e.g.,device-based) service usage measure to a limit or range of usageexpected if end-user device 100 is properly implementing a servicepolicy that should be in place; (e) comparing a classification ofend-user device 100 usage to a limit or range of usage expected ifend-user device 100 is properly implementing a service policy thatshould be in place; (f) comparing an aggregation of two or moreclassifications of end-user device 100 usage to an aggregate limit onusage to determine if the difference between the two measures is withina specified tolerance; (g) comparing a trusted measure of usage of aclass (e.g., an application, a group of applications, a networkdestination, a group of network destinations, etc.) to a limit or rangeof usage expected if end-user device 100 is properly implementing aservice policy that should be in place; (h) comparing a trusted measureof usage of a class (e.g., an application, a group of applications, anetwork destination, a group of network destinations, etc.) to anon-secure (e.g., device-based) measure of usage of the same class todetermine if the difference between the two measures is within aspecified tolerance; (i) comparing a statistical characterization ofusage by a population of end-user devices to a trusted measure ofend-user device 100's service usage to determine if the differencebetween the two measures is within a specified tolerance; (j) comparinga statistical characterization of usage of a particular class (e.g., anapplication, a group of applications, a network destination, a group ofnetwork destinations, etc.) by a population of end-user devices to atrusted measure of end-user device 100's usage of that same class todetermine if the difference between the two measures is within aspecified tolerance; (k) comparing a statistical characterization ofusage by a population of end-user devices to a non-secure measure ofend-user device 100's service usage to determine if the differencebetween the two measures is within a specified tolerance; (l) comparinga statistical characterization of usage of a class (e.g., anapplication, a group of applications, a network destination, a group ofnetwork destinations, etc.) to a non-secure (e.g., device-based) measureof usage of the same class to determine if the difference between thetwo measures is within a specified tolerance; (m) comparing detailedclass (e.g., an application, a group of applications, a networkdestination, a group of network destinations, etc.) usage information ina usage report (trusted or non-secure) to determine whether a policythat should be in place allows the classified activity; (n) determiningwhether service processor 115 successfully authenticated with servicecontroller 122; (o) determining whether service processor 115 isreporting (e.g., sending heartbeat messages, device reports, etc.) toservice controller 122 in an expected manner; (p) determining whetherusage of one or more classes (e.g., an application, a group ofapplications, a network destination, a group of network destinations,etc.) is consistently slightly under particular limits that wouldindicate likely fraud on the part of end-user device 100; (q) comparingan amount or percentage of unknown or unclassified data usage allocatedby service processor 115 to a particular class to an expected amount orpercentage of unknown or unclassified data usage, where the expectedamount or percentage is determined using information from a trustedsource (e.g., a web crawler, domain object model, etc.).

The outputs of the N tests may be pass/fail indicators or values (e.g.,integer, binary, real numbers, etc.). In some embodiments in which theoutputs of the N tests are pass/fail indicators, combiner 2810determines a fraud score of “pass” or “fail” (e.g., combiner 2810generates one fraud score (e.g., a discrete value such as 0) if theresult is “pass” and a different fraud score (e.g., a different discretevalue such as 1) if the result is “fail”). In some embodiments, thefraud score is “pass” if each of the N individual test results indicatesthe associated test was passed. In some embodiments, the fraud score is“fail” if at least one of the N individual test results indicates thatthe associated test was failed. In some embodiments, the fraud score is“pass” if at least M individual test results indicate the associatedtests were passed, where M is less than N. In some embodiments, thefraud score is “fail” if M or more individual test results indicate theassociated tests were failed. As will be appreciated by a person havingordinary skill in the art in view of the disclosures herein, there aremany other ways to combine the individual test results and determine thefraud score, and the examples above are not meant to be limiting.

In some embodiments, the output of each of the N tests is a value. Insome embodiments, combiner 2810 performs a linear combination of the Nindividual test results. In some embodiments, combiner 2810 scales oneor more of the N test results before performing a combination (linear orotherwise).

In some embodiments, each output value is between a minimum value and amaximum value (e.g., between 0 and 1, or between values A and B,inclusive, etc.), and the maximum value is associated with a highlikelihood of fraudulent behavior by end-user device 100. In someembodiments, each output value is between 0 and 1, and each output valuerepresents a probability of fraudulent behavior on the part of end-userdevice 100. In some such embodiments, combiner 2810 multiplies theindividual test result values to generate the fraud score. In someembodiments, combiner 2810 applies a weighting factor to one or more ofthe N test results before multiplying them. As will be appreciated by aperson having ordinary skill in the art in view of the disclosuresherein, there are many other ways to combine the individual test resultsand determine the fraud score, and the examples above are not meant tobe limiting.

In some embodiments, a high fraud score is associated with a highlikelihood of fraudulent behavior on the part of end-user device 100. Insome such embodiments, if the fraud score generated by combiner 2810based on the results of N initial tests is greater than (or greater thanor equal to) a threshold, service controller 122 generates a fraudalert. In some embodiments, if the fraud score generated by combiner2810 based on the results of N initial tests, where N is less than themaximum number of tests available, is greater than (or greater than orequal to) a threshold, additional tests are run. In some embodiments,one or more additional tests are added to the set of tests selectedinitially (e.g., the value of N is increased, and additional tests areselected and included). In some embodiments, at least one of the one ormore additional tests is more computationally-expensive than one or moreof the tests in the initial set of N tests.

In some embodiments in which a high fraud score is associated with ahigh likelihood of fraudulent behavior on the part of end-user device100, if the fraud score generated by combiner 2810 based on the resultsof N initial tests, where N is less than the maximum number of testsavailable, is greater than (or greater than or equal to) a threshold, adifferent set of N tests is selected and run. In some embodiments, thedifferent set of N tests includes one or more of the tests run in theinitial set of N tests. In some embodiments, at least one of the testsin the different set of N tests is more computationally-expensive thanone or more of the tests in the initial set of N tests.

In some embodiments, a low fraud score is associated with a highlikelihood of fraudulent behavior on the part of end-user device 100. Insome such embodiments, if the fraud score generated by combiner 2810based on the results of N initial tests is less than (or less than orequal to) a threshold, service controller 122 generates a fraud alert.In some embodiments, if the fraud score generated by combiner 2810 basedon the results of N initial tests, where N is less than the maximumnumber of tests available, is less than (or less than or equal to) athreshold, additional tests are run. In some embodiments, one or moreadditional tests are added to the set of tests selected initially (e.g.,the value of N is increased, and additional tests are selected andincluded). In some embodiments, at least one of the one or moreadditional tests is more computationally-expensive than one or more ofthe tests in the initial set of N tests.

In some embodiments in which a low fraud score is associated with a highlikelihood of fraudulent behavior on the part of end-user device 100, ifthe fraud score generated by combiner 2810 based on the results of Ninitial tests, where N is less than the maximum number of testsavailable, is less than (or less than or equal to) a threshold, adifferent set of N tests is selected and run. In some embodiments, thedifferent set of N tests includes one or more of the tests run in theinitial set of N tests. In some embodiments, at least one of the testsin the different set of N tests is more computationally-expensive thanone or more of the tests in the initial set of N tests.

In some embodiments, one of the N tests indicates whether serviceprocessor 115 successfully completed the authentication procedure withservice controller 122. In some embodiments, a failure of serviceprocessor 115 to complete the authentication procedure with servicecontroller 122 results in a fraud score that indicates end-user device100 is likely behaving fraudulently (e.g., an automatic “fail” or afraud score that indicates a high likelihood of fraud). In someembodiments, the result of one or more tests is a quantized valueassociated with a likelihood of error (e.g., fraud) or a likelihood ofnon-error (e.g., no fraud), and the overall pass/fail criterion is basedon a combination of one or more of the quantized values.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 applies different sets of Ntests at different times. For example, in some embodiments, servicecontroller 122 applies a set of N tests including more computationallyexpensive tests on occasion or periodically. In some embodiments,service controller 122 varies the value of N at various times. In someembodiments, service controller 122 regularly applies a small or modestset of tests, and then occasionally or periodically applies a larger setof tests. In some such embodiments, the larger set of tests includes oneor more tests that are more computationally expensive than tests in thesmaller set (e.g., tests that require processing of flow data records,discussed below).

In some embodiments, if the fraud score indicates a policyimplementation error (e.g., likely fraudulent behavior by end-userdevice 100), service controller 122 takes an action comprising one ormore of: generating a fraud alert; flagging end-user device 100 or auser associated with end-user device 100 for further evaluation;charging for end-user device 100's usage at a pre-determined rateassociated with end-user device 100 being in a fraudulent state;notifying a user of end-user device 100; notifying a networkadministrator; quarantining end-user device 100 or a user's access tothe access network; suspending end-user device 100 or a user of end-userdevice 100 from the access network.

Fraud Detection Based on Service Processor Behavior

Fraudulent or potentially fraudulent activity by end-user device 100 canbe detected by service controller 122 by observing the behavior ofend-user device 100 after service processor 115 has been authenticated.In some embodiments, detecting fraud comprises ensuring that servicecontrol device link 1691 and service control server link 1638 areoperating correctly, and there is no break in a continuous heartbeatauthentication sequence.

In some embodiments, service processor 115 sends periodic or occasionaldevice-based usage data reports (UDRs) to service controller 122. TheUDRs contain information about end-user device 100's data usage. Forexample, the UDRs may indicate how many bytes of data associated with aparticular application, such as a map application, or service, such as amusic streaming service, end-user device used since the last report, orduring a particular time period. In some embodiments, service processor115 sends the UDRs in response to a request from service controller 122.In some embodiments, service controller 122 generates a fraud alert if,after having been authenticated, service processor 115 fails to senddevice-based usage reports when expected or requested by servicecontroller 122, or when service processor 115 sends device-based usagereports at unexpected or improper times. In some embodiments, servicecontroller 122 generates a fraud alert if it receives UDRs from serviceprocessor 115 after receiving a “data session stopped” trigger from anetwork element.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 generates a fraud alert ifservice processor 115 fails to respond as expected to commands issued byservice controller 122. In some embodiments, service controller 122sends a command to service processor 115 and observes a response fromservice processor 115. In some embodiments, when fraud is suspected,service controller 122 instructs service processor 115 to apply andenforce policy modifications. Service controller 122 then observes theresponse of service processor 115 and performs an analysis oninformation sent by service processor 115 to service controller 122 todetermine whether the behavior of end-user device 100 is indicative offraud.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 directs service processor115 to change a setting of end-user device 100. If the setting changeordinarily would cause a deterministic behavior change in the operationof an end-user device that is operating according to an establishedpolicy, service controller 122 may determine that end-user device 100 isoperating fraudulently if service controller 122 does not observe thatend-user device 100's behavior has changed in the expected manner. As anexample, service controller 122 might suspend end-user device 100's useof a sponsored service (i.e., a service for which a sponsor entitysubsidizes an end-user device's access to that service). If end-userdevice 100 continues to use the sponsored service after servicecontroller 122 suspended end-user device 100's use of the sponsoredservice, service controller 122 may conclude that the access isfraudulent.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 changes a parameter to causeend-user device 100 to modify its behavior and potentially also tochange particular settings of end-user device 100. For example, servicecontroller 122 might communicate to service processor 115 a lowermaximum data rate at which end-user device 100 is allowed to send dataover the access network. If end-user device 100 continues to send dataat a rate above the newly-imposed maximum data rate, service controller122 may conclude that end-user device 100 is operating fraudulently. Insome embodiments, parameter changes are constructed, for example, fromrules or by building a reaction model for a user population, where thereaction model learns to distinguish legitimate activity from fraudulentbehavior.

Fraud Detection Using Trusted Usage Measures/Records

Fraudulent or potentially fraudulent activity by end-user device 100 canbe detected by examining trusted measures or records of data usage byend-user device 100. In some embodiments, a network element (e.g.,service usage reconciliation and fraud detect 642 or fraud server 129)examines the content of usage reports from a trusted source to determinewhether end-user device 100 is operating within the policies that shouldbe in place. The usage reports may indicate a variety of information,including, for example, one or more of: a “bulk” measure of aggregatedata usage, destinations accessed, network state (e.g., time of day,network busy state, network congestion state, etc.), type of network(e.g., 2G, 3G, 4G, WiFi, home, roaming, etc.), etc. In some embodiments,the trusted records contain information about end-user device 100's datause associated with a class of service activities, where the class is aparticular application, a group of applications, a particular networkdestination, a group of network destinations, a network type, etc. Forexample, the trusted records may contain one or more of: record starttime, record end time, information identifying the class, the amount ofdata use associated with the class, etc.

There are several possible sources of trusted records, including networkelements, end-user device 100, and third-party sources. Records fromnetwork elements are generally trusted because it is difficult forunauthorized parties to obtain access to the records themselves or thenetwork elements that generate the records, particularly if some or allof the security measures disclosed herein are in place. Examples ofnetwork elements that can produce trusted records are: gateways (e.g.,GGSN 2240, SGSN 2230, PDSN, routers, switches, etc.), a home agent,proxy servers, a charging gateway system, a mediation element (e.g.,mediation 22210), a reconciliation element (e.g., reconciliation server131), a billing element (e.g., central billing 1619, carrier billing139), a AAA element (e.g., access network AAA server 1621), and othernetwork elements.

End-user device 100 can also generate trusted records if it includes asecure device data record (DDR) processor and a secure protocol for thesending of reports from the secure DDR processor to service controller122. The use of secure DDRs is described in detail in U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 13/247,998, which is entitled “Secured Device DataRecords” and is incorporated herein by reference.

Third-party sources can also provide trusted records if measures are inplace to verify the reports. Examples of third-party sources that canprovide trusted records are: partner service destination servers (e.g.,search sites, advertisement sites, application service sites, shoppingsites, content sites, gaming sites, e-mail sites, etc.), enterprisecustomer networks, etc. Third-party sources may provide such informationas usage reports, site visits, transaction reports, ad view reports,economic benefit reports, usage credit increase instructions, etc.

In some embodiments, using data usage reports from a trusted source, anetwork element determines whether end-user device 100's usage, as givenby a trusted usage measure is within a limit or range of usage behaviorexpected if an applicable policy is in place. For example, in someembodiments, the network element determines whether the bulk usage byend-user device 100 is no higher than a maximum amount specified by apolicy that should be in place. In some embodiments, the network elementdetermines whether end-user device 100's use of a particular class(e.g., an application, a group of applications, a network destination, agroup of network destinations, network type, etc.) is within data usagelimits specified in the control policy that should be in place. In someembodiments, the network element determines whether end-user device100's use of a particular class is allowed under the control policy thatshould be in place. As will be now be appreciated by one of ordinaryskill in the art in view of the disclosures herein, there are many waysthat a network element can use information in reports from a trustedsource to verify that end-user device 100 is operating in compliancewith policies that should be in place, and the examples given above arenot meant to be limiting.

Fraud Detection Using Non-Secure Device-Based Usage Measures/Records

In some embodiments, service processor 115 is not capable of generatingand sending secure DDRs. Instead, service processor 115 is capable onlyof generating and sending non-secure records (e.g., UDRs) of end-userdevice 100's data usage. In such cases, an unscrupulous user mightattempt to hack end-user device 100 so that the reports it sends containinformation that is more favorable to the user than it should be, e.g.,by reporting less data usage (either aggregate or of a class) thanend-user device 100 actually used or by reporting data usage that shouldbe accounted as usage under a subscriber-paid service plan as usage of asponsored service. In some embodiments, service controller 122 usesdevice-based usage measures to detect when a user attempts to tamperwith service processor 115 in order to have usage of one servicereported incorrectly (e.g., as usage of a different class, as usage of asponsored service when it is actually part of a subscriber-paid plan,etc.). In some embodiments, service controller 122 compares usagemeasures in device-based (e.g., non-secure) reports to correspondingusage measures in a report from a trusted source.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 generates a fraud alert ifit receives UDRs from end-user device 100, but the UDRs indicateend-user device 100's usage is beyond a charging policy limit. In someembodiments, if service controller 122 receives UDRs from end-userdevice 100, but the charging codes in those UDRs do not correspond tocharging codes for the currently-allowed active services (e.g., thecharging codes indicate that end-user device 100 is using data or aclass for which it is not authorized, etc.), service controller 122generates a fraud alert.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 examines the content ofdevice-based usage reports (e.g., reports generated by service processor115 and sent to service controller 122) to verify that service processor115 is properly classifying services. In some embodiments, servicecontroller 122 determines whether applications being used ordestinations being accessed by end-user device 100 are authorized undera service plan associated with end-user device 100. In some embodiments,service controller 122 examines the content of device-based usagereports to determine whether end-user device 100 imposed a servicecontrol that was supposed to be in place (e.g., a cap on usage; a speedof usage (such as a maximum rate); an amount of usage of background orforeground data; state modifiers such as time-of-day, network busystate, network type (e.g., home, roaming, WiFi, cellular, etc.);quality-of-service limits, etc.).

In some embodiments, service controller 122 examines the content ofdevice-based usage reports to verify that the service usage measuresbeing reported by end-user device 100 are compliant with the accessnetwork policy or policies that should be in place. In some embodiments,service controller 122 determines whether one or more of the followingmeasures are within limits imposed by a policy that should be in place:bulk (e.g., aggregate) usage; usage of a class (e.g., an application, agroup of applications, a network destination (e.g., IP address, domainaddress, etc.), a group of network destinations, etc.);application-specific usage that includes transaction-basedsingle-application service or multi-application service; backgroundusage; foreground usage; usage that is identified by a time-of-day,network-busy-state, quality-of-service, or network-type state modifier;roaming usage; usage associated with specific content (e.g., streamingvideo, streaming audio, etc.); usage based on a specific layer 3/4protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP, and/or a Layer 7 protocol (e.g., IGMP, RTMP,RSTP, etc.)).

In some embodiments in which service processor 115 tracks end-userdevice 100's use of a class (e.g., an application, a group ofapplications, a network destination, a group of network destinations,network type, etc.), service controller 122 examines the content ofdevice-based usage reports to determine whether end-user device 100 isproperly identifying and allocating data usage associated with theclass. As is described in detail in several previous applications listedin the “Cross Reference to Related Applications” section (including U.S.patent publication 2010/0198698, filed Jan. 27, 2010 and entitled“Adaptive Ambient Services”), classifying data usage in the dynamic(e.g., non-static) environment of the Internet can be challenging. Forexample, a class may include access to a particular web site. Serviceprocessor 115 should count, as usage of the class, end-user device 100'saccess to the collection of URLs associated with the web site, but notaccess to other network destinations and/or applications not associatedwith the web site. Although it is possible to create, at any point intime, a comprehensive list of all content associated with the web site,a problem arises whenever the web site changes (e.g., links or URLs arechanged, content from other web sites is included or removed, etc.),because the list of associated addresses/domains and access listpolicies will be inaccurate if it is not updated immediately after thechange.

Several of the patent applications listed in the “Cross Reference toRelated Applications” section of this document, including U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 13/253,013, entitled “System and Method forProviding User Notifications” and incorporated by reference herein,disclose ways to track changes in the Internet to facilitate providing,for example, service plans with different classes, sponsored services,etc. One way to track changes is to use search engine/web crawlertechniques to create and update a catalog of content sources,destinations (e.g., advertisement servers, network domains, etc.) etc.that are associated with a class. As would be understood by a person ofordinary skill in the art, a web crawler is a computer program thatbrowses the web in a methodical, automated way. Web crawlers are alsoknown as ants, automatic indexers, bots, web spiders, web robots, or webscutters. Web crawlers may be used to copy, check, or validate links onweb sites. A web crawler may start with a list of URLs to visit. As thecrawler visits these URLs, it identifies all the hyperlinks in the pageand adds them to the list of URLs to visit. The new list is sometimescalled the crawl frontier. URLs from the crawl frontier are thenrecursively visited according to a set of policies that specify whichpages to visit, how often to re-visit those pages, etc.

The immediate identification and propagation to all service processorsof all changes in every web site associated with every sponsored serviceor every class within all service plans can be difficult. Therefore, insome embodiments, when end-user device 100 engages in service activitiesassociated with a class (e.g., sends or receives data using a particularapplication that is itself a class, or using an application from adefined set of applications comprising a class; or accesses a particularnetwork destination that is itself a class, or accesses a particularnetwork destination that is in a class comprising a set of networkdestinations; or uses a particular network type, etc.), and in thecourse of using data within the class end-user device 100 is directed toa destination that service processor 115 does not know or isunclassified, service processor 115 grants a temporary access “lease.”Under the lease, access to, for example, certain unknown or unclassifieddestinations is allowed (e.g., for a particular amount of data, for aparticular amount of time, etc.) but monitored until the unclassified orunknown application or destination can be reclassified as allowed ordisallowed. A lease temporarily allows unknown or unclassifiedactivities to take place within the class under the theory that suchactivities may be the legitimate result of a change in an Internetdestination included in the class, and, therefore, it would beundesirable to block these activities or to allocate data access costsassociated with them to a “bulk” usage category or to a different classwhen they should be allocated to the class.

Service controller 122 can use information from a web crawler/searchengine (e.g., the crawl frontier) to assess whether service processor115 is likely correctly allocating data usage to particular classes. Insome embodiments, service controller 122 determines whether serviceprocessor 115 is allocating a reasonable amount of unknown orunclassified data usage to the class based on web crawler results. Forexample, if the web crawler results indicate that, at a particular pointin time or on average, approximately 80 percent of content available ator through a particular web site is known (e.g., has a URL that aloneindicates it is part of the class, has a URL that indicates it is froman ad server or another so-called known, benign domain, the content ofwhich is unlikely to be accessed fraudulently by a user, etc.), and 20percent of the content is unknown (e.g., not known to be part of theclass, not a known, benign domain, etc.), service controller 122 maydetermine that end-user device 100 is likely operating fraudulently ifonly 50 percent of the data usage allocated by service processor 115 isknown to be associated with the web site, and the other 50 percent ofthe data usage allocated by service processor 115 to the class isassociated with unknown or unclassified content or destinations. Such aresult may indicate that service processor 115 has been hacked and isimproperly allocating data usage to the class.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 determines whetherdevice-based usage reports indicate that service processor 115 is likelyfraudulently allocating data usage to a sponsored service. For example,in some embodiments, service controller 122 determines how much of thedata usage service processor 115 is allocating to a sponsored service isknown to be associated with the sponsored service and how much is notknown to be associated with the sponsored service. In some embodiments,service controller 122 determines (e.g., based on web crawler or similardata) whether service processor 115 is allocating too much unknown orunclassified data usage to a sponsored service. In some embodiments,service controller 122 assesses whether service processor 115 isproperly granting leases (e.g., by determining whether the leases are ofan appropriate duration, are terminated properly, etc.). In someembodiments, service controller generates a fraud alert if the UDRsindicate that end-user device is improperly classifying disalloweddestinations (e.g., web sites, URLs, etc.) as part of a sponsoredservice.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 compares usage counts incarrier-based usage reports, or usage reports from another trustedsource, to usage counts in UDRs from end-user device 100. In someembodiments, if difference between the usage counts in the two reportsis not within a tolerance (e.g., an amount of data, a percentage, etc.),service controller 122 generates a fraud alert. In some embodiments, ifthe counts in the reports agree, and the charging codes in the UDRs arecorrect, but the UDRs indicate that service processor 115 hasincorrectly categorized (e.g., classified) the data usage, servicecontroller 122 generates a fraud alert. In some embodiments, if thecounts in the reports are in agreement, but the usage rate (e.g., unitsof data per unit of time) within a service component (e.g., a class) orwithin a service activity is greater than a rate limit set by thecontrol policy, service controller 122 generates a fraud alert.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 generates a fraud alert if acomparison between the device-based UDRs and carrier-based (or othertrusted) usage reports indicates that end-user device 100 consistentlyunder-reports its usage of data in a particular class (e.g., anapplication, a group of applications, a destination, a group ofdestinations, etc.). Such underreporting may indicate that serviceprocessor 115 is substituting usage counts from a higher-priced servicefor the counts associated with a lower-priced or sponsored service(e.g., service processor 115 is reporting more usage of the lower-pricedservice and less usage of the higher-priced service). Such “skimming”can occur, for example, within a single service, across multipleservices, across multiple time periods, or in other ways or combinationsof these ways.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 generates a fraud alert ifthe UDRs from service processor 115 indicate that end-user device 100'susage of a service, component, or activity is abnormal when compared toa hard rate limit, such as an allowed usage per hour, day, or week, oran expected rate limit, such as a rate limit imposed on streamingservices.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 compares a usage rate ofend-user device 100 to the “average” end-user device usage rate, whichit determines using a statistical model of usage data associated with aspecific service plan or component of a service plan (e.g., a class) bya population or sub-population of devices. In some such embodiments,service controller 122 performs what is known in the art as a k-nearestneighbor classification, using the usage rate to identify whetherend-user device 100 is potentially behaving fraudulently. As would beunderstood by a person having ordinary skill in the art, the k-nearestneighbor classification may be trained by learning vector quantization(LVQ) using tunable training parameters such as, for example, the timewindow of data usage, usage rate, etc.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 may or may not generate afraud alert upon detecting a particular condition. For example, if theusage counts contained in trusted reports and UDRs from serviceprocessor 115 are in agreement, but end-user device 100's usage rate, interms of units of data per unit of time, deviates significantly from theusage rate of the “average” user, it could mean that service processor115 has been tampered with or otherwise compromised. Alternatively,however, it could mean simply that the usage patterns for that serviceactivity or service component are changing, or that end-user device 100is being used legitimately, but in an unusual manner as compared to howmost end-user devices are used. A change in usage patterns could result,for example, if the service plan to which end-user device 100 issubscribed adds streaming content, such as video or audio, and a user isamong the first to take advantage of the new content. In someembodiments, service controller 122 may simply flag the activity aspotentially fraudulent, or it may wait until it has performed additionalanalysis to make a decision regarding whether service processor 115'sbehavior is likely fraudulent.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 determines a second measureof a network state to confirm that end-user device is reporting thecorrect network state in its charging reports. In some embodiments,service controller 122 (or another suitable network function) obtainsthe network state as determined using a group of devices. In someembodiments, service controller 122 (or another suitable networkfunction) characterizes sub-network portions (e.g., base stations, basestation sectors, geographic areas, RANs, etc.) based on a population ofend-user devices connected to that sub-network portion.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 determines a second measureof device access behavior for a given network state to ensure end-userdevice 100 is implementing the correct controls. In some embodiments,the second measure is from a network element. In some embodiments, thesecond measure is from a secure DDR processor on end-user device 100. Insome embodiments, the second measure is from a second monitor pointwithin end-user device 100. In some embodiments, the second measure is“good customer feedback” from a third party source.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 compares a trusted (e.g.,network-based, secure DDR, or third-party) measure of the device'sservice usage to a device-based (e.g., service-processor-based) measureof the device's service usage. In some embodiments, one or both of thetrusted service usage measures and the device-based service usagemeasures include a classification of service usage based on application.In some embodiments, one or both of the service usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on network destination or networkservice identifier. In some embodiments, one or both of the serviceusage measures include a classification of service usage based onnetwork type (e.g., roaming, home, cellular, WiFi, etc.). In someembodiments, one or both of the service usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on time of day. In someembodiments, one or both of the service usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on QoS class. In some embodiments,one or both of the service usage measures include a classification ofservice usage based on geography. In some embodiments, one or both ofthe service usage measures include a classification of service usagebased on a roaming network.

In some embodiments, a trusted service policy implementation is verifiedby comparing a first device-based service processor service usagemeasure against a second device-based service processor service usagemeasure. In some embodiments, one or both service processor usagemeasures include a classification of service usage based on application.In some embodiments, one or both service processor usage measuresinclude a classification of service usage based on network destinationor network service identifier. In some embodiments, one or both serviceprocessor usage measures include a classification of service usage basedon network type. In some embodiments, one or both service processorusage measures include a classification of service usage based on timeof day. In some embodiments, one or both service processor usagemeasures include a classification of service usage based on QoS class.In some embodiments, one or both service processor usage measuresinclude a classification of service usage based on geography. In someembodiments, one or both service processor usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on a roaming network.

FIG. 43 illustrates an example embodiment of a service controllerreconciliation processing procedure that may be used to detect fraudusing information from an end-user device 100 and information from asecond source. Service processor 115 (not shown) or an application onend-user device 100 (not shown) generates usage measures 2300. Based onusage measures 2300, end-user device 100 sends first usage records toservice controller 122, or service controller 122 requests first usagerecords from end-user device 100. Service controller 122 processes thefirst usage records in device usage record pre-processing 2310. In someembodiments, device usage record pre-processing 2310 modifies the formatof the first usage records to facilitate one or more of service usageprocessing, reporting, analysis, comparison, mediation andreconciliation operations performed within the service controllersystem. In some embodiments, device usage record pre-processing 2310observes the first usage records and time stamps and time synchronizes,time aligns, or time aggregates multiple first usage records so that amore consistent measure of usage with a common time reference can beachieved within the service controller system for one or more of serviceusage processing, reporting, analysis, comparison, mediation andreconciliation purposes. Service controller 122 stores the first usagerecords in device usage records 2320.

A second source (not shown) generates or provides second service usagemeasures 2370. In some embodiments, the second source is a networkelement, such as a mediation element, a gateway, a real-time reportingelement, a charging element, a billing element, or the like. In someembodiments, the second source is a database. In some embodiments, thesecond source is a roaming partner network element. In some embodiments,the second source is an element on end-user device 100 that generatessecure device data records. In some embodiments, the second source is apartner network destination that provides information about customerusage of or transactions with that destination. In some embodiments, thesecond source is an application on end-user device 100.

Based on the second service usage measures, the second source sendssecond usage records to service controller 122, or service controller122 obtains the second usage records from the second source. Servicecontroller 122 processes the second usage records in recordnormalization, time reconciliation and pre-preprocessing 2360. In someembodiments, record normalization, time reconciliation andpre-preprocessing 2360 modifies the format of the second usage recordsto facilitate one or more of service usage processing, reporting,analysis, comparison, mediation and reconciliation operations performedwithin the service controller system. In some embodiments, recordnormalization, time reconciliation and pre-preprocessing 2360 observesthe second usage records and time stamps and time synchronizes, timealigns, or time aggregates multiple second usage records so that a moreconsistent measure of usage with a common time reference can be achievedwithin the service controller system for one or more of service usageprocessing, reporting, analysis, comparison, mediation andreconciliation purposes. Service controller 122 stores the second usagerecords in second source usage records 2350.

Service controller 122 applies reconciliation and verificationprocessing algorithms 2340 to reconcile records in device usage records2320 with records in second source usage records 2350 and to validaterecords in device usage records 2320. Service controller 122 storesinformation based on the results of reconciliation and verificationprocessing algorithms 2340 in data warehouse 2330.

In some embodiments, reconciliation and verification processingalgorithms 2340 reconcile detailed classifications of service usage offof a bulk service usage accounting and onto a finer classification ofservice usage accounting. For ease of explanation, the finerclassifications of service usage accounting are referred to herein as“micro charging data records” or “micro-CDRs.” In some embodiments,reconciliation and verification processing algorithms 2340 accomplishcharging for detailed classifications of service usage by providing adetailed micro-CDR charging code identifier in the micro-CDR usagerecord communicated to the carrier network mediation or billing system(e.g., operator data mediation 2380). In some embodiments,reconciliation and verification processing algorithms 2340 accomplishcharging for a detailed classification of service usage by mediating out(or subtracting) the amount of service usage reported in the micro-CDRfrom the amount of service usage accounted to bulk service usage. Insome embodiments, reconciliation and verification processing algorithms2340 sends charging data records (e.g., CDRs, micro-CDRs, etc.) tooperator data mediation 2380.

In some embodiments, reconciliation and verification processingalgorithms 2340 perform a fraud analysis using information from one orboth of second source usage records 2350 and device usage records 2320.In some embodiments, reconciliation and verification processingalgorithms 2340 compares usage records associated with a specific deviceor user credential from one or both of second source usage records 2350and device usage records 2320 to determine if service usage is outsideof pre-defined service usage policy behavior limits. In someembodiments, reconciliation and verification processing algorithms 2340compares service usage information associated with a specific device oruser credential from one or both of second source usage records 2350 anddevice usage records 2320 to determine if a pre-defined service usagelimit has been reached or exceeded. In some embodiments, reconciliationand verification processing algorithms 2340 compares service usageinformation associated with a specific device or user credential fromone or both of second usage records 2350 and device usage records 2320to determine if the specific device or user is exhibiting a serviceusage behavior that is outside of pre-defined statistical limits ascompared to the service usage behavior of a device or user population.In some embodiments, reconciliation and verification processingalgorithms 2340 stores the results of its fraud analysis in datawarehouse 2330. In some embodiments, reconciliation and verificationprocessing algorithms 2340 sends fraud alerts to operator CRM system2390 (e.g., a carrier fraud processing system, carrier personnel, adevice user, a system administrator, etc.).

In some embodiments, the second usage records comprise information frommultiple other measures or reports. In some embodiments, the secondusage records are based on information, measures, or reports fromend-user device 100. In some embodiments, the second usage records arebased on information, measures, or reports from other end-user devices.In some embodiments, the second usage records are determined based oninformation, measures, or reports from one or more network elements(e.g., a base station, the RAN, the core, or using device-assistedmeans, etc.).

In some embodiments, the second usage records comprise a measure of bulk(e.g., aggregate or unclassified) data usage by end-user device 100. Forexample, in some embodiments, the second usage records comprise a bulkusage report, specific to end-user device 100, generated by the network,by an application service provider, or by a server. In some embodiments,the second usage records are based on information in one or moreprevious reports sent by end-user device 100.

In some embodiments, the second usage records comprise informationassociated with the access network state. In some embodiments, thesecond usage records are determined from network state taggedinformation. In some embodiments, the second usage records compriseinformation from a device data record (DDR), which may indicate thenetwork busy state and the network type. In some embodiments, the secondusage records are determined from DDR network state tagged information.

In some embodiments, the second usage records comprise information fromflow data record. In some embodiments, the flow data record (FDR)reports a detailed level of service usage classification that indicatesservice usage broken down by network source or destination (e.g.,domain, URL, IP address, etc.) and possibly one or more ports andprotocols. In some embodiments, the FDR reports a detailed level ofservice usage classification that indicates usage broken down by deviceuser application or OS application. In some embodiments, the FDR reportsa detailed level of service usage classification that indicates serviceusage broken down by time of day, network congestion state or serviceQoS level. In some embodiments, the FDR reports a detailed level ofservice usage broken down by network type (e.g., 2G, 3G, 4G, WiFi, home,roaming, etc.). In some embodiments, the FDR reports a detailed level ofservice usage broken down by home or roaming network.

In some embodiments, the FDRs are sourced from a network element capableof classifying traffic (e.g., a deep packet inspection [DPI] gateway, aproxy server, a gateway or server dedicated to a given serviceclassification, a good customer feedback source described elsewhereherein, etc.). In some embodiments, the second usage records are derivedfrom a device service monitor. In some embodiments, the second usagerecords are derived from a trusted device service monitor. In someembodiments, the trusted device service monitor is located in a secureexecution environment on the device that cannot be accessed by a user oruser installed application software.

In some embodiments, the second usage records allow service controller122 to determine whether the access behavior of end-user device 100,given the network state, indicates that end-user device 100 isimplementing the correct policy controls. In some embodiments, servicecontroller 122 confirms that service processor 115 is reporting thecorrect network state in its data usage reports. In some embodiments, anetwork element determines the correct network state based on a group ofdevices. The information is reported to service controller 122 oranother suitable network function. Service controller 122 (or othersuitable network function) characterizes portions of the sub-network(e.g., base stations, base station sectors, geographic areas, radioaccess network (RAN), etc.) based on the population of end-user devicesconnected to that sub-network portion. The network element can alsogather network busy-state measures from network equipment, such as frombase stations or by sampling the RAN, to determine the second measure.

In some embodiments, the second usage records provide information abouta cap on the aggregate amount of data usage by end-user device 100.Service controller 122 verifies that the total data usage by end-userdevice 100, as reported in the first usage records, does not exceed thecap. If the first usage records provide data usage amounts forindividual services used by end-user device 100, service controller 122verifies that the sum of the usage amounts for the individual servicesdoes not exceed the cap.

In some embodiments, the network classifies FDRs to known servicecomponents, determines credits of classified usage for each servicecomponent, ensures that the service component usage does not exceedspecified limits (or matches end-user device reports for the component),and checks whether the sum of the components matches the bulk measure.

There are several potentially fraudulent circumstances that may bedetected by service controller 122 using one or more of the embodimentsdisclosed herein, such as the example embodiment illustrated in FIG. 43. In some embodiments, service controller 122 generates a fraud alert ifit receives carrier-based usage reports from a network element and UDRsfrom service processor 115, but the usage counts contained in thereports are not in agreement within a specified tolerance. In order togenerate a fraud alert under these circumstances, in some embodimentsservice controller 122 accounts for unsent usage reports that may stillbe on end-user device 100.

FIG. 44 illustrates an exemplary embodiment with network system elementsthat can be included in a service controller system (e.g., servicecontroller 122) to facilitate a device-assisted services (DAS)implementation and the flow of information between those elements. FIG.44 shows the flow of information to facilitate reconciliation ofdevice-generated data usage records with network-generated (e.g.,wireless network carrier-generated) data usage records associated withan end-user device, such as end-user device 100.

Carrier-generated charging data records (CDRs) or real-time reportingrecords (RTRs) (or other real-time or near-real-time usage recordformats such as, e.g., flow data records (FDRs), batch processed usagerecords, continuous usage record event feeds or SMS formatted usagerecord messages) flow from carrier 2650 (which can be, e.g., a real timereporting system, a network gateway, a network usage charging systemelement, a AAA, an HLR, a billing element, etc.) to load balancer 2652to CDR/RTR filtering element 2654.

In some embodiments, load balancer 2652 selects one of many CDR/RTRprocessing threads that are available in the service controllerinformation processing system. In some embodiments, the processingthread is an asynchronous software or firmware program running on agateway or server CPU. In some embodiments, the processing thread is avirtual machine processing thread that exists in a resource pool ofgateway or server CPUs or virtual machines, which may includegeographically separated or redundant resource pools. As illustrated inFIG. 44 , each processing thread includes the functional steps ofCDR/RTR filtering 2654, JMS queue 2656, CDR/RTR processor 2658 and theinterface to CDR/RTR database 2660. In some embodiments, processingthreads are asynchronous in that they are initiated when load balancer2652 directs one or more CDR/RTR data transfers to the thread andterminated when the processed CDR/RTR information has been processed anddeposited into CDR/RTR database 2660. Note that FIG. 44 shows only oneof potentially many available CDR/RTR processing threads.

CDR/RTR filtering element 2654 selects the records that are associatedwith devices that include a device client that communicates with theservice controller (e.g., the device client can be a service processorconfigured to provide service usage notification updates, on-deviceservice plan purchase or activation with UI options display and userselection actions, device-assisted access control policy enforcement,device-assisted service usage charging policy enforcement,device-assisted service notification messages, etc.). In someembodiments, devices supporting DAS are identified by device credentialsor user credentials that are communicated to the service controller asdescribed herein, where the device credential or user credential aremembers of a device group or user group that is managed by the servicecontroller.

In some embodiments, CDR/RTR filtering element 2654 may be usedadvantageously to quickly receive and acknowledge a CDR/RTR record toprovide asynchronous functionality because of real-time processingrequirements, server processing thread scalability and maintainabilityrequirements, or server processing thread geographic redundancyrequirements. In some embodiments, filtering eliminates unnecessary loadon JMS queue 2656 and/or CDR/RTR database 2660. CDR/RTR filteringelement 2654 places the records from end-user devices known to beconfigured with a device client (e.g., a service processor configured toprovide service usage notification updates, on-device service planpurchase or activation with UI options display and user selectionactions, device-assisted access control policy enforcement,device-assisted service usage charging policy enforcement,device-assisted service notification messages, etc.) that communicateswith the service controller through Java messaging service (JMS) queue2656. In some embodiments, CDR/RTR filtering element 2654 filters outdevice records for devices that may have a form of service processor115, but service processor 115 has not properly authenticated with theservice controller 122. In some embodiments, the device clients that areknown to be configured with a device client that communicates withservice controller 122 are determined by looking up a device credentialor user credential associated with CDRs or RTRs in a device group oruser group management database.

JMS queue 2656 buffers the CDR/RTR information remaining after CDR/RTRfiltering 2654 and allocates one or more CDRs/RTRs to a service usageprocessing thread in CDR/RTR processor 2658. In some embodiments, JMSqueue 2656 is a persistent queue. In some embodiments, JMS queue 2656 isa primary messaging system between service controller applications.

CDR/RTR processor 2658 retrieves the records from JMS queue 2656,transforms the records, and stores them in CDR/RTR database 2660. Insome embodiments, CDR/RTR processor 2658 is an application or a processthread. In some embodiments, CDR/RTR processor 2658 pulls a CDR/RTRrecord from JMS queue 2656, transforms the record, and stores thetransformed record in CDR/RTR database 2660 in one transaction in orderto provide fault tolerance in the case of system failure. In someembodiments, CDR/RTR processor 2658 formats the CDR/RTR information toprovide a common service usage information format to facilitate one ormore of service usage processing, reporting, analysis, comparison,mediation and reconciliation operations performed within the servicecontroller system. In some embodiments, CDR/RTR processor 2658 observesCDR/RTR time stamps and time synchronizes, time aligns, or timeaggregates multiple CDR/RTR reports so that a more consistent measure ofusage with a common time reference can be achieved within the servicecontroller system for one or more of service usage processing,reporting, analysis, comparison, mediation and reconciliation purposes.

In some embodiments, end-user devices capable of DAS reporting (e.g.,devices configured with a device client that communicates with theservice controller, such as service processor 115 described herein)connect periodically or on occasion to usage reporting gateway 2672 toreport their data usages. In some embodiments, DAS reporting informationincludes but is not limited to one or more of user service plan purchaseor activation selection choices, device user service policyconfiguration preference selections (e.g., user-generated service policyassignments for applications, websites, network types, or home/roamingpolicies), DAS service usage reports, DAS device policy state reports,DAS software environment integrity reports, and other reports.

In some embodiments, DAS device usage reports and analytics flow fromcarrier device network 2668 (e.g., devices configured with serviceprocessors 115 that are in communication with the service controller) toload balancer 2670 to usage reporting gateway 2672. In some embodiments,load balancer 2670 selects one of many usage reporting processingthreads that are available in the service controller informationprocessing system. In some embodiments, the usage reporting processingthread is an asynchronous software or firmware program running on agateway or server CPU. In some embodiments, the usage reportingprocessing thread is a virtual machine processing thread that exists ina resource pool of gateway or server CPUs or virtual machines, which mayinclude geographically separated or redundant resource pools. Asillustrated in FIG. 44 , each usage reporting processing thread consistsof the functional steps of usage reporting gateway 2672, JMS queue 2674,report processor 2676, and the interface to usage report database 2678.In some embodiments, usage reporting processing threads are asynchronousin that they are initiated when load balancer 2670 directs one or moreusage reporting data transfers to a thread and terminated when theprocessed usage reporting information has been processed and depositedinto usage report database 2678. Note that FIG. 44 shows only one ofpotentially many available usage reporting processing threads.

Usage reporting gateway 2672 accepts reports from devices configuredwith a device client (e.g., service processor 115 configured to provideservice usage notification updates, on-device service plan purchase oractivation with UI options display and user selection actions, deviceassisted access control policy enforcement, device assisted serviceusage charging policy enforcement, device assisted service notificationmessages, etc.) that communicates with service controller 122 and placesthe reports on JMS queue 2674. In some embodiments, usage reportinggateway 2672 only accepts device reports from device service processors115 that have authenticated with the service controller system (e.g.service controller 122). In some embodiments, usage reporting gateway2672 only accepts device reports from device service processors 115configured with device credentials or user credentials that are membersof a device group or user group that is managed by service controller122. In some embodiments, usage reporting gateway 2672 rejects reportsfrom end-user devices without authenticated service processors. In someembodiments, usage reporting gateway 2672 is an application or a processthread. In some embodiments, usage reporting gateway 2672 quicklyreceives and acknowledges end-user device reports. In some embodiments,usage reporting gateway 2672 provides asynchronous functionality that isadvantageous to support real-time processing requirements.

In some embodiments, end-user device 100 is authenticated before reportsare put onto JMS queue 2674. In some embodiments, JMS queue 2674 is apersistent queue. In some embodiments, JMS queue 2674 is a primarymessaging system between service controller applications.

Report processor 2676 retrieves reports from JMS queue 2674, transformsthe reports, and stores the transformed reports in usage report database2678. In some embodiments, report processor 2676 is an EAI. In someembodiments, report processor 2676 retrieves reports from JMS queue2674, transforms the reports, and stores the transformed reports inusage report database 2678 in a single transaction in order to providefault tolerance in case of system failure. In some embodiments, reportprocessor 2676 formats the device usage report information to provide acommon service usage information format to facilitate one or more ofservice usage processing, reporting, analysis, comparison mediation andreconciliation purposes internal processing and comparison within theservice controller system. In some embodiments, report processor 2676observes device usage report time stamps and time synchronizes, timealigns or time aggregates multiple device usage reports so that a moreconsistent measure of usage with a common time reference can be achievedwithin the service controller system for one or more of service usageprocessing, reporting, analysis, comparison mediation and reconciliationpurposes.

In some embodiments, CDR/RTR filtering 2654, CDR/RTR processor 2658,report processor 2676, and usage reporting gateway 2672 share a host.

In some embodiments, micro-CDR generator 2680 retrieves records fromCDR/RTR database 2660 and retrieves reports from usage report database2678. In some embodiments, micro-CDR generator 2680 determines a serviceusage amount for a micro-CDR service usage classification, assigns ausage accounting identifier to the micro-CDR report that identifies theusage as being accounted to a device user for the device associated witha device credential or user credential, and reports this amount ofservice usage to the carrier network 2666 (in the exemplary embodimentof FIG. 44 , through JMS queue 2662 and FTP or publisher 2664). In someembodiments, micro-CDR generator 2680 determines a service usage amountfor a micro-CDR service usage classification, assigns a usage accountingidentifier to the micro-CDR report that identifies the usage as beingaccounted to a service sponsor, and reports this amount of service usageto carrier network 2666. In some embodiments the micro-CDR for thesponsored service usage report also includes an identifier for a devicecredential or user credential. In some embodiments, the amount ofservice usage accounted for in the micro-CDR is mediated or reconciledoff of a device or user bulk service usage accounting. In someembodiments, micro-CDR generator 2680 sends micro-CDRs to JMS queue2662. In some embodiments, FTP or publisher 2664 retrieves micro-CDRsfrom JMS queue 2662 and pushes the micro-CDRs to carrier 2666.

In some embodiments, fraud analyzer 2682 retrieves records from CDR/RTRdatabase 2660. In some embodiments, fraud analyzer 2682 retrievesreports form usage report database 2678. In some embodiments, fraudanalyzer 2682 retrieves micro-CDRs from micro-CDR generator 2680. Insome embodiments, fraud analyzer 2682 performs a fraud analysis usinginformation from one or more of CDR/RTR database 2660, usage reportdatabase 2678, and micro-CDR generator 2680. In some embodiments, fraudanalyzer 2682 compares usage records associated with a specific deviceor user credential from one or more of CDR/RTR database 2660, usagereport database 2678, and micro-CDR generator 2680 to determine ifservice usage by that device is outside of pre-defined service usagepolicy behavior limits. In some embodiments, fraud analyzer 2682compares service usage information associated with a specific device oruser credential from one or more of CDR/RTR database 2660, usage reportdatabase 2678, and micro-CDR generator 2680 to determine if apre-defined service usage limit has been reached or exceeded by thatdevice. In some embodiments, fraud analyzer 2682 compares service usageinformation associated with a specific device or user credential fromone or more of CDR/RTR database 2660, usage report database 2678 andmicro-CDR generator 2680 to determine if the specific device or user isexhibiting a service usage behavior that is outside of pre-definedstatistical limits as compared to the service usage behavior of a deviceor user population. In some embodiments, fraud analyzer 2682 stores theresults of its fraud analysis in data warehouse 2694. In someembodiments, fraud analyzer 2682 sends fraud alerts to carrier network2666.

Fraud Detection for Time-Based Service Plans

In some embodiments, a service plan in effect for end-user device 100 isa time-based service plan (e.g., access network costs associated with aparticular service or application are not charged to the user, or arecharged to the user at a reduced rate during a particular time period).In some such embodiments, an agent on end-user device 100 detectsfraudulent or potentially fraudulent activities by determining whetherthe time or time zone setting on end-user device 100 is correct orwithin a tolerance. FIG. 45 illustrates an example procedure to detectwhen a user of end-user device 100 attempts to alter end-user device100's use of a time-based service plan by modifying the time setting onend-user device 100.

At step 1060, an agent (e.g., policy control agent 1692, service monitoragent 1696, policy implementation agent 1690, etc.) on end-user device100 obtains the actual time. In some embodiments, the agent obtains theactual time from a trusted source. In some embodiments, the trustedsource is an NTP server. In some embodiments, the trusted source is acell tower. In some embodiments, the agent obtains the actual time basedon information about a cell tower location. In some embodiments, theagent obtains the actual time based on information from a GPS receiver.In some embodiments, the agent obtains the actual time based on ageo-located IP address. At step 1062, the agent compares the timesetting on the device (the device time) to the actual time. At step1064, the agent determines if the difference between the actual time andthe device time is within a tolerance. In some embodiments, thetolerance is set by portal user 102. If the difference is within thetolerance, the process ends at step 1068. If the difference is notwithin the tolerance, the agent takes an action at step 1066. In someembodiments, the action is to generate a fraud alert. In someembodiments, the action is to adjust the time setting on end-user device100. In some embodiments, the action is to use the actual time toenforce a policy (e.g., a control policy, a charging policy, or anotification policy). In some embodiments, the action is to take acountermeasure, such as, for example, to block, delay, rate-limit, orquarantine access to the access network by end-user device 100. In someembodiments, the action is to provide a notification to a user ofend-user device 100. In some embodiments, the action is to send amessage to service controller 122.

FIG. 46 illustrates an example embodiment of a procedure to detect whena user of end-user device 100 attempts to alter end-user device 100'suse of a time-based service plan by modifying the time zone setting ofend-user device 100. At step 1070, an agent (e.g., policy control agent1692, service monitor agent 1696, policy implementation agent 1690,etc.) on end-user device 100 obtains the actual time zone. In someembodiments, the agent obtains the actual time zone from a trustedsource. In some embodiments, the trusted source is an NTP server. Insome embodiments, the trusted source is a cell tower. In someembodiments, the agent obtains the actual time zone based on informationabout a cell tower location. In some embodiments, the agent obtains theactual time zone based on information from a GPS receiver. In someembodiments, the agent obtains the actual time zone based on ageo-located IP address. At step 1072, the agent compares the time zonesetting on the device to the actual time zone. At step 1074, the agentdetermines if the difference between the actual time zone and the devicetime zone is within a tolerance. In some embodiments, the tolerance isset by portal user 102. If the difference is within the tolerance, theprocess ends at step 1078. If the difference is not within thetolerance, the agent takes an action at step 1076. In some embodiments,the action is to generate a fraud alert. In some embodiments, the actionis to adjust the time zone setting on end-user device 100. In someembodiments, the action is to use the actual time zone to enforce apolicy (e.g., a control policy, a charging policy, or a notificationpolicy). In some embodiments, the action is to take a countermeasure,such as, for example, to block, delay, rate-limit, or quarantine accessto the access network by end-user device 100. In some embodiments, theaction is to provide a notification to a user of end-user device 100. Insome embodiments, the action is to send a message to service controller122.

Additional Fraud Detection Techniques

FIG. 47 illustrates a fraud detection approach in accordance with someembodiments. UDRs (e.g., device-based usage records) are provided torule-based detection element 2550. In some embodiments, rule-baseddetection element 2550 includes rules that can be applied to detectfraud scenarios that can be described deterministically. As will now beappreciated by a person having ordinary skill in the art, many of thedetection approaches disclosed herein are amenable to being implementedas rules for use by rule-based detection element 2550. For example, acomparison between a policy that is supposed to be in place andinformation in a usage report associated with end-user device 100,whether the report is device-based or network-based, trusted ornon-secure, etc., can easily be expressed as a rule. Examples ofpotential rules include, but are not limited to: whether end-user device100's bulk usage is below a service plan cap; whether end-user device100's usage of a particular class (e.g., an application, a group ofapplications, a network destination, a group of network destinations,etc.) is below a service plan limit; whether end-user device 100's usageof a sponsored service is compliant with the sponsored service policythat should be in place; whether end-user device 100's usage of aparticular network, network type, quality-of-service class, etc. iscompliant with a control policy that should be in place; whetherend-user device 100 failed the authentication procedure; etc.

In the embodiment of FIG. 47 , rule-based detection element 2550 alsoobtains CDRs. In some embodiments, rules in fraud rules 2510 are eventdriven and are applied to incoming events (e.g., CDRs from the carriernetwork or UDRs from end-user device) in real time or near-real time. Aswill be appreciated by a person having ordinary skill in the art inlight of the disclosures herein, rule-based detection element 2550 mayuse only UDRs, only CDRs, or both UDRs and CDRs.

FIG. 48 illustrates a procedure that rule-based detection element 2550may use to apply rules to detect fraud. At step 2560, rule-baseddetection element 2550 obtains device events or reports, e.g., UDRsand/or CDRs. At step 2562, rule-based detection element 2550 places theobtained device events in working memory. At step 2564, rule-baseddetection element 2550 obtains one or more rules and processes thedevice events using those rules. At step 2566, rule-based detectionelement 2550 determines whether the results of the processing indicate afraud event. If so, then at step 2568, rule-based detection element 2550stores the fraud event in main database 2514. If not, rule-baseddetection element 2550 returns to step 2560 to begin the procedure againwith additional or different records.

As illustrated in FIG. 47 , UDRs are also supplied to static analysiselement 2552, which generates a fraud score upon detecting potentiallyfraudulent behavior by end-user device 100. In some embodiments, staticanalysis element 2552 determines a fraud score using one or more modelsobtained from a statistical modeling element. In some embodiments,static analysis element 2552 compares end-user device 100's serviceusage against a corresponding population statistic for the device-basedservice usage measure. In some embodiments, these population statisticsfor the device-based service usage measures include a classification ofservice usage based on application. In some embodiments, thesepopulation statistics for the device-based service usage measuresinclude a classification of service usage based on network destinationor network service identifier. In some embodiments, these populationstatistics for the device-based service usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on network type. In someembodiments, these population statistics for the device-based serviceusage measures include a classification of service usage based on timeof day. In some embodiments, these population statistics for thedevice-based service usage measures include a classification of serviceusage based on QoS class. In some embodiments, these populationstatistics for the device-based service usage measures include aclassification of service usage based on geography. In some embodiments,these population statistics for the device-based service usage measuresinclude a classification of service usage based on a roaming network.

FIG. 49 illustrates a procedure static analysis element 2552 uses todetermine fraud based on a statistical model in accordance with someembodiments. At step 2588, static analysis element 2552 retrieves UDRsfrom UDR storage 2598 and builds a static classification model. At step2590, static analysis element 2552 delays the UDRs. At step 2592, staticanalysis element 2552 checks the data drift. At step 2594, staticanalysis element 2552 determines whether the data drift is significant.If the drift is not significant, then static analysis element 2552returns to step 2590, and the UDRs are further delayed. If the drift issignificant, then static analysis element 2552 returns to step 2588 andbuilds a new static classification model. At step 2580, static analysiselement 2552 computes the current usage profile for end-user device 100over the reference time period in the UDRs obtained from UDR storage2598. At step 2582, static analysis element 2552 classifies end-userdevice 100's behavior using model 2596. At step 2584, static analysiselement 2552 determines whether end-user device 100's behavior should beclassified as fraudulent. If so, then at step 2586, static analysiselement 2552 stores a fraud score in main database 2514. If, at step2584, static analysis element 2552 determines that end-user device 100'sbehavior should not be classified as fraudulent, then static analysiselement 2552 returns to step 2580 to analyze the next UDRs.

As illustrated in FIG. 47 , UDRs are also supplied to time-seriesanalysis element 2554, which generates a fraud score upon detectingpotentially fraudulent behavior by end-user device 100. As will beappreciated by a person having ordinary skill in the art, a time seriesis a sequence of data points, typically measured at successive timesspaced at uniform time intervals. Time-series analysis comprises methodsof analyzing time series data to extract meaningful statistics and othercharacteristics of the data. A time-series model generally reflects thefact that observations close together in time are more closely related(e.g., correlated) than observations that are further apart. Inaddition, time-series models often make use of the natural one-wayordering of time so that values for a given period are expressed asderiving in some way from past values and not from future values. Insome embodiments, time-series models are used to detect significantchanges in an individual subscriber's usage behavior that might indicatefraud. In some embodiments, a time-series model is used to comparecurrent data usage against a past usage trend or to predict futurepotential fraud based on past usage. A time-series model may model anindividual device's data usage, or it may leverage population orsubpopulation data.

FIG. 50 illustrates a procedure time-series analysis element 2554 usesto determine fraud based on a time-series model in accordance with someembodiments. At step 2608, time-series analysis element 2554 retrievesUDRs from UDR storage 2598 and builds a time-series model (e.g., ahidden Markov model). At step 2612, time-series analysis element 2554delays the UDRs. At step 2614, time-series analysis element 2554 checksthe data drift. At step 2616, time-series analysis element 2554determines whether the data drift is significant. If the drift is notsignificant, then time-series analysis element 2554 returns to step2612, and the UDRs are further delayed. If the drift is significant,then time-series analysis element 2554 returns to step 2608 and builds anew time-series model. At step 2600, time-series analysis element 2554collects a sequence of usage data over a reference time period usingUDRs obtained from UDR storage 2598. At step 2602, time-series analysiselement 2552 computes a distribution of hidden states at the end of thesequence using time-series model 2610. At step 2604, time-seriesanalysis element 2554 determines whether end-user device 100's behaviorshould be classified as fraudulent. If so, then at step 2606,time-series analysis element 2554 stores a fraud score in main database2514. If, at step 2604, time-series analysis element 2554 determinesthat end-user device 100's behavior should not be classified asfraudulent, then time-series analysis element 2554 returns to step 2600to analyze the next UDRs.

Fraud control center 2516 retrieves fraud data from main database 2514and performs one or more of the following functions: an aggregateanalysis of various fraud metrics (events and/or scores) to determinewhether end-user device 100 is likely operating fraudulently;presentation of fraud-related information through a dashboard (e.g., auser interface); and taking an action to mitigate the fraud (e.g.,notify a network administrator of a network resource so that furtherevaluation can take place, increase a billing rate for end-user device100, notify a user of or subscriber associated with end-user device 100of the service agreement violation and, if applicable, increased billingrate, via one or more communication media [e.g., service processor 115,device notification client user interface, text message, e-mail message,voicemail, phone call], throttle or suspend end-user device 100's accessto the access network, throttle or suspend an application's access tothe access network.

FIG. 51 illustrates a fraud detection system that supports rule-basedfraud detection and the application of statistical or time-series modelsin accordance with some embodiments. End-user device 100, equipped withservice processor 115, exchanges network traffic with carrier element2506 (e.g., a AAA server such as access network AAA server 1620, GGSNsuch as GGSN 2240, etc.). Service processor 115 also sends UDRs togateway application server 138. Gateway application server 138 sends theUDRs to EAI server 128. In addition to device-based UDRs, EAI server 128also receives network-based CDRs from RADIUS server 2504. EAI server 128processes the UDRs and/or the CDRs and stores the processed records inmain database 2514 (which may be within database cluster 116). EAIserver 128 also sends some or all of the records to fraud server 129.Fraud server 129 includes fraud rules 2510 and fraud models 2512. Fraudrules 2510 includes one or more rules that fraud server 129 may apply todetermine whether to generate a fraud event, as, for example, describedin the context of FIG. 48 . Fraud models 2512 includes one or moremodels that fraud server 129 may apply to determine whether to generatea fraud score, as, for example, described in the context of Figures SSand TT,

As illustrated in the embodiment of FIG. 51 , offline statistical model2522 retrieves UDRs from main database 2514 and generates models for useby fraud server 129 in determining whether end-user device 100 isoperating fraudulently. In some embodiments, offline statistical model2522 uses population data (e.g., UDRs, CDRs, etc.) to construct groupprofiles for legitimate subpopulations and for fraudulent subpopulationsof end-user devices within the control of service controller 122. Insome embodiments, offline statistical model 2522 identifies sudden orlong-term trends or global behavior shifts and adapts one or more datamodels based on those trends or shifts. In some embodiments, offlinestatistical model 2522 uses on-line learning to refine and train one ormore models.

Fraud server 129 generates fraud events (e.g., fraud alerts) and storesthem in main database 2514. Fraud control center 2516 retrieves frauddata from main database 2514. Depending on the content of the frauddata, fraud control center 2516 may display information about the frauddata on dashboard 2518, which, in some embodiments, includes a userinterface such as a display. In some embodiments, fraud responder 2520takes an action based on the fraud data, such as notifying carrier 2506of fraudulent or potentially fraudulent activity by end-user device 100.

Detection of Fraudulent Use of SIM Cards

End-user device 100 may contain a “sponsored SIM” card or anothercredential that allows the device to use a fixed amount of data,possibly associated with a particular service, at a reduced charge or atno charge to the user. Unscrupulous users may attempt to find ways toincrease their quantity of free or subsidized data usage with sponsoredSIM cards. In some embodiments, service controller 122 detects fraudassociated with SIM cards and takes actions to address the fraud.

Without loss of generality, in the following related embodiments theterms “SIM card” and “SIM” are used to represent a device credentialsource. As would be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art,other device credential sources (e.g., a soft-SIM, a universal SIM, anIMSI source, a wireless modem, a phone number source, an IMEI source, anMEID source, a MAC address source, an IP address source, a secure deviceidentifier source, a device secure communication encryption key source,etc.) can be interchanged with SIM card in many of the embodiments. Forexample, in embodiments in which a SIM card is moved from one device toanother, another type of device credential could be moved instead (e.g.,soft SIM, universal SIM, an IMSI source, a wireless modem, a phonenumber source, an IMEI source, an MEID source, a MAC address source, anIP address source, a secure device identifier source, a device securecommunication encryption key source, etc.). As another example, when auser tampers with a service processor associated with a SIM, the usercould be tampering with a service processor associated with another typeof device credential (e.g., soft SIM, universal SIM, an IMSI source, awireless modem, a phone number source, an IMEI source, an MEID source, aMAC address source, an IP address source, a secure device identifiersource, a device secure communication encryption key source, etc.).There are many other examples where the term “SIM” can be exchanged foranother source of device credentials, with the examples being toonumerous to list and yet evident to one of ordinary skill in the art inthe context of the teachings herein.

In some embodiments, the one or more device credential sources include aSIM card. In some embodiments, service controller 122 can be configuredto recognize which end-user device 100 or service processor 115 the SIMis associated with, use the SIM and device association to look up adesired device portion of a wireless access network service policy, andcommunicate the policy to the appropriate device service processor. Insome embodiments, the two different device portions of a wireless accessnetwork policy are determined according to a device group or user groupservice policy definition that includes one or more SIM credentialsand/or one or more service processor credentials, and these policydefinitions are entered in a virtual service provider work station thatmanages the service controller and/or service processor policies.

In some embodiments, service controller 122 is configured to recognizewhen the SIM card from a first device with a first service processor hasbeen moved to a second device with a second service processor. In somesuch embodiments, service controller 122 is configured to recognizewhich device or service processor the SIM is associated with, use theSIM and device association to look up a desired network portion of awireless access network service policy, and cause the network portion ofa wireless access network service policy to be implemented or enforcedin one or more network service policy enforcement elements. In someembodiments, the two different network portions of a wireless accessnetwork policy are determined according to a device group or user groupservice policy definition that includes one or more SIM credentialsand/or one or more service processor credentials, and these policydefinitions are entered in a virtual service provider work station thatmanages the service controller and/or network service policy enforcementelement policies.

In some embodiments, the one or more device credential sources include aSIM card. In some embodiments, service controller 122 is configured todetect when a device user has moved the SIM card from a first deviceconfigured with a properly configured service processor to a seconddevice that is not configured with a properly configured serviceprocessor. In some embodiments, service controller 122 is configured todetermine that the first device is configured with a properly configuredservice processor and communicate a device portion of a wireless accessnetwork service policy to the appropriate device service processor. Insome embodiments, the device portion of a wireless access network policyis determined according to a device group or user group service policydefinition that includes a SIM credential and/or a service processorcredential, and these policy definitions are entered in a virtualservice provider work station that manages the service controller and/ordevice service processor policies. In some embodiments, servicecontroller 122 is configured to determine that the first device isconfigured with a properly configured service processor and cause afirst network portion of a wireless access network service policy to beimplemented or enforced in one or more network service policyenforcement elements. In some embodiments, service controller 122 isconfigured to determine that the second device is not configured with aproperly configured service processor and cause a second network portionof a wireless access network service policy to be implemented orenforced in one or more network service policy enforcement elements. Insome embodiments, the device portion of a wireless access network policyis determined according to a device group or user group service policydefinition that includes a SIM credential, and these policy definitionsare entered in a virtual service provider work station that manages theservice controller and/or network service policy enforcement elementpolicies.

In some of these embodiments, the differences between the first networkportion of a wireless access network service policy and the secondnetwork portion of a wireless access network service policy can includea difference in network access privileges, a difference in allowablenetwork destinations, a difference in service usage accounting orbilling for “bulk” access, a difference in service usage accounting orbilling for a classification of access, a difference in service usageaccounting rates or billing rates for “bulk” access, a difference inservice usage accounting rates or billing rates for a classification ofaccess, a difference in sponsored (ambient) service accounting orbilling, a difference in service speed or quality, a difference in whichnetworks the device or user has access to, a difference in the serviceusage notification that is provided to the end user, a difference inroaming service policies or permissions or accounting/billing rates, aquarantining of the device or user access capabilities, differencesbetween (e.g., disabling or otherwise modifying) one or more features ofdevice operation, or suspending the device from access to the network.

In some embodiments, a SIM and service processor 115 are associated witha classification of service usage and a corresponding device portion ofaccess network service policy enforcement. Service controller 122 isthen responsible for properly authenticating the proper configuration ofservice processor 115 in association with the SIM in order to determinethe appropriate network portion of network access service policy thatshould be enforced.

In some embodiments, a SIM and service processor 115 are associated withone or more application-specific services wherein the device networkaccess service has policy elements that are specific to a devicesoftware or firmware application. A software or firmwareapplication-specific service can include but is not limited to a servicewith specific policy elements associated with a user applicationprogram; an operating system program, library or function; a backgroundapplication service such as an application update, content caching,software update or other background application service.

In some embodiments, a SIM and service processor 115 are associated withone or more network-destination-specific services wherein the devicenetwork access service has policy elements that are specific to anetwork destination or resource. A network destination or resource caninclude but is not limited to a server, gateway, destination address,domain, website or URL.

In some embodiments, a SIM and service processor 115 are associated withany combination of a device application, network destination orresource; a type of network; a roaming condition (e.g., a home orroaming network); a time period; a level of network congestion; a levelof network quality-of-service (QoS); and a background or foregroundcommunication.

In some embodiments, a SIM and service processor 115 are associated withone or more sponsored services (also referred to herein as ambientservices), wherein a portion or all of the service usage accounting forone or more classifications of service usage are accounted to, chargedto, or billed to a service sponsor rather than the device user or partywho pays for the user service plan. The portion of service that issponsored can be all of the device access or a portion or classificationof the device access. In some embodiments, the classification of thesponsored portion of service (e.g., the identification of the portion ofthe device's use of the access network that should be allocated to theservice sponsor) is accomplished on the device with service processor115. In some embodiments, the classification of the sponsored portion ofservice is accomplished in the network using DPI elements, gatewayelements, server elements, proxy elements, website elements or webservice elements. In some embodiments, the classification of thesponsored portion of service is accomplished with a classificationpolicy implemented by a combination of a service processor on the device(e.g., steering a classification of service to a given network elementvia a re-direction, re-route, or tunnel [e.g. secure SSL, VPN, APN orother tunnel protocol]) and one or more network elements (e.g., DPIelements, gateway elements, server elements, proxy elements, websiteelements or web service elements). In some embodiments, the portion ofservice that is sponsored includes service for one device application ora group of device applications. In some embodiments, the portion ofservice that is sponsored includes service for a network destination orresource, a server or website, or a group of network destinations,servers or websites. In some embodiments, the portion of service that issponsored includes service on a specific type of network. In someembodiments, the portion of service that is sponsored includes serviceon a home network or a roaming network. In some embodiments, the portionof service that is sponsored includes service during a time period. Insome embodiments, the portion of service that is sponsored includesservice for a certain range of network congestion. In some embodiments,the portion of service that is sponsored can include service for acertain range of network QoS. In some embodiments, the portion ofservice that is sponsored includes service for a network background orforeground data communication. In some embodiments, the portion ofservice that is sponsored includes any combination of deviceapplication, network destination or resource, a type of network, aroaming condition (e.g., home or roaming network), a time period, alevel of network congestion, a level of network QoS, and a background orforeground communication.

In some embodiments, a SIM (or other source of user credential or devicecredential, as explained previously) is installed in or present inassociation with a device configured with a device service processorconfiguration that provides access network policy enforcement. In suchembodiments, one or more network elements can implement or enforce anetwork-based portion of access network policy enforcement, and serviceprocessor 115 can be configured to implement or enforce a device-basedportion of access network policy enforcement. In some embodiments, oneor more SIM credentials can be used at least in part to identify thenetwork-based portion of access network policy. In some embodiments, oneor more SIM credentials can be used at least in part to identify thedevice-based portion of access network policy.

In some embodiments that include a SIM module policy association, thepolicy enforcement includes one or more of access control policyenforcement, service usage limit, access accounting policy enforcement,and access service user notification policy enforcement. In someembodiments, the access control policy enforcement includes one or moreof allowing, limiting, blocking, deferring, delaying or traffic shapingdevice network access for “bulk” access (e.g., “not classified” access),or one or more specific classifications of access network serviceactivities. In some embodiments, the access accounting policyenforcement includes one or more of counting an amount of “bulk” (e.g.,“unclassified”) access network service usage, or counting an amount ofaccess network service usage for one or more specific classifications ofaccess network service activities. In some embodiments, the accessservice notification policy enforcement includes one or more ofnotifying an end user when a pre-defined service usage condition occursfor “bulk” (e.g. “unclassified”) access network service usage ornotifying an end user when a pre-defined service usage condition occursfor one or more specific classifications of access network serviceactivities. Examples of specific classifications of access networkservice activities include access by an application or OS function,access to one or more network destinations or network resources (such asa web site, domain, IP address or other address identifier, URL, sockettuple, network server, network route or APN, network gateway or proxy,network content source or sub-network). Additional examples of specificclassifications of access network service activities include deviceaccess to network services with different QoS service levels. In someembodiments, a portion of the policies associated with specificclassifications of access network service are implemented or enforcedwith a device-based service processor, and other portions of accessnetwork service policy are enforced in one or more network-basedelements.

In some embodiments in which one or more network elements implement orenforce a network-based portion of access network policy enforcement anda device service processor is configured to implement or enforce adevice-based portion of access network policy enforcement, one or moredevice SIM credentials are identified and used at least in part todetermine the policies enforced by the network. In such embodiments,service processor 115 can be relied upon to implement or enforce certainaspects of access network service policy that are not implemented orenforced in the network.

In some embodiments, a first portion of access network service policy isdetermined at least in part by one or more SIM credentials and isimplemented by one or more network elements, and a second portion ofaccess network service policy is intended to be implemented by adevice-based service processor, but the SIM is installed in a devicethat is not configured with a service processor capable of implementingthe second portion of access network service policy. In some suchembodiments, a network element identifies whether the SIM is installedin a device that is configured with a service processor capable ofimplementing the second portion of access network service policyintended to be implemented on the device. In some embodiments, theidentification is accomplished by a network system that implements oneor more of the following device configuration detection and networkpolicy selection functions: (1) Identify when a SIM whose credentialsare used at least in part to identify a network-based portion of accessnetwork policy is installed in a device configured to include a serviceprocessor capable of implementing or enforcing a device-based portion ofaccess network service policy, and provision a first network-basedservice policy in one or more network-based policy enforcement elementsthat implement or enforce access network service policy; (2) Identifywhen a SIM whose credentials are used at least in part to identify thenetwork-based portion of access network policy is installed in a devicethat is not configured to include a service processor capable ofimplementing or enforcing a device-based portion of access networkservice policy and implement a second network-based service policy inone or more network-based policy enforcement elements that implement orenforce access network service policy.

In some embodiments, when it is determined that a SIM whose credentialsare used at least in part to identify the network-based portion ofaccess network policy is installed in a device configured to include aservice processor capable of implementing or enforcing a device-basedportion of access network service policy, a network-based service policyprovisioning system provisions a first network-based service policy intoone or more network elements (e.g., programs or sends the policy to oneor more network elements) and also provisions a device-based servicepolicy into a device service processor. In some embodiments, when it isdetermined that a SIM whose credentials are used at least in part toidentify the network-based portion of access network policy is installedin a device that is not configured to include a service processorcapable of implementing or enforcing a device-based portion of accessnetwork service policy, a network-based service policy provisioningsystem provisions a second network-based service policy into one or morenetwork elements, and there is no policy provisioning for a device-basedservice processor.

Such embodiments are advantageous, for example, when a device-basedservice processor is capable of implementing or enforcing a networkaccess service policy that has fine grain classification aspects thatare not otherwise implemented or enforced in the network. For example,in some embodiments a SIM is installed in a first device configurationthat includes a device-based service processor (e.g., service processor115) capable of classifying access network service usage associated withone or more device software applications and enforce a policy for accesscontrol, service limit, access accounting or access service notificationfor that classification. In this case a first set of network-basedaccess network service policies may be provisioned into the networkelements that implement or enforce access network service policy. If thesame SIM is installed in a second device configuration that does notinclude the described service processor capability, a second set ofnetwork-based access network service policies may be provisioned intothe network elements that implement or enforce access network servicepolicy. In such embodiments, the first device configuration can includea trusted access control or service limit policies in service processor115 that determine the network access allowances for one or moreapplications, and the first network service policies are configured tofacilitate this device-based application access control or servicelimitation. In contrast, the second device configuration, having noservice processor, has no trusted access control or service limitationpolicies, and therefore the second network service policies may beconfigured in a manner that allows access only if the service plan orservice account associated with the SIM (or second device or SIM user)includes permissions for “bulk” access, “unclassified” access, or accessthat is classified by the network and not by the device.

In some embodiments, the second network service policies are configuredto modify the classification of network access services in accordancewith capabilities that exist only in the network without the assistanceof a device-assisted classification component.

In some embodiments, the second network service policies include asecond access service accounting or charging rate that is different thanthe access service accounting or charging rate of the first networkservice policies. For example, the method of service accounting orservice charging to the end user in the case where the SIM is installedin a device configuration that includes a service processor capability(e.g., the device is capable of performing service classification,accounting, control or notification functions) can be different than themethod of service accounting or service charging to the end user in thecase where the SIM is installed in a device configuration that does notinclude the service processor capability. For example, if the SIM isinstalled in a device configuration that includes a service processorcapability, a given application (e.g., social networking application,email application, search application, voice application, newsapplication, etc.) might have a first service accounting or chargingpolicy defining a first charging measure (e.g., time-based usage for anapplication, website, content type, service type QoS class; or e.g.,megabyte-based usage for an application, website, content type, servicetype QoS class, etc.) and/or first charging rate (e.g., $X per minute;or e.g., $Y per megabyte, etc.) when the device configuration includes aservice processor capability, whereas when the SIM is not installed in adevice configuration that includes a service processor capability, alltraffic may be rated in the same manner (e.g., time-based ormegabyte-based), potentially with a higher price. In some embodiments,when the SIM is not installed in a device configuration that includes aservice processor capability, the device network access permissions arealtered, or the device's communications may be quarantined or blocked.

In some embodiments, when a SIM is installed in a device with a firstdevice configuration, service processor 115 is configured todifferentially treat one or more classifications of access networkservice activities based on network congestion level, time of day, QoSlevel or background/foreground access (e.g., background content cachingor background upload of device/user analytics, background software or OSupdates, background application/server communications, etc.), but thesame SIM can alternatively be installed in a device without such serviceprocessor capabilities (e.g., a device with a second deviceconfiguration). In such an embodiment, one or more of the network-basedportions of access control or service limitation policy, network-basedportion of accounting or charging policy, or network-based portion ofuser notification policy can be varied depending on whether the SIM isinstalled in a device with the first device configuration or the seconddevice configuration. For example, if the SIM is recognized by thenetwork in association with the first device configuration, a loweraccounting rating or service usage price can be applied to traffic thatis (i) allocated to background status, (ii) is controlled based onnetwork congestion level, (iii) is controlled based on time of day, (iv)is controlled based on a lower QoS classification allowance, etc.,whereas if the SIM is recognized by the network in association with thesecond device configuration, a single, potentially higher accountingrating or service usage price can be applied. In some embodiments, ifthe SIM is recognized by the network in association with the seconddevice configuration the device network access permissions can bealtered, or the device's communications can be quarantined or blocked.

In some embodiments, when a SIM is determined by a network element to beinstalled in a device configuration that includes a service processorservice usage charging capability, one or more network elements areconfigured to zero-rate the device access (i.e., the one or more networkelements will not apply the service usage accounting recorded by one ormore network elements to the user's bill), and user service accountingor charging is turned over to a service controller that receives serviceusage accounting or charging information from the service processor.

In some embodiments, when a SIM is determined by a network element to beinstalled in a device configuration that includes a service processorcapability to route, re-direct or otherwise steer traffic for one ormore service activity classifications to one or more proxygateway/servers, one or more network elements are configured tozero-rate the device access (i.e., the one or more network elements willnot apply the service usage accounting recorded by one or more networkelements to the user's bill), and user service accounting or charging isturned over to one or more proxy gateway/servers configured to accountor charge for device service usage.

In some embodiments, when a SIM is determined by a network element to beinstalled in a device configuration that includes a service processorcapability to route, re-direct or otherwise steer traffic for one ormore service activity classifications to one or more proxygateway/servers, the one or more proxy gateway/servers performadditional traffic access control or service limitation policyimplementation or enforcement for the one or more classifications ofservice usage.

In some embodiments, when a SIM is determined by a network element to beinstalled in a device configuration that includes a service processorcapability to route, re-direct or otherwise steer traffic for one ormore service activity classifications to one or more proxygateway/servers, the one or more proxy gateway/servers performadditional service usage classification for the purpose of service usageaccounting, access control, service limiting or user notification.

In some embodiments, when a SIM is determined by a network element to beinstalled in a device configuration that does not include a serviceprocessor capability to route, re-direct or otherwise steer traffic forone or more service activity classifications to one or more proxygateway/servers, network elements other than the proxy gateway/serversaccount for service usage, potentially at a different rate than when aSIM is determined by a network element to be installed in a deviceconfiguration that includes a service processor capability to route,re-direct or otherwise steer traffic for one or more service activityclassifications.

In some embodiments in which the device configuration includes a serviceprocessor capability to route, re-direct or otherwise steer traffic forone or more service activity classifications to one or more proxygateway/servers, the device routing, re-directing, or steering isaccomplished by routing, re-directing, or steering the device trafficfor one or more service usage classifications to a specific networkdestination or resource associated with the proxy gateway/server. Insome embodiments, the routing, re-directing, or steering is accomplishedusing a secure tunnel through the network. In some embodiments therouting, re-directing, or steering is accomplished with a VPN or APNtunnel.

In some embodiments, a network-based service charging policy system isused in conjunction with a user service agreement confirmation system,wherein the user agreement confirmation system provides confirmationthat the user has agreed to access service usage terms that stipulate afirst rate of access service usage accounting or charging when a SIM isdetected in association with a device configuration that includes aservice processor capability, and a second rate of access service usageaccounting or charging when a SIM is detected in association with adevice configuration that does not include a service processorcapability. In some embodiments, if a user removes or tampers with adevice configuration that includes a service processor capability, or ifa user installs a SIM in a device that is not configured with a serviceprocessor capability, the user service usage billing conditions arechanged. In some embodiments, depending on the device configuration(e.g., with or without a service processor capability), the user isbilled at a different rate for “bulk” service usage, or is billed at adifferent rate for one or more classifications of service usage.

In some embodiments, a network-based service charging policy system isused in conjunction with a user service agreement confirmation system,wherein the user agreement confirmation system provides confirmationthat the user has agreed to access service usage terms that stipulate afirst set of access service privileges when a SIM is detected inassociation with a device configuration that includes a serviceprocessor capability, and a second set of access service privileges whena SIM is detected in association with a device configuration that doesnot include a service processor capability. In some embodiments, if auser removes or tampers with a device configuration that includes aservice processor capability, or if a user installs a SIM in a devicethat is not configured with a service processor capability, the userservice usage permissions are modified. In some embodiments, thismodification can include altering the allowed network destinations,altering the allowed network services, altering the allowed networkresources, quarantining access or blocking access.

In some embodiments the presence of a device service processor incombination with a SIM results in the service controller providingadvantageous network access services to the user. Examples include butare not limited to the sponsored services discussed herein, user-paidapplication-based services (e.g., user-paid services where access forone or more device applications is included in a service allowance withpotentially lower cost than overall internet access), user-paiddestination services (e.g., user-paid services where access for one ormore network destinations or resources is included in a serviceallowance with potentially lower cost than overall internet access),roaming services (e.g., services that aid the user when the device isconnected to a roaming network, such as by informing the user that sheis roaming and asking if she wishes to continue or block roaming serviceusage, up to date roaming service usage indication or cost indication,roaming service rate indications, allowing a user to decide which deviceservice usage classifications he wishes to allow while roaming, etc.),or service usage notification services (e.g., providing the user with anupdate of how much service usage or cost has been incurred, informingthe user of what service plans are available, informing the user when aservice plan sign up may be advantageous to the user based on anactivity or group of activities the user is attempting, or providing theuser with a set of service plan sign up choices that can be selected andpurchased in a device user interface (UI), etc.). In some embodiments,these user services are made possible by the capabilities of the serviceprocessor on the device in conjunction with a specific configuration ofa service controller or other network elements on an access serviceprovider network.

In some embodiments, if the SIM for a first network service provider isremoved from the device and another SIM for a second network or serviceprovider is installed, the user may not have access to the sameservices. In some embodiments, the service processor on the devicedetects that the SIM has been changed and informs the user through adevice user interface (UI) notification that if the user changes SIMS orservice provider networks, the user will lose certain services. In someembodiments, the services that will be lost are listed in a UInotification. In some embodiments the UI notification states that if theuser wishes to regain access to certain services, the user canre-install the original SIM.

The above description is provided to enable any person skilled in theart to make and use the invention. Various modifications to theembodiments are possible, and the principles described herein may beapplied to these and other embodiments and applications withoutdeparting from the spirit and scope of the invention. Thus, theinvention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments andapplications shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistentwith the principles, features and teachings disclosed herein.

The invention can be implemented in numerous ways, including as aprocess; an apparatus; a system; a composition of matter; a computerprogram product embodied on a computer readable storage medium; and/or aprocessor, such as a processor configured to execute instructions storedon and/or provided by a memory coupled to the processor. In thisspecification, these implementations, or any other form that theinvention may take, may be referred to as techniques. In general, theorder of the steps of disclosed processes may be altered within thescope of the invention. Unless stated otherwise, a component such as aprocessor or a memory described as being configured to perform a taskmay be implemented as a general component that is temporarily configuredto perform the task at a given time or a specific component that ismanufactured to perform the task. As used herein, the term ‘processor’refers to one or more devices, circuits, and/or processing coresconfigured to process data, such as computer program instructions.

While various embodiments of the present invention have been describedabove, it should be understood that they have been presented by way ofexample only, and not of limitation. Likewise, the various diagrams maydepict an example architectural or other configuration for theinvention, which is done to aid in understanding the features andfunctionality that can be included in the invention. The invention isnot restricted to the illustrated example architectures orconfigurations, but the desired features can be implemented using avariety of alternative architectures and configurations. Indeed, it willbe apparent to one of skill in the art how alternative functional,logical or physical partitioning and configurations can be implementedto implement the desired features of the present invention. Also, amultitude of different constituent module names other than thosedepicted herein can be applied to the various partitions. Additionally,with regard to flow diagrams, operational descriptions and methodclaims, the order in which the steps are presented herein shall notmandate that various embodiments be implemented to perform the recitedfunctionality in the same order unless the context dictates otherwise.

Although the invention is described above in terms of various exemplaryembodiments and implementations, it should be understood that thevarious features, aspects and functionality described in one or more ofthe individual embodiments are not limited in their applicability to theparticular embodiment with which they are described, but instead can beapplied, alone or in various combinations, to one or more of the otherembodiments of the invention, whether or not such embodiments aredescribed and whether or not such features are presented as being a partof a described embodiment. Thus, the breadth and scope of the presentinvention should not be limited by any of the above-described exemplaryembodiments.

Terms and phrases used in this document, and variations thereof, unlessotherwise expressly stated, should be construed as open ended as opposedto limiting. As examples of the foregoing: the term “including” shouldbe read as meaning “including, without limitation” or the like; the term“example” is used to provide exemplary instances of the item indiscussion, not an exhaustive or limiting list thereof; the terms “a” or“an” should be read as meaning “at least one,” “one or more” or thelike; and adjectives such as “conventional,” “traditional,” “normal,”“standard,” “known” and terms of similar meaning should not be construedas limiting the item described to a given time period or to an itemavailable as of a given time, but instead should be read to encompassconventional, traditional, normal, or standard technologies that may beavailable or known now or at any time in the future. Likewise, wherethis document refers to technologies that would be apparent or known toone of ordinary skill in the art, such technologies encompass thoseapparent or known to the skilled artisan now or at any time in thefuture.

The presence of broadening words and phrases such as “one or more,” “atleast,” “but not limited to” or other like phrases in some instancesshall not be read to mean that the narrower case is intended or requiredin instances where such broadening phrases may be absent. The use of theterm “module” does not imply that the components or functionalitydescribed or claimed as part of the module are all configured in acommon package. Indeed, any or all of the various components of amodule, whether control logic or other components, can be combined in asingle package or separately maintained and can further be distributedin multiple groupings or packages or across multiple locations.

Additionally, the various embodiments set forth herein are described interms of exemplary block diagrams, flow charts and other illustrations.As will become apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art afterreading this document, the illustrated embodiments and their variousalternatives can be implemented without confinement to the illustratedexamples. For example, block diagrams and their accompanying descriptionshould not be construed as mandating a particular architecture orconfiguration.

INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE

This document incorporates by reference for all purposes the followingnon-provisional U.S. patent applications: application Ser. No.12/380,778 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP004), filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitledVERIFIABLE DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICE USAGE BILLING WITH INTEGRATEDACCOUNTING, MEDIATION ACCOUNTING, AND MULTI-ACCOUNT, now U.S. Pat. No.8,321,526 (issued Nov. 27, 2012); application Ser. No. 12/380,780(Attorney Docket No. RALEP007), filed Mar. 2, 2009, entitled AUTOMATEDDEVICE PROVISIONING AND ACTIVATION, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,839,388 (issuedSep. 16, 2014); application Ser. No. 12/695,019 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP022), filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled DEVICE ASSISTED CDR CREATION,AGGREGATION, MEDIATION AND BILLING, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,275,830 (issuedSep. 25, 2012); application Ser. No. 12/695,020 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP024), filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled ADAPTIVE AMBIENT SERVICES, nowU.S. Pat. No. 8,406,748 (issued Mar. 26, 2013); application Ser. No.12/694,445 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP025), filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitledSECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES, now U.S. Pat. No.8,391,834 (issued Mar. 5, 2013); application Ser. No. 12/694,451(Attorney Docket No. RALEP026), filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled DEVICEGROUP PARTITIONS AND SETTLEMENT PLATFORM, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,548,428(issued Oct. 1, 2013); application Ser. No. 12/694,455 (Attorney DocketNo. RALEP027), filed Jan. 27, 2010, entitled DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICESINSTALL, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,402,111 (issued Mar. 19, 2013); applicationSer. No. 12/695,021 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP029), filed Jan. 27, 2010,entitled QUALITY OF SERVICE FOR DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES, now U.S. Pat.No. 8,346,225 (issued Jan. 1, 2013); application Ser. No. 12/695,980(Attorney Docket No. RALEP030), filed Jan. 28, 2010, entitled ENHANCEDROAMING SERVICES AND CONVERGED CARRIER NETWORKS WITH DEVICE ASSISTEDSERVICES AND A PROXY, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,340,634 (issued Dec. 25,2012); application Ser. No. 13/134,005 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP049),filed May 25, 2011, entitled SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR WIRELESS NETWORKOFFLOADING, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,635,335 (issued Jan. 21, 2014);application Ser. No. 13/134,028 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP032), filedMay 25, 2011, entitled DEVICE-ASSISTED SERVICES FOR PROTECTING NETWORKCAPACITY, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,589,541 (issued Nov. 19, 2013);application Ser. No. 13/229,580 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP033), filedSep. 9, 2011, entitled WIRELESS NETWORK SERVICE INTERFACES, now U.S.Pat. No. 8,626,115 (issued Jan. 7, 2014); application Ser. No.13/237,827 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP034), filed Sep. 20, 2011, entitledADAPTING NETWORK POLICIES BASED ON DEVICE SERVICE PROCESSORCONFIGURATION, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,832,777 (issued Sep. 9, 2014);application Ser. No. 13/239,321 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP036), filedSep. 21, 2011, entitled SERVICE OFFER SET PUBLISHING TO DEVICE AGENTWITH ON-DEVICE SERVICE SELECTION, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,898,293 (issuedNov. 25, 2014); application Ser. No. 13/248,028 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP037), filed Sep. 28, 2011, entitled ENTERPRISE ACCESS CONTROL ANDACCOUNTING ALLOCATION FOR ACCESS NETWORKS, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,924,469(issued Dec. 30, 2014); application Ser. No. 13/247,998 (Attorney DocketNo. RALEP038), filed Sep. 28, 2011, entitled COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE WITHSECURE DATA PATH PROCESSING AGENTS, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,725,123 (issuedMay 13, 2014); application Ser. No. 13/248,025 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP043), filed Sep. 28, 2011, entitled SERVICE DESIGN CENTER FORDEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,924,543 (issued Dec. 30,2014); application Ser. No. 13/253,013 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP035),filed Oct. 4, 2011, entitled SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROVIDING USERNOTIFICATIONS, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,745,191 (issued Jun. 3, 2014);application Ser. No. 13/309,556 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP040), filedDec. 1, 2011, entitled END USER DEVICE THAT SECURES AN ASSOCIATION OFAPPLICATION TO SERVICE POLICY WITH AN APPLICATION CERTIFICATE CHECK, nowU.S. Pat. No. 8,893,009 (issued Nov. 18, 2014); and application Ser. No.13/309,463 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP041), FILED Dec. 1, 2011, entitledSECURITY, FRAUD DETECTION, AND FRAUD MITIGATION IN DEVICE-ASSISTEDSERVICES SYSTEMS, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,793,758 (issued Jul. 29, 2014).

This document incorporates by reference for all purposes the followingprovisional patent applications: Provisional Application No. 61/206,354(Attorney Docket No. RALEP001+), filed Jan. 28, 2009, entitled SERVICESPOLICY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND METHOD; Provisional Application No.61/206,944 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP002+), filed Feb. 4, 2009, entitledSERVICES POLICY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND METHOD; Provisional ApplicationNo. 61/207,393 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP003+), filed Feb. 10, 2009,entitled SERVICES POLICY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND METHOD; andProvisional Application No. 61/207,739 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP004+),entitled SERVICES POLICY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND METHOD, filed Feb. 13,2009; Provisional Application No. 61/270,353 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP022+), filed on Jul. 6, 2009, entitled DEVICE ASSISTED CDRCREATION, AGGREGATION, MEDIATION AND BILLING; Provisional ApplicationNo. 61/275,208 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP023+), filed Aug. 25, 2009,entitled ADAPTIVE AMBIENT SERVICES; and Provisional Application No.61/237,753 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP024+), filed Aug. 28, 2009,entitled ADAPTIVE AMBIENT SERVICES; Provisional Application No.61/252,151 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP025+), filed Oct. 15, 2009,entitled SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES; ProvisionalApplication No. 61/252,153 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP026+), filed Oct.15, 2009, entitled DEVICE GROUP PARTITIONS AND SETTLEMENT PLATFORM;Provisional Application No. 61/264,120 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP027+),filed Nov. 24, 2009, entitled DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES INSTALL;Provisional Application No. 61/264,126 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP028+),filed Nov. 24, 2009, entitled DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES ACTIVITY MAP;Provisional Application No. 61/348,022 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP031+),filed May 25, 2010, entitled DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES FOR PROTECTINGNETWORK CAPACITY; Provisional Application No. 61/381,159 (AttorneyDocket No. RALEP032+), filed Sep. 9, 2010, entitled DEVICE ASSISTEDSERVICES FOR PROTECTING NETWORK CAPACITY; Provisional Application No.61/381,162 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP033+), filed Sep. 9, 2010, entitledSERVICE CONTROLLER INTERFACES AND WORKFLOWS; Provisional Application No.61/384,456 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP034+), filed Sep. 20, 2010,entitled SECURING SERVICE PROCESSOR WITH SPONSORED SIMS; ProvisionalApplication No. 61/389,547 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP035+), filed Oct.4, 2010, entitled USER NOTIFICATIONS FOR DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES;Provisional Application No. 61/385,020 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP036+),filed Sep. 21, 2010, entitled SERVICE USAGE RECONCILIATION SYSTEMOVERVIEW; Provisional Application No. 61/387,243 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP037+), filed Sep. 28, 2010, entitled ENTERPRISE AND CONSUMERBILLING ALLOCATION FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATION DEVICE SERVICE USAGEACTIVITIES; Provisional Application No. 61/387,247 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP038+), filed September 28, entitled SECURED DEVICE DATA RECORDS,2010; Provisional Application No. 61/407,358 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP039+), filed Oct. 27, 2010, entitled SERVICE CONTROLLER AND SERVICEPROCESSOR ARCHITECTURE; Provisional Application No. 61/418,507 (AttorneyDocket No. RALEP040+), filed Dec. 1, 2010, entitled APPLICATION SERVICEPROVIDER INTERFACE SYSTEM; Provisional Application No. 61/418,509(Attorney Docket No. RALEP041+), filed Dec. 1, 2010, entitled SERVICEUSAGE REPORTING RECONCILIATION AND FRAUD DETECTION FOR DEVICE ASSISTEDSERVICES; Provisional Application No. 61/420,727 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP042+), filed Dec. 7, 2010, entitled SECURE DEVICE DATA RECORDS;Provisional Application No. 61/422,565 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP043+),filed Dec. 13, 2010, entitled SERVICE DESIGN CENTER FOR DEVICE ASSISTEDSERVICES; Provisional Application No. 61/422,572 (Attorney Docket No.RALEP044+), filed Dec. 13, 2010, entitled SYSTEM INTERFACES ANDWORKFLOWS FOR DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES; Provisional Application No.61/422,574 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP045+), filed Dec. 13, 2010,entitled SECURITY AND FRAUD DETECTION FOR DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES;Provisional Application No. 61/435,564 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP046+),filed Jan. 24, 2011, entitled FRAMEWORK FOR DEVICE ASSISTED SERVICES;Provisional Application No. 61/472,606 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP047+),filed Apr. 6, 2011, entitled MANAGING SERVICE USER DISCOVERY AND SERVICELAUNCH OBJECT PLACEMENT ON A DEVICE; Provisional Application No.61/550,906 (Attorney Docket No. RALEP048+), filed Oct. 24, 2011,entitled SECURITY FOR DEVICE-ASSISTED SERVICES.

1. An end-user device, comprising: one or more modems for enabling thewireless end-user device to communicate over at least a first wirelessaccess network; memory configured to store a first application programconfigured to execute on the wireless end-user device and furtherconfigured to assist the end-user device in accessing one or more dataservices over at least the first wireless access network, a firstapplication credential associated with the first application program, afirst policy comprising one or more first policy instructions to beapplied when the first application program initiates or attempts toinitiate a communication over the first wireless access network; and oneor more device agents configured to detect an attempted installation ofupdate software on the end-user device, the update software purportingto be a modification, update, or replacement of the first applicationprogram, and allow the update software to be installed on the wirelessend-user device.